I read this as an offline, endpoint-specific compatibility repair - I’ll inspect the prior diagnosis and adapter contracts, add focused regression tests, implement the minimal audited capability gate, then run the required local verification.


I read this as an evidence-backed compatibility implementation - the prior omission was deliberate for ChatGPT Codex, while the later structured-output change reintroduced the unsupported field; I’ll now pin that distinction with failing offline tests before changing the adapter.


I read this as implementation repair - complete the red tests, then run focused verification.


I read this as final verification and authorization reporting - inspect the sealed evidence for the exact child pins, then close without live changes.


I read this as completed offline compatibility repair - the transport contract is implemented and verified.

- Codex `chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex`: preserves strict `text.format`, omits unattested `max_output_tokens`, and puts the 256-token limit in the instruction contract.
- Generic OpenAI Responses: retains `max_output_tokens`.
- HTTP 400s now carry only redacted diagnostics and classify as nonretryable; no request/customer/model prose is persisted.

Verification: focused tests 10 passed; related suite 514 passed; Ruff passed; offline wheel build passed.

Task23 pins: consumed authorization for child `e2f07f9a41431ff1`, parent `664046dbca210afc` generation 6 / digest `9bc0920c5be80a312ab04f3cbb4f75a4d69cbee967ed9bddd402959ea7347454`.

No new authorized child is justified: the sealed authorization is consumed, the existing child is terminal, and its contract explicitly forbids retry or further children. No live state was changed.

Note: project-wide `ty` still reports unrelated existing diagnostics outside these changed ranges.


I read this as a controlled Task23 authorization implementation and publication - inspect the existing journal, lineage, callback, and deployment seams before creating the single pinned approval card.


I read this as a test-first authorization seam - add a red contract for the new terminal parent before implementing its isolated journal and callback route.


I read this as callback hardening - add the gateway callback contract so the approved card can only record authorization and never start generation.


I read this as live preflight only - validate the fresh journal’s exact parent and source pins before publishing any Owner card.


I read this as publish-surface completion - add the constrained operator script that can claim, reseal, publish, and verify the card without any generation path.


I read this as safe deployment gating - determine whether activating the new callback would risk retrying the already-terminal parent before any service restart or card send.


I read this as type-cleanup of the new sealed boundary - resolve only the diagnostics introduced by the authorization implementation, without changing its contract.


I read this as implementation and controlled publication - completed the single card and verified its sealed no-generation state.

Published exactly one Owner-DM authorization card for parent `e2f07f9a41431ff1` (Telegram message `144`).

Verified:
- Codex contract pins strict `text.format` and omits `max_output_tokens`.
- No model-provider call, child append, or customer delivery occurred.
- Gateway restarted and is active with the callback route loaded.
- Focused tests: `145 passed`; Ruff, `ty check`, diff check, and offline wheel build passed.