## Verdict
**ITERATE**

## Claim Checks
- **Scope and big-picture fit:** The plan consistently targets one paid customer, a 4-week activated loop grounded by a prewritten 12-week plan, Telegram plus a Richard-only loopback console, and no auto-send. It explicitly excludes generic deployment, systemd rework, global auth, browser frameworks, and multi-customer infrastructure. This is proportional to the confirmed pilot.
- **Outcome preservation:** The stated outcomes are preserved across Summary, In Scope, AC1–AC16, and Rollback: adaptive 60–90s customer check-in, 30s trainer record, isolated evidence drafting, human edit/approval/send, weekly reporting, four conjunctive KPIs, safety escalation, and human-gated activation.
- **Human approval and isolation:** Principles 1–2, AC1/AC2/AC6/AC9, and R2/R3 establish inactive-by-default onboarding, separate customer identity/storage, no pre-approval sends, and append-only audit events. These are the right invariants, but the send transition is not specified tightly enough to implement AC9 and AC15 without making a safety decision.
- **Metrics and rollback:** The plan identifies a single KPI origin, boundary-value arithmetic tests, disable-first rollback, and a manual outage drill. The metric event types are named, but evaluation-window rules are not; different reasonable implementations could produce different pilot pass/fail results.
- **Representative implementation simulation — adaptive check-in:** The named Telegram, schema, schedule, and grounding touch points establish where work belongs. However, “sleep/condition/performance anomaly” has no predicate/threshold or branch table, so AC3/AC4 cannot serve as a deterministic oracle. The 60–90s and 30s criteria also cannot be established by unit “timing budget assertions” alone because they are human completion-time outcomes.
- **Representative implementation simulation — approve/send:** Distinct draft/final/approval/send events and a shared Telegram/web send path are sound. Missing are the exact approved-version binding and bounded retry rule needed to ensure edits after approval cannot be sent and outage recovery cannot duplicate a send. This is directly required by AC9/AC15, not a request for generalized crash consistency.
- **Representative implementation simulation — loopback console:** O1 and R4 choose the correct minimal architecture: loopback bind, SSH tunnel, and one local owner token. AC8 and the bind refusal test do not explicitly require token rejection on every read/mutation route or a CSRF-resistant mutation mechanism, leaving the owner-only contract under-specified. No global auth framework is needed.
- **File references:** The plan names seven product touch points and a new console, but only generically names docs and no test files. Its Handoff prohibits touching files outside the touch-point list, which conflicts with the required new tests, runbook, ADR, and potentially token-operation documentation. Per the assignment, only the immutable planner artifact was read; all referenced repository files, HANDOFF sections, suite counts, and baseline claims remain unverified rather than assumed.

## Missing Evidence
Definitely missing or materially thin:
1. A deterministic anomaly rule/branch mapping and a real-interface timing verification protocol for AC3–AC5.
2. Unambiguous safety behavior. “Missing consent or safety signal → no draft” can mean either absence of a safety assessment or presence of a safety flag; R9 instead implies a detected flag blocks normal feedback. The allowed owner-only escalation artifact and customer-send prohibition must be explicit.
3. An approval/send state contract binding approval to an immutable final version and defining duplicate-safe handling of retries/ambiguous Telegram outcomes.
4. KPI evaluation semantics: pilot timezone and start/end, scheduled denominator while disabled/withdrawn, satisfaction event selection, operator-time week boundaries/scope, and the cutoff/evidence for “actual renewal.”
5. Owner-token and mutation-request negative acceptance checks for the loopback/SSH-tunnel console.
6. Named test/docs/ADR touch points or an explicit exception to the touch-point restriction.

Unverified by explicit target-only constraint: existence/current behavior of every referenced source file, HANDOFF §6, existing claim semantics, registry validation, and the 75/701/109/776 suite-count claims.

## Approval Boundary
The bounded product scope, anti-scope, four ADR directions, additive loopback-console choice, append-only audit intent, human-gated onboarding, and disable-first rollback are suitable to carry forward. Implementation should not begin from this artifact until the material rule/oracle gaps above are resolved; otherwise executors must invent customer-visible branching, KPI pass/fail semantics, or send-safety behavior. Real-customer enable remains outside autonomous approval and must occur only after Richard reviews evidence for every safety gate. Token rotation, provider-terms/consent alignment, deletion/retention evidence, and the final test-account dry run remain human/operational gates.

## Summary
- **Clarity:** Strong scope and sequence; ambiguous safety-signal wording and unspecified adaptive rules remain material.
- **Verifiability:** Good boundary-value and regression intent; human timing, owner-only access, and send-recovery oracles need explicit procedures.
- **Completeness:** Broadly complete for the pilot; missing KPI-window semantics and an executable tests/docs allowlist.
- **Big Picture:** Excellent proportional fit; no forbidden generic infrastructure is needed.
- **Principle/Option Consistency:** ADR choices align with principles. The file-touch restriction conflicts with required tests/docs, and the safety-signal text conflicts internally.
- **Alternatives Depth:** Adequate for this bounded MVP; rejected options are tied to confirmed scope and risk.
- **Risk/Verification Rigor:** Risks are correctly identified, but the highest-impact send, console-access, and metric risks need deterministic acceptance rules.

## Required Changes
1. Add a compact rule table for normal versus sleep/condition/performance/pain or medical-risk inputs: exact predicates, follow-up fields, maximum branches, and expected output. Define detected medical/eating-risk/drug/extreme-manipulation behavior separately from missing/invalid consent or incomplete safety assessment, including whether an owner-only escalation note may be created and affirming that no normal customer feedback is sendable.
2. Define the minimal approval/send transition: approval references an immutable final event/version; only that version is sendable; edits invalidate prior approval; one persistent send claim/idempotency key exists per approved final and destination; ambiguous Telegram outcomes stop for manual reconciliation rather than automatic resend. Add focused dual-surface/race/retry tests sufficient for AC9 and AC15.
3. Specify KPI calculation policy: timezone; activated pilot interval; scheduled-denominator treatment of disabled/withdrawn days; completed-event deduplication; satisfaction scale and selected event; operator-time inclusions and weekly boundaries; and renewal pass evidence/cutoff. Preserve the four-way logical AND and existing numeric boundaries.
4. Replace automated human-duration assertions with a bounded timed dry-run protocol in the actual test-account Telegram flow (normal and each anomaly class, plus trainer entry), while retaining unit tests for branch count/field selection. State the pass rule for 60–90s and ≤30s.
5. Add minimal console acceptance checks: process refuses non-loopback bind; every evidence/read/edit/approve/send route rejects a missing or wrong owner token; mutation requests are POST-only and CSRF-resistant for the SSH-tunnel/browser usage; no token is exposed in persisted events/logs. Do not add global auth or a framework.
6. Resolve the touch-point contradiction by naming the relevant existing/new test files and concrete runbook/ADR paths, or explicitly permit colocated tests and the listed safety/ops documents outside the product touch-point list. Clarify that operational token rotation does not require committing a secret.