I read this as a release-gate security/privacy audit of the exact fixed candidate and its canonical evidence - I’ll identify the candidate/evidence chain, verify every listed fail-closed and privacy invariant without modifying product code, then issue a decisive PASS/FAIL and write a redacted 0600 Task26 receipt if the repository convention supports it.


I read this as locating the authoritative release artifact before judging controls - the working directory is an evidence/orchestration root rather than a Git checkout, so I’m narrowing to its canonical Task25/26 evidence and the referenced candidate repository instead of treating unrelated session logs as evidence.


I read this as binding the review to the release’s declared source and runtime lineage - I found the canonical Task24/25 chain and will now verify its pinned candidate, live deployment digests, exact control evidence, and post-cleanup preservation rather than relying on summary claims.


I read this as separating control correctness from provenance correctness - the summaries support the intended behavior, but the full candidate manifest predates Task23/24 source changes, so I’m testing whether a later seal closes that gap and independently inspecting the exact callback, authority, request-seal, trainer-free, delivery-gate, and cleanup implementations.


I read this as validating the two remaining high-risk seams: whether the Task22 trainer-removal receipt truly supersedes Task21’s earlier trainer topology, and whether Task24’s post-preflight lineage fix plus live send are sealed into one immutable candidate/evidence graph.


I read this as distinguishing “trainer authority absent in durable state” from the stronger required claim “no trainer membership/marker/route/data access” - I’m checking the trainer-removal transaction and current v1 loader boundaries directly, because the canonical Task22 summary alone does not prove every one of those subclaims.


I read this as finishing the candidate-level code audit while treating missing live membership proof as a separate evidence defect - the v1 coordinator constructs no trainer routes, but the release still needs an authenticated post-removal topology receipt and a complete candidate seal.


I read this as closing the immutable-evidence review before issuing the verdict - Task23-25 indexes are self-consistent and private, while Task22’s canonical summary is older and less protected; the decisive blocker remains that no one manifest binds the current security-relevant source, harness, tests, and dirty-tree snapshot.


I read this as validating the current bytes without confusing test success for provenance - 81 focused contract/CAS/schema tests pass, but the integration test was marker-deselected, so I am running that isolated network-disabled disposable-profile path explicitly once.


I read this as separating behavioral confidence from release evidence - the current offline contract suite passes, but the exact integration harness fails after cleanup because its required regenerable draft no longer exists; I am recording that together with the unsealed-tree and staff-membership proof gaps in the private Task26 receipt.


I read this as a stricter scope check against the plan’s literal v1 invariant - beyond provenance, the current candidate still defines and persists `trainer_handoff` review data and retains callable trainer-oriented coordinator scaffolding, so this is a candidate-bound release blocker even though the active registry builds no trainer route.


I read this as a final Task26 security/privacy verdict - report release blockers and the remediation required for a candidate-bound PASS.

# Verdict: FAIL — release blocked

## Findings

1. **HIGH — Trainer-free v1 invariant is violated**
   - The current candidate defines, generates, and serializes `trainer_handoff` data:
     - `nutrition_coaching_proposal.py:42,110,125,141`
     - `nutrition_coaching_proposal_validation.py:419,462`
     - `nutrition_coaching.py:8927`
   - It also retains trainer coordinator and Telegram scaffolding, including `_send_coach_trainer_handoff` and trainer launcher/callback methods.
   - The archived v1 draft ledger contains **3 nonempty `trainer_handoff` fields**.
   - Active v1 configuration constructs no trainer routes, and no trainer delivery or unauthorized disclosure was observed. Nevertheless, this fails the explicit requirement for no trainer marker, review, safety path, data, or implementation scaffolding.

   **Remediation:** replace trainer-specific data with Owner-only safety notes; remove or exclude trainer methods, fields, and sender logic from the v1 closure; migrate active projections forward; rerun Tasks23-25.

2. **HIGH — Exact candidate is not immutably bound**
   - Worktree: 178 dirty/untracked entries.
   - Current NUL-framed status digest:
     `ae78c0f38c66cf104c9f71ba4acc845e6daf09b9edf5f31a858da14ac74e2ce0`
   - Existing Task23 evidence pins older successor, Telegram, and test bytes.
   - Task24 preflight pins current `telegram.py` but older harness/integration bytes.
   - Task24 lineage repair pins current coordinator/integration bytes but another older harness.
   - No complete later manifest binds the current runtime, scripts, tests, package inputs, and status snapshot.

   **Remediation:** freeze one exact tree, produce a complete transitive manifest, and rerun all affected gates against that single digest.

3. **MEDIUM — Current Task24 integration proof is not reproducible**
   - Focused contracts: **81 passed**, with the integration test deselected.
   - Explicit network-disabled integration run: **1 failed** before handler execution because the cleaned profile had no current regenerable draft.
   - This is a fixture/lifecycle verification defect, not evidence of an unauthorized send.

   **Remediation:** construct an immutable pre-clean Task24 fixture in the disposable sandbox, then run the exact current real-handler matrix once.

4. **LOW — Task22 evidence permissions**
   - Task22 index and markdown are `0664`; Task23-25 canonical evidence is `0600`.
   - The enclosing evidence directory is `0700`, so current exposure is limited.

## Controls successfully substantiated

- Synthetic customer was outside the scoped staff chat.
- Owner-only callback authority, nonce/render binding, and generation CAS are implemented.
- Stale, repeat, and wrong-role actions produced no extra durable mutation or send.
- Request/schema binding and untrusted-input fencing are present.
- Exactly one synthetic delivery occurred; restart produced no duplicate.
- Cleanup records disabled delivery/customer state, inactive runtime, no jobs/processes/orphans.
- Archive hashes and owner-only permissions match canonical evidence.

No product, profile, service, Telegram, provider, delivery, archive, or Git action was performed.

Receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-security-privacy-review.redacted.json`
Mode: `0600`
SHA-256: `0b5986b53080dd07705fb7a49f297d367d8e4c95be48d574c0e41b6c63831ba2`


I read this as defining the repair worker’s executable security contract, not performing the repair - I’ll inventory every trainer-bearing v1 surface, define immutable fixture/archive rules and permission gates, then check whether a candidate-bound repair checkpoint already exists.


I read this as turning the plan language into fail-closed gates rather than an advisory checklist - the initial scan confirms the repair must cover substantially more than `trainer_handoff`, including live Telegram dispatch, coordinator APIs, onboarding projections, role whitelists, prompts, and adaptive trainer-data fields.


I read this as establishing the immutable adjudication boundary now - no repair checkpoint is present yet, so the verdict remains FAIL while I persist a private JSON contract that the eventual checkpoint must satisfy atomically.


I read this as establishing the repair acceptance contract and holding FAIL until an exact checkpoint satisfies it - the machine-checkable inventory is now sealed.

Created:

`/.omo/evidence/task26/task26-trainer-free-v1-acceptance-inventory.json`

- Mode: `0600`
- SHA-256: `31f1118c224285e7ddf82c2901c3885a2eda105d882f763ed8c113cd909eb56f`
- Source edits: **0**
- Repair checkpoint observed: **no**
- Current verdict: **FAIL**

The inventory requires:

- Zero trainer-bearing fields, serializers, validators, prompts, methods, callbacks, launchers, projections, routes, configuration, data, or wheel/runtime scaffolding.
- Static and dynamic v1 closure manifests with exact candidate binding.
- Historical trainer artifacts quarantined outside the runtime closure.
- Forward-only trainer-free successor projection while preserving the original Task25 archive hashes.
- Immutable pre-clean fixture independent of the live profile, with network-disabled real-handler execution.
- Task22 canonical files at `0600`, unchanged bytes and hashes, with `.omo/evidence` at `0700`.
- All previous DM isolation, Owner-only authority, callback/CAS, schema, redaction, exactly-once delivery, cleanup, and archive-integrity controls rerun without regression.

Any closure match, fixture dependency on live state, mixed candidate pin, test failure, or permission/hash drift remains a decisive FAIL.


I read this as the checkpoint-triggered security adjudication - I’ll authenticate the sealed inventory, report, standalone source/build graph, then independently execute only offline/read-only security gates and keep repository-wide quality results separate.


I read this as authenticating the claimed standalone boundary before trusting its PASS label - the report itself matches the sealed inventory context, but it is explicitly readiness-withheld and omits several mandatory inventory leaves, so I’m checking the implementation and adjacent Task26 receipts directly rather than promoting the report.


I read this as testing whether the standalone package actually closes the sealed controls, not merely whether its narrow tests pass - source hashes currently match the report, but the implementation already lacks card/render/check-in/draft-digest binding and durable transport receipt persistence, so those are candidate-level security concerns to verify against the artifacts and tests.


I read this as separating narrow closure successes from security completeness - the zero-trainer package boundary looks genuine, while the fixture, callback, and delivery models do not yet encode several mandatory authorities; I’m now rerunning the claimed offline toolchain and probing those exact fail-closed boundaries.


I read this as a security re-audit - I authenticated the standalone candidate, exercised its offline controls, and separated package quality from security acceptance.

# SECURITY_REPAIR_FAIL

## Authenticated

- Sealed inventory: `31f1118c224285e7ddf82c2901c3885a2eda105d882f763ed8c113cd909eb56f`
- Closure report: `38e46c52f71274ebfe9d46a662efd37f1d8efcefe13e61c81b5835b2e2a50452`
- Both files are `0600`; Task26 directory is `0700`.
- Standalone source digest: `f89626050d0f9640cf33b92af03affaa7868323031598c042f97b9be287e23ea`
- Fixture manifest/state: `99fa9f...` / `0d7a8b...`
- Rebuilt wheel twice offline, byte-identical:
  `7a3734f38be4377c5061c5e3505c38aa1d1f6f0811223ddedb9c75ca9e0063e0`
- Wheel has exactly nine reported members, zero trainer matches, and its installed entrypoint passed.

## Decisive security-only blockers

1. **No inventory-compliant checkpoint or immutable candidate graph**
   - The report explicitly says `readiness: WITHHELD`.
   - It omits the mandatory candidate manifest, status snapshot, closure manifest, retained production wheel, migration/fixture receipts, verification receipts, and Task22 binding.
   - The later provenance record is explicitly `NO-GO`.
   - Standalone files and tests remain untracked and unbound.

2. **Persisted state fails open**
   - Startup accepted a draft containing a trainer-bearing route field and an event containing a trainer role.
   - Nested draft/event records do not enforce exact key/value schemas.
   - This fails `TFV1-SERIALIZER-001` and `TFV1-VALIDATOR-001`.

3. **Draft, card, and transport bindings are incomplete**
   - `revision_binding_digest` is only syntax-checked, not recomputed.
   - A modified body was approved and sent under the unchanged revision/digest.
   - There is no card/render identity, check-in revision, or request fingerprint binding.
   - Any nonempty sender receipt marks delivery audited, but the receipt and its destination/body/event binding are not persisted.

4. **Cleanup does not fence an in-flight delivery**
   - A deterministic event-driven probe showed cleanup returned `inactive` with zero sends, followed by one send and `sent_audited`.
   - `_finish_delivery` does not recheck active state after transport completion.

5. **Fixture and required real-handler proof are absent**
   - The fixture manifest does not bind the successor archive, source archive hashes, or migration receipt.
   - No candidate code references the authenticated successor projection.
   - Tests use an injected `Sender`; there is no bubblewrap network-isolated Telegram/provider-bound real-handler matrix or required callback/card/event counts.

6. **Standalone closure is not established as the production v1 closure**
   - The narrow package and wheel are trainer-free.
   - However, no checkpoint replaces or disables the inventory’s required production roots. The existing production closure report still records 281 forbidden matches.
   - This is a security closure blocker, not a repository-wide quality finding.

## Passing controls

- Exact Owner address authorization, distinct customer DM, stale generation/revision rejection, duplicate rejection, and lock-protected normal CAS passed.
- Task22 canonical hashes, `0600` modes, `0700` parent, and indexed child hashes/modes passed.
- Successor projection has three mapped records, private modes, and zero forbidden matches, but is not candidate-bound.
- Standalone quality lane passed independently: **15 tests**, Ruff, Ty, AST/compile checks, reproducible build, wheel scan, installation, and entrypoint execution.

No product/evidence edits, live/profile/service operations, network access, delivery, or Git mutations were performed.


I read this as final Task26 verification - I’ll authenticate the sealed checkpoint and candidate first, then run only its declared offline security gates and write one private verdict receipt.


# SECURITY_REPAIR_FAIL

Candidate `c3b1ea...f95` and checkpoint authenticated without drift. Passing controls included:

- 15 unit/security tests; cleanup fence passed
- 2 bwrap integration tests
- Zero runtime/wheel forbidden matches
- Reproducible wheel and installed entrypoint passed
- Fixture, successor hash chain, Task22 permissions, CAS, authority, and privacy checks passed

Decisive blockers:

1. Build executable and candidate-seal test are absent from the immutable candidate graph.
2. Four unbound bytecode cache files can participate in source-based bwrap execution.
3. Bwrap “real-handler” card/acknowledgement/draft counts are test-local counters, not production-handler outcomes.
4. Fixture embeds successor hashes but is not deterministically derived from authenticated successor records.

Receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-final-security-privacy-reaudit.redacted.json`
Mode: `0600`
SHA-256: `09caa96a9b9e832048b5c17ccc107951173cfc15d70537b1420007ec26221958`

No product, live profile, service, network, provider, delivery, or Git actions were performed.


I read this as the final Task26 adjudication - I’ll authenticate checkpoint v2 and candidate `96e1…678e` first, then rerun every sealed security gate, explicitly retest the four prior blockers, and write one private verdict receipt.


# SECURITY_REPAIR_FAIL

Checkpoint v2 initially matched its referenced hashes, but `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/owner_v1` disappeared before atomic candidate authentication completed. Under the sealed inventory, candidate drift or a missing referenced leaf is an immediate failure.

The four repaired blockers and remaining controls were not adjudicated after authentication failed.

Receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-final-security-privacy-reaudit-v2.redacted.json`
Mode: `0600`
SHA-256: `3a17ab84ff0ddd0d96d1ce7e45e19da02b23e22a4319270b9b8002ec02b49861`

No live, Git, network, service, delivery, or Task27 actions were performed.


I read this as the recovered-snapshot Task26 adjudication - I’ll atomically authenticate the private snapshot and manifest first, then run every sealed gate and prior-blocker probe only against that snapshot before writing one `0600` verdict receipt.


# SECURITY_REPAIR_FAIL

The recovered snapshot authenticated atomically before and after execution:

- Snapshot digest: `e880717e…c59ed`
- Manifest: `c9fdac78…e689b`
- Candidate digest recomputed successfully
- 37 snapshot entries and 28 candidate leaves matched
- No symlinks, cache leaves, drift, or missing required inputs

All other security controls passed, including 21 unit tests, 2 bwrap tests, closure/wheel scans, reproducible build, fixture derivation, cleanup fence, Task22, archive chain, and privacy checks.

Decisive remaining blockers:

1. The production handler reports two new drafts and draft-created events, but durable state retains one draft and only approval/send events. Counts are backed by in-memory counter objects, not handler state.
2. Send acknowledgement is recorded after customer transport returns, violating the required acknowledgement-before-background-work ordering.

Receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-final-security-privacy-reaudit-v3.redacted.json`
Mode: `0600`
SHA-256: `8975656a415151aa208be8345de1ff1ad092d92cbf3305b779f24446ad0753df`

No snapshot/source cleanup, live, Git, network, service, delivery, or Task27 actions were performed.


I read this as the final Task26 adjudication for candidate `2a0c…83cb` - I’ll atomically authenticate the new snapshot, checkpoint, and receipt first, then rerun every sealed gate with explicit durable-count and acknowledgement-order probes before writing one `0600` verdict receipt.


# SECURITY_REPAIR_PASS

Candidate `2a0cd32e…83cb` passed all sealed Task26 security/privacy gates.

- Snapshot authenticated atomically before and after execution
- All 40 snapshot and 28 candidate entries matched
- Zero forbidden runtime/wheel matches or unbound cache leaves
- Durable draft/event counts verified
- Acknowledgement persisted and completed before customer transport
- Cleanup, restart, exactly-once, fixture derivation, archive, Task22, and privacy controls passed
- Tests: 23 unit/security passed; 2 bwrap integration passed
- Reproducible 11-member wheel and installed entrypoint passed

Receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-final-security-privacy-reaudit-v4.redacted.json`
Mode: `0600`
SHA-256: `2a7b6b380518a9bcd9e7e8296cd9f549744c60a82931af0c3f4cdc40b5325470`

No live, Git, source, snapshot, service, delivery, or Task27 actions were performed.


I read this as the definitive Task26 v5 adjudication - I’ll authenticate the supplied snapshot, checkpoint, readiness receipt, and candidate graph first, rerun every sealed security clause and prior-blocker probe in disposable sandboxes, then write one `0600` PASS/FAIL receipt.


I read this as an immediate v5 stop - I’ve halted adjudication and will preserve read-only findings for v6.

- No v5 PASS/FAIL receipt was written.
- Snapshot and product source were not mutated.
- No live, Git, delivery, service, or Task27 actions occurred.
- Provenance digest/permission findings and quality Ty diagnostics remain unresolved.
- Task26 v5 is not approved; awaiting v6.