## Summary
Reviewed only immutable revision `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.gjc/_session-019f8523-2088-7000-84b9-de6e6ccef8fd/plans/ralplan/019f8523-2088-7000-84b9-de6e6ccef8fd/stage-09-revision.md` at SHA-256 `f77047e8e91ce63d217be0da719a10aee52cc0922cfbd0eee40d7cf9a916ef4f`, against the specified deep-interview source spec. The stage-8 HIGH blocker is resolved: the safety predicate is consistently consent absent/not granted **or safety signal present**, with normal drafts permitted only for consented, unflagged records and flagged records held, escalated, and never sent.

## Claims
- The revision remains bounded to one external paid customer, a written 12-week plan, and a four-week daily/weekly pilot; its anti-scope list excludes the prohibited platform, auth, framework, deployment, and multi-customer expansion.
- The source contract already returns no grounded draft when `safety_signals` is non-empty or AI consent is not granted (`checkin_cli/customer_grounding.py:39-41`). Revision Principles 7, In Scope, the grounding owner map, sequencing step 4, AC7, AC17, and focused verification now match that predicate.
- The revision corrects the prior executable gaps without broadening scope: canonical events are assigned to `models.py` and existing `EventStore.append_wizard_event`, adaptive and trainer flows to `wizard.py`/`wizard_models.py` and gateway render/routing owners, trainer identity is exact-address bound, and the due-task source owns the four-week weekday-only/monthly-dormant boundary.
- Concrete source evidence supports those owners: current `models.py` owns `EventType`/`Event`; `store.py` provides locked, deduplicated `append_wizard_event`; `customer_schedule.py` currently emits daily, weekly, and monthly tasks; `customer_coaching.py` currently contains only customer/owner addresses; and `telegram.py` owns current scheduler delivery and owner draft rendering.

## Analysis
### Spec compliance
The revision preserves every active source-spec obligation: inactive gated onboarding, per-customer isolation, token rotation/test-account mis-send check, adaptive 60–90 second weekday check-in, trainer’s ≤30 second record, human-only approval and sending, Telegram plus Richard-only private loopback screen, weekly summary, the four-way KPI conjunction, privacy/provider terms procedures, manual fallback, and personal-flow regressions. AC1–AC20 provide testable acceptance for the user-visible and safety-critical additions.

The earlier stage-8 blocker is directly corrected rather than hidden by fallback behavior. AC7 and AC17 distinguish the consented/no-signal draft case from absent-consent and present-signal holds; the latter explicitly requires a hold reason, zero customer send, human review, and professional-referral guidance. This both permits required normal-day short feedback and prevents unsafe automatic handling.

### Architecture
The selected reuse seams are proportionate to the one-customer pilot. Existing event locking/deduplication is reused rather than introducing a generic storage path; reporting remains a projection of the customer event stream. The new console is deliberately loopback-only, token-protected, and constrained to the same approval/send path as Telegram. The planner names the actual owners for trainer ingress, adaptive rendering, delivery callbacks, typed events, and schedule projection, so the stage-8 strict owner-map impossibility is resolved.

The pilot boundary is explicit and observable: only weekday daily/weekly tasks are emitted within the active KST window, monthly work is suppressed at the source, and automation stops after day 28 absent an explicit extension. Trainer ingress is similarly bounded to one registry-bound exact Telegram triple with customer/foreign refusal tests. Stopwatch and loopback HTTP checks make the timing and console requirements observable without requiring an unrequested framework.

### Antithesis and synthesis
A broader dashboard/auth/deployment redesign could add generic defenses, but it conflicts with the declared four-week, single-customer constraint and is not necessary for the stated private loopback surface. Conversely, retaining the former absence-based safety gate would make normal feedback impossible. The revision chooses the minimal safe middle path and attaches it to explicit acceptance tests.

## Root Cause
The prior blocker was a natural-language inversion of the safety-signal condition. This revision normalizes the condition across scope, owner map, sequence, acceptance, verification, risk, and ADR text, matching the inspected primary grounding contract.

## Findings
No blocking findings. No CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW issue was confirmed within the requested bounded review criteria.

## Recommendations
1. Proceed with the ordered implementation and retain the AC7/AC17 three-case predicate tests as the activation gate.
2. Keep real-customer activation disabled until the stated safety bundle and test-account dry run pass.

## Architectural Status
CLEAR

## Code Review Recommendation
APPROVE

## Tradeoffs
- **Selected:** stdlib loopback console plus local token and shared Telegram approval/send path; meets the private operator-screen requirement with minimal pilot surface.
- **Rejected:** generic dashboard/auth/deployment redesign; outside the bounded MVP and unnecessary for the specified loopback-only operator workflow.