## Summary

Reviewed planner artifact `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.gjc/_session-019f8518-dc3d-7000-a5ca-df57d336fdf6/plans/ralplan/019f8518-dc3d-7000-a5ca-df57d336fdf6/stage-08-planner.md` against `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.gjc/_session-019f8455-334a-7000-99ca-318dfd0e06b1/specs/deep-interview-dual-coach-single-customer-pilot.md`; reviewed artifact binding: SHA-256 `7d24213a3618045787d0c5666e7b9766cdcaf613315e12f34a5f232eabf92275`, Planner stage_n 8. The plan otherwise preserves the bounded one-customer, four-week pilot and its safety/acceptance boundaries, but an inverted safety-signal gate is a confirmed contradiction that makes normal-day feedback impossible.

## Claims

- The planner remains scoped to one external paid customer, KRW 150k bank transfer, a 12-week plan with only the first four-week daily/weekly loop active, and a minimal loopback console; it explicitly excludes the forbidden broad deployment, auth, framework, and multi-customer work (planner Summary, Principles, In Scope, Out of Scope).
- Its acceptance set covers the required customer-visible and safety outcomes: onboarding gate, isolation/mis-send test, timed adaptive check-in and trainer record, approval-only sending, loopback review/edit/approve/send, weekly summary, conjunctive KPI judgment, privacy procedures, provider terms, outage recovery, and regressions (planner AC1–AC16).
- The existing grounded-draft contract rejects an unsafe snapshot when `parsed.safety_signals` is present and rejects missing AI consent (`customer_grounding.py:39-41`). This is the correct safety predicate.
- No product mutation, tests, lint, or formatting were run, as required for this read-only planning review.

## Analysis

### Spec compliance

The plan correctly reconciles the one-customer correction, mandatory private operator screen, four-week activation boundary, human-approved sends, KPI conjunction, and named deferrals. Its loopback-only stdlib console and focused HTTP integration/manual browser QA are proportionate to the bounded pilot rather than an unrequested dashboard redesign.

However, the planner says an evidence draft is blocked when "consent or safety signals are absent" in In Scope and repeats a hard block on "missing consent or safety signals" in the grounding touch point; AC7 likewise says "missing consent or safety signal → no draft." Read literally, a normal check-in with no safety signal can never receive a draft or the required short confirmation. That contradicts the spec requirement that normal days generate short feedback and conflicts with the inspected existing implementation, which blocks on a safety signal being present.

### Architecture and synthesis

The existing registry, customer-scoped schedule claims, customer grounding, append-only store, and exact-address coordinator show that the selected additive boundaries are implementable for this pilot. The planner also keeps approval audit events and the loopback screen on the same send path, avoiding a parallel auto-send path.

The narrow correction is sufficient: draft generation must proceed only when AI consent is granted and no safety signal is present. When a safety signal is present, it must hold normal feedback and create the stated human-review/professional-referral path. The targeted tests must cover both the valid normal case and the safety-hold case. No broader Hermes, production authentication, browser framework, generic concurrency, or deployment changes are warranted.

### Antithesis

A maximally conservative reading that blocks whenever signals are absent might appear safer, but it removes normal-day feedback entirely and cannot satisfy AC10. It is a fail-closed implementation of the wrong predicate, not a safety improvement.

## Root Cause

A natural-language predicate inversion ("safety signals are absent" rather than "a safety signal is present") was propagated into scope, the grounding change description, AC7, and the focused-test wording. It conflicts with both the approved pilot behavior and the existing primary grounding contract.

## Findings

- **HIGH — Correct the inverted safety-signal draft gate.** `stage-08-planner.md` In Scope, File-Level Changes (`customer_grounding.py`), AC7, and Focused Verification. The stated absence-based gate would suppress all normal-day drafts and therefore violates the required normal-day short confirmation. Replace it with: block when consent is missing/not granted **or a safety signal is present**; the latter produces a human-review/referral hold. Add explicit tests for (1) granted consent plus no safety signals yields a draft and (2) any safety signal yields no normal draft plus the hold/escalation. Reported as P1.

## Recommendations

1. Amend the four safety-gate references before implementation: In Scope, the `customer_grounding.py` touch point, AC7, and Focused Verification.
2. Retain all remaining boundaries and acceptance criteria unchanged; they are appropriately bounded for this MVP.

## Architectural Status

BLOCK

## Code Review Recommendation

REQUEST CHANGES

## Tradeoffs

- **Correct present-signal hold (recommended):** permits approved normal-day drafts and holds only unsafe records; matches the spec and existing `customer_grounding.py` contract.
- **Current absence-signal hold:** prevents normal-day feedback, fails AC10, and provides no usable pilot loop.