# Task27 bounded-pilot release verdict ## Verdict **GO for one explicitly consenting bounded pilot customer only.** This report authorizes a controlled handoff for candidate `d1109d8f78aaccf949ec4f664d9e62584c3cca33032030518bc3e2d712239112`. It does not itself activate a customer, start a service, contact Telegram or a provider, send a message, change a profile, commit, push, or release code. Every customer-facing action still requires its existing permission-sealed preflight and explicit owner/operator action. Delivered artifact: `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.omo/evidence/task26/task26-combined-v38-delivered-st_01a019d7` The delivered root passes its sealed independent verifier and frozen bootstrap directly, without regenerating or replacing its retained postfreeze seal. ## Exact candidate and seals - Candidate: `d1109d8f78aaccf949ec4f664d9e62584c3cca33032030518bc3e2d712239112` - Hermes wheel: `f8b3c779c58435dd33f8f9bbc89e9823bd09f81367a27366c6d678270c1860b1` - Profile wheel: `a56da2417df0912f3fe407c0b78befd7362207d1c8a35271000af46701ba79d2` - Corrected Ty wheel: `932d4552233cfbaa325ddc3db5982150a37f437cf94a332eb3869052148bfe4c` - Prefreeze seal: `257498e6aa2db7107ee24223a29b09f2e26c3d493869dc21206688be24b037b9` - Postfreeze seal: `3002d815d7523c2971c990544d92c1f0d16fd51781f83d9d636ef6336b5878f6` - Delivered-bundle seal: `54be54cf89720057486596a21941ec5d456a1c54148f66dbde0475503a752f67` - Receipt seal: `52b7de2d30d99f38db6f73ad70ebe9a21c99449348f069cf3d1f29f5cab745c8` - Qualification ledger: `.omo/start-work/ledger.jsonl:169` - Six-lane review: `.omo/start-work/ledger.jsonl:170` ## Privacy and authority architecture - Customers and the owner/operator remain distinct private-DM identities. No shared customer group is part of the pilot. - Trainer-free v1 is preserved: neither delivered runtime wheel exposes a trainer role, route, authority, or customer-data path. - The protected controller is the only capability-issuance path. Capabilities bind the exact candidate, product, authority snapshot, owner, customer route, card, generation, and expiry. - Activation, service startup, capability issue, complete Telegram update processing, background recovery, background generation, scheduled transport, and provider transport are externally authorized under shared leases. Revocation-first performs zero mutation/send; operation-first makes revocation wait until the authorized operation completes. - The event-driven `dnotify_signalfd_v1` watcher performs eventual disconnect with one watched directory and zero inotify watches. - Every live advisory completion path sets `store=false`. - Source and installed local-socket receipts use a real PTB/HTTPX loopback connection, record zero external traffic, deliver one post-revocation update from the server, and show zero handler entries and mutations. ## Automated qualification All results are sealed to this candidate: | Gate | Result | |---|---:| | Actual isolated profile qualification | 749 passed | | Focused Task26 | 306 passed | | Expanded Task26 | 76 passed | | Parser source | 204 passed | | Parser installed | 204 passed | | Related lifecycle | 131 passed | | Full Gateway | 8,552 passed, 0 failed | | Direct-URL attacks | 32 passed | | Ty target attacks | 14 passed | | Final-state/materializer focused suite | 119 passed | | Background authority: nutrition/controller/Telegram | 324 passed | | Runtime/Ty/startup authority | 53 passed | | Golden/final-state authority | 116 passed | | Delivered-bundle verifier suite | 106 passed | | Hands-on profile/seal scenarios | 126 passed | | Hands-on authority/Telegram scenarios | 50 passed | | Hands-on controller scenarios | 19 passed | | Ruff and scoped Ty | PASS | Direct delivered-root commands also passed: ```text python -I verification-tools/independent_verify_candidate.py => TASK26_INDEPENDENT_CANDIDATE_PASS python -I verification-tools/task26_frozen_bootstrap.py => TASK26_FROZEN_BOOTSTRAP_PASS => ACTUAL_INSTALLED_GOLDEN_PATH_PASS ``` Hermetic Ty uses the sealed Python 3.12.9 interpreter and exactly one `--python-version 3.12`. It reports 809 diagnostics outside the nine selected transport/capability spans and zero diagnostics inside those spans. ## Real-surface evidence The retained, authorized synthetic rehearsal used the intended Telegram surfaces: - Synthetic customer Telegram user/chat `8527916639`, customer `task22_dm_rehearsal`, session `rb_f4L9siIlDP-R6IF27GwxdA`. - Task24 recorded one customer-DM delivery with provider message ID `157`, one `sent_audited` receipt, and one synthetic customer DM. - Task25 archive `2009ac177177839cefddb98f285e27fa`, digest `644d74b05bc8115f9e3aeeba035188da195a7de18f1bc737648931d64bf43bcf`, retains 23 verified scopes including customer/owner state, activation journals, the exactly-once receipt, and cleanup evidence. - Evidence: - `.omo/evidence/dualcoach-task-24-live-terminal-evidence.json` - `.omo/evidence/dualcoach-task-25-evidence-index.json` - `.omo/evidence/dualcoach-task-25-evidence.json` - `.omo/evidence/dualcoach-task-25-live-terminal-evidence.json` No new live Telegram or provider action was needed or performed during Task26. ## Exactly-once proof - Golden source and installed lifecycles each contain one transport call, one `sent_audited` delivery, one customer-surface receipt, consumed capability state, and duplicate rejection. - Unknown provider outcome consumes authority and is not retried. - The historical Task24 receipt records exactly one synthetic customer-DM delivery. - Capability claim is atomic and precedes provider I/O under the delivery lock. ## Recovery and adversarial scenarios The sealed candidate covers: - update-first and revocation-first ordering; - background recovery, generation, scheduled transport, capability issue, and provider transport revocation races; - cancellation and error cleanup; - reconnect and Telegram polling-conflict reauthorization; - authority tamper/unavailability; - stale, duplicate, wrong-actor, expired, and unknown-outcome delivery paths; - genuine parse ambiguity, later-field revision, and stale field-zero rejection; - preview/production isolation; - approved-card projection failure before capability issue; - forward cleanup resumption from `copied_verified`; - direct-URL external/VCS/editable/wrong-hash substitutions; - Ty target omission, duplication, wrong version, and semantic drift; - delivered-root missing, regenerated, substituted, extra-file, symlink, writable-mode, stale-path, and absent-receipt attacks. ## Cleanup state - The rehearsal customer is disabled and nonconsenting. - Delivery is disabled by default. - Gateway is inactive/dead and no scheduled jobs remain. - Delivered, receipt, and prefreeze roots are `0500`; files are `0400`. - All three roots have zero writable paths and zero symlinks. - Original, rehydrated, hostile-CWD, tamper, watcher, socket, authority, and review temporary runtimes were removed. - Final scans show zero Task26 process, FD, watcher, socket, runtime, pending, unknown, or orphan residue. ## Independent reviewer verdicts All six Task26 lanes passed on the same delivered candidate: | Lane | Verdict | |---|---| | Objective and constraints | PASS | | Code quality | PASS | | Security and safety | PASS | | Hands-on QA | PASS | | Release provenance | PASS | | Trainer-free privacy and authority | PASS | Receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-v38-final-six-lane-review.json` ## Pilot scope The initial rollout is limited to: 1. one explicitly consenting pilot customer; 2. private customer and owner/operator DMs only; 3. no shared customer group; 4. one candidate: `d1109d8f...39112`; 5. daily owner/operator review during the observation window; 6. no expansion until the observation window is clean. No automatic customer activation, delivery, or service start is authorized by this report. ## Immediate disable and rollback criteria Disable the pilot and stop further delivery immediately on any: - candidate, wheel, authority, profile, delivered-seal, or receipt mismatch; - owner/customer identity or private-route mismatch; - missing, expired, reused, duplicate, or wrong-actor capability; - unknown provider outcome, duplicate delivery, missing `sent_audited` row, or surface-receipt mismatch; - revocation that does not fence ingress/background/transport work; - watcher, socket, process, FD, pending, unknown, orphan, or writable residue; - provider call without `store=false`; - unexpected external network destination; - profile source drift or qualification-test regression; - capability-surface Ty diagnostic; - failed daily owner/operator review. Rollback is fail-closed: stop the gateway, disable delivery and the pilot customer, revoke the candidate authority, archive the terminal receipts, and require a new immutable candidate plus the full qualification and six-lane review before resuming. ## Residual risks - Integrity is deterministic and owner-permission sealed, not externally signed or WORM against a privileged host administrator. - The 809 Ty diagnostics outside the selected transport/capability spans remain technical debt; this report does not claim whole-module Ty cleanliness. - Current real-network proof is the retained authorized synthetic Telegram rehearsal; Task26 added real loopback PTB/HTTPX revocation evidence without contacting Telegram or providers. - A bounded pilot still depends on explicit customer consent, daily owner review, trusted-host operation, and the existing permission-sealed preflight.