I read this as a production recovery and minimal-fix task - I’ll authenticate the activation and delivery state read-only, reproduce the missing-card path, then apply or invoke the smallest verified recovery.


I read this as a live Task23 delivery repair - trace the launcher path, make the smallest verified correction, then send one pinned synthetic-DM card only.


I found the publication gap: activation only durably reserved an informational notice; neither gateway startup nor a profile cron job drained it as the reusable launcher. I also detected and am containing one unbound local wizard draft created by an earlier diagnostic call; it has no Telegram message, binding, callback use, or delivery.


I read this as an implementation and controlled recovery request - I am validating the exact startup and launcher contracts, then will make the smallest tested change and use only the authorized adapter path.


The runtime is correctly profile-scoped; the defect is the absent trigger, not `HERMES_HOME`. I also confirmed that invoking the existing tick unchanged would drain the unrelated prepared completion notice before the card, producing two DMs, so I am isolating that side effect before any delivery.


The supported recovery is already present: a profile-scoped cron job with `inline_card: nutrition-coaching-tick` invokes the live gateway adapter and the per-customer delivery ledger provides exactly-once protection. The only missing state is that job; I am proving the supported job API can provision it before creating it, and will terminalize the unrelated prepared notice through its store API so it cannot become a second DM.


The public cron API accepts a schedule string, not a parsed object; my disposable probe caught that boundary before any live mutation. I am rerunning it with the actual API shape and validating the single enabled-customer set and the notification’s supported pre-provider terminal transition.


The provisioning and suppression transitions both passed disposable API probes, and the focused adapter/ledger tests pass. I am now subscribing to the scheduled-delivery ledger, then creating and immediately triggering the one profile-scoped launcher job; no restart, raw Bot API call, or customer callback interaction is involved.


The mutation completed, but the filesystem watcher could not allocate an inotify watch and exited before observing the send. The provider path was not retried or duplicated; I am using the durable ledger and gateway journal with a bounded state wait to observe the already-triggered job, then will pause it after the one authorized recovery delivery.


The ledger did not receive a delivery receipt within the bounded recovery window, so no card was sent and I am not re-triggering the job. I am inspecting the job outcome and the live adapter’s scheduler inputs to isolate the failed gate before any further mutation.


The live scheduler did fire twice, but `send_inline_card` was disabled before the delivery ledger, so Telegram was never called. I am stopping the failing recovery job now, then tracing why the running adapter lacks the nutrition coordinator despite the independently verified registry authority.


The profile configuration contains the correct nutrition feature flags, so the failed scheduler run exposed a stale gateway initialization state rather than an eligibility or routing defect. The job is paused; I am reproducing coordinator initialization with the exact loaded Telegram configuration, then will perform a controlled restart only after confirming no other startup recovery queue can publish.


I read this as a controlled Task23 recovery - the adapter initializes cleanly from the live profile, while the service is actively polling; I will trace the scheduler's loss of the adapter error and inspect the live process logs/config path before proposing any restart.


I read this as an investigation before any disruptive recovery - the failure is now narrowed to a boolean-only scheduler bridge that discards `SendResult.error`; I will identify the adapter's exact tick result and whether startup pinned a provider-preflight error, without triggering another card.


I read this as root-cause isolation - the live adapter passed its capability gate, so its coordinator and bot were present; I will trace the pre-reservation tick branches and validate their imports/authority read-only to locate the only remaining failure class.


message: WebSocket error

stop_reason: error


I read this as a safe dry-run diagnosis - no provider path has been reached, so I will execute the tick's real pre-provider logic with its reservation replaced by an in-memory audited receipt, which proves the failing branch without altering any ledger or sending a message.


I read this as the Task23 repair - the exact failure is now proven: the ready fence exists but its required `scheduled-deliveries.jsonl` ledger does not, so the tick returns `schedule delivery fence unavailable: FileNotFoundError` before reservation or Telegram. I will locate the supported ledger-initialization API and its contract, then initialize only that empty schedule store and re-run the no-send preflight.


I read this as a targeted runtime repair - the public initializer validates the existing ready fence but does not create its omitted empty ledger, so I will inspect the missing-file contract and its tests before making any durable change.


I read this as correcting the diagnosis - the schedule ledger safely treats both absent paths as an empty store, and direct reads pass; the `FileNotFoundError` is inside the tick's broader planning block. I will execute its individual planning calls with tracebacks to identify the exact absent authority artifact.


I read this as a source-level fix, not a profile mutation - the daily card is blocked by optional reminder planning: its missing event-lock and risk-policy prerequisites are correctly insufficient for a reminder but must not prevent an independent authorized daily launcher. I will add a focused regression test, then isolate reminder planning so it fails closed only for reminders.


I read this as completing the smallest safe code change - the existing scheduled-card test already uses a real customer coordinator, so I will convert it into the regression by relying on the absent optional reminder state, then update only the tick's planning boundary.


I read this as implementing the isolated-reminder boundary - I will patch the tick so only base due-work and ledger integrity can block a daily delivery, while unavailable reminder authority simply yields no reminder; the revised test will prove the daily card still sends.


I read this as regression coverage for the repair - the daily/weekly task planning and ledger guard remain fail-closed, while the optional reminder branch is isolated; I will now update the existing real-coordinator test to exercise the missing lock/policy condition.


I read this as verification of the targeted fix - the regression now uses the exact absent optional artifacts seen in Task23; I will run it with the relevant scheduler tests and static diagnostics before any live retry.


I read this as preparing the controlled live recovery - the focused tests pass, and the fix is not loaded by the running gateway; I will verify all startup recovery queues and the cron API's one-shot semantics before restarting or re-enabling anything.


I read this as final restart safety validation - there is one bootstrap ledger to classify and no enabled cron jobs; I will confirm that ledger is terminal and use a true one-shot inline-card job rather than briefly re-enabling the old minute-based job.


I read this as a no-send live-profile diagnostic - I will exercise the repaired daily branch with all reservation, lifecycle, and transport effects held in memory.


I read this as controlled gateway activation - the no-send diagnostic reached the only daily recipient and simulated a complete audited lifecycle, so I will recheck live queues and restart with all cron delivery still disabled.


I read this as post-restart health verification - the replacement process is profile-scoped with no runnable delivery queue; I will await its explicit Telegram connection or startup failure event before arming the one-shot.


I read this as a blocked restart diagnosis - the replacement process did not emit a connection event within the bounded window, so I will inspect its live state and logs without arming any delivery.


I read this as one-shot delivery staging - the live gateway connected at 08:27:49 KST from the updated source; I will create a future-dated, repeat-once inline-card job through the profile cron API, leaving the prior recovery job paused.


I read this as final pre-trigger validation - the only enabled job is the staged repeat-once launcher; I will revalidate recipient authority and empty durable delivery state, then subscribe to its ledger transition before triggering it.


I read this as the authorized one-shot send - all gates still resolve only to task22's due daily card; I will trigger it once through the profile cron API while awaiting the exact durable `sent_audited` ledger event.


I read this as a delivery safety interruption - the host cannot allocate another inotify watch, so the watcher was never armed and the launcher was never triggered; I will pause the future job before its scheduled time and switch to a bounded exact-ledger-state wait.


I read this as the revised one-shot send - the job is safely paused and no delivery exists; I will subscribe to the exact durable ledger state in a bounded watcher before triggering it, then pause/remove any residual job after `sent_audited`.


I read this as post-trigger outcome diagnosis - the bounded watcher returned but terminal cleanup raced its residual-job pause assertion; I will inspect the durable ledger and cron state before taking any further action.


I read this as delivery verification - the one-shot job cleaned itself up after its first run; the durable schedule receipt is `sent_audited` with Telegram message ID 127, while the cron wrapper reports failure only because it also surfaced the pre-terminalized activation notice.


I read this as completed authorized delivery - I delivered one Task23 synthetic check-in card and verified its durable receipt.

- Delivered only to `task22_dm_rehearsal` DM `8527916639/0`.
- Durable ledger: `sent_audited`, reservation `087046cc272444a0b4bd19cbde050c31`, Telegram message ID `127`.
- Ledger body contains the `오늘 체크인 시작` check-in card copy; no Task24 entries.
- One-shot job removed itself; prior recovery job remains paused; no cron jobs are enabled.
- Gateway restarted and is active/polling from the updated source.

The cron wrapper output says `inline-card send failed` because it also reports the separately terminalized activation notice as a failure. The delivery ledger proves the card itself completed `prepared -> sending -> delivered -> sent_audited` with provider receipt `127`.