I read this as an implementation task - I’ll inspect the active remediation materials and v1 closure, add regression coverage, make only the required removals, then run the specified local verification gates.


I read this as a binding acceptance update to the remediation - I’ll load the adjudicator inventory, align the repair and regression tests to its exact clauses, and only report readiness after its verifier and required local gates pass.


I read this as implementation - I will close the remaining active trainer runtime paths, then verify the acceptance inventory.


I read this as implementation - I verified the acceptance gates and withheld readiness.

**Not ready for Task26 re-audit.**

- Focused trainer-free contract: `6 passed`; root source hashes were stable across re-scan.
- Task22 canonical files remain `0600` with the required unchanged hashes.
- Created an owner-only successor projection: 3 mapped records, v3 owner-review projection, zero forbidden tokens in active-v1 state.
- Static closure scan decisively fails: **281 forbidden matches across 20 reachable modules**. The report is `0600` at `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-v1-runtime-closure-static-report.redacted.json`.
- Task24 still derives its fixture from the live profile/archive, violating the immutable successor-fixture requirement.
- Ty is not clean (existing unresolved/type diagnostics), so full verification and wheel acceptance cannot proceed.

No `READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT` checkpoint was written.


I read this as implementation - I will isolate a minimal owner-only v1 package and prove its source, runtime, and wheel closure before considering readiness.


I read this as implementation - I built and verified the isolated v1 candidate, while withholding readiness for unresolved repository-wide gates.

- Added standalone `hermes-owner-v1` package/wheel with an isolated entrypoint, owner-only callbacks, durable CAS state, cleanup fence, and synthetic pre-clean fixture.
- Added root-discovered v1 contract, import-closure, dynamic, wheel, reproducibility, offline matrix, fixture, and concurrency tests.
- Verified: `9 passed` v1 tests; `6 passed` existing contract tests; Ruff, Ty, compileall, AST, reproducible wheel, installed-wheel entrypoint, and token scans pass.
- Wrote protected evidence: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-closure-report.redacted.json` (`0600`).

I did not return `READY_FOR_SECURITY_REAUDIT`: repository-wide Task26 gates remain unresolved, and LSP diagnostics cannot access the execution repository from its configured request cwd.


I read this as Task26 security remediation - I will inspect the failing security inventory and current candidate boundary, make only verified repair changes, and withhold readiness unless every requested gate passes.


I read this as convergence on the smallest owner-v1 closure - I will checkpoint the saved state, identify only current failures, and avoid further scope expansion unless a focused repair is required.


Checkpoint written: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-security-repair-progress.redacted.json` (`0600`).

Known-good candidate digest: `2d2be3bb243b4a2675fa039e944cee6af9925f2f7a3790614fddbd6bc046be73`.

Completed and sealed: exact state schemas, binding/receipt validation, cleanup fence, successor-bound fixture, private wheel, closure manifest, disabled-root declaration, and bwrap network-isolated handler execution.

Single unrepaired blocker: `TFV1-FIXTURE-001` exact Task24 count matrix.
`pytest tests/gateway/test_task24_preflight_integration.py -q -m integration` fails because the full-path report lacks `real_handler_counts`; all other candidate checks pass (`16 passed, 2 deselected`, Ruff, Ty, compileall, seal).

`READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT` is withheld.


I read this as a focused Task24 fixture-matrix repair - I will make the existing bwrap handler exercise emit the required counts from executed operations, then reseal and publish readiness only if every requested check passes.


Checkpoint: no source or evidence changed after the passing bwrap integration, 16-test set, Ruff, Ty, compileall, and candidate seal. The only error was a read-only final-audit Python syntax typo; readiness remains pending final hash and installed-wheel receipts.


Checkpoint: permissions were tightened and the full seal/verification run completed; the final audit assertion was incorrectly applied to executable sealing scripts, not a candidate failure. No source content changed after the passing verification.


Checkpoint: candidate sealing and verification still pass; the second audit typo again classified executable scripts as non-executable source. The saved candidate has not changed, and readiness remains pending only the corrected read-only audit.


I read this as Task26 completion - the single Task24 count-matrix blocker is repaired and fully resealed.

READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT

- Task24 bwrap matrix: `2 passed, 1 deselected`; exact callback/card/event/delivery counts verified.
- Owner-v1 set: `16 passed, 2 deselected`; Ruff, Ty, and compileall pass.
- Retained wheel/install/closure checks pass.
- Stable candidate: `c3b1ea6877bc1a2ecc510de70610552fd397e13a73719df4bb82a943f2373f95`
- Readiness checkpoint (`0600`): `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-readiness-checkpoint.redacted.json`
- No live profile, service, network, provider, delivery, or Git mutation performed.


I read this as a focused Task26 re-audit repair - I will authenticate the four stated gaps, add failing coverage before changing only the owner-v1 candidate, then reseal and publish readiness only if every gate is green.


I read this as a Task26 stall checkpoint - I will run one bounded verification of the four named repairs before making any additional change, then report the exact closure state.


Checkpoint: the consolidated hardening run found one blocker only: deterministic successor derivation rejects the authenticated manifest/receipt pair. Candidate graph binding and zero-cache assertions passed; bwrap was not rerun because the bounded command stopped at that failure. Changed scope is limited to owner-v1 fixture/handler/sealing code and its Task24/hardening tests; no live or Git mutation occurred.


Checkpoint: all requested tests, bwrap, Ruff, Ty, compileall, derivation, and installed entrypoint passed. The final read-only closure assertion failed after entrypoint install; no source changed. I will identify that single audit condition before any further edit.


I read this as Task26 completion - all four re-audit blockers are repaired and resealed.

READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT

- Candidate binds the wheel build executable, candidate-seal test, all owner-v1 tests, derivation script, and successor records.
- Owner-v1 cache leaves: `0`; source bwrap execution uses `-B`.
- Task24 counts now come from `hermes_owner_v1.task24_handler` production outcomes under `bwrap --unshare-net`.
- Fixture successor records are deterministically derived and byte-compared against authenticated projection receipts.
- Verified: `21 passed, 2 deselected`; bwrap `2 passed, 1 deselected`; Ruff, Ty, compileall, reproducible retained wheel, installed entrypoint, closure, and mutation-zero checks pass.
- New private checkpoint: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-readiness-checkpoint-v2.redacted.json`
- Candidate: `96e1a264fedca02b6fd47417fea08d5f1df617f9fe1448cc050b055c4d8c678e`


I read this as Task26 forensic recovery - I will establish what removed the candidate, authenticate recoverable bytes without Git or live access, and only restore into a sealed private Task26 location after byte verification.


I read this as Task26 exact-byte recovery - I will use only the authenticated retention chain, build a private immutable execution-repository snapshot, and authenticate it before any verification lane.


I read this as Task26 recovery completion - exact bytes are restored into a sealed private snapshot and authenticated.

READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT

- Recovered historical candidate bytes match the v2 wheel, closure, candidate manifest, and digest commitments.
- New stable snapshot digest: `e880717efeb8c56b81fe80454263f4b8b25f6aec7f4c3c01e2a6d03f159c59ed`
- Snapshot manifest: `c9fdac787b46ad1575de4300bb3aacba28901eb1821459972721e1efc84e689b`
- Stored at `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.task26-evidence/task26-owner-v1-96e1a264-recovered-v1`
- Fresh-process authentication passed; all snapshot files are non-writable, caches are absent, and offline verification/installed entrypoint/successor derivation passed.
- Checkpoint: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-recovery-readiness-checkpoint-v3.redacted.json` (`0600`).

The filesystem denied `chattr +i`; the snapshot is sealed with `0500` directories, `0400` files, and manifest authentication. No Task27, Git, network, or live actions occurred.


I read this as Task26 implementation - I will stage only from the sealed e880 snapshot, add regression coverage for the two ordering/state blockers, then reseal only after the full offline suite passes.


I read this as implementation - the Task26-only repair is complete and privately sealed.

- Fixed durable Task24 draft/event accounting and acknowledgement-before-transport ordering, with crash/restart coverage.
- Regression tests were added first; final offline validation passed: `23 passed, 2 deselected`; Task24 bwrap: `2 passed, 1 deselected`.
- Candidate digest: `2a0cd32e...ce4583cb`; sealed snapshot manifest: `06ffc1e...6008a29`.
- Fresh-process authentication passed with zero writable files, symlinks, or cache leaves.
- Final `0600` receipt: `abe0cb...b7308033`.

POSIX read-only plus manifest authentication meets the Task26 fail-closed offline control, but it is not kernel immutable: `chattr +i` remains unavailable and is not claimed. No Task27, Git, live, provider, customer, or network action occurred.


I read this as a read-only handoff - returning only the requested identifiers.

- Candidate digest: `2a0cd32e520b092ec5208a2ae5fa9499d310428cc71ce07c31746c01ce4583cb`
- Snapshot-manifest SHA-256: `06ffc1e2505451ca77dad630cd2e1e635f10644236d9ac875660474846008a29`
- Immutable snapshot: `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.task26-owner-v1-snapshots/task26-owner-v1-2a0cd32e520b`
- Readiness checkpoint: `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-recovery-readiness-checkpoint-v3.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `13143e28934a331a671bc89cadd6cdf05848e676bd58ef093f92d4a1ae940b0c`
- Final receipt: `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-repair-v4-final-receipt.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `abe0cb62863c4681f77eb00a558270bbc2b8198d357588dbe7686511b7308033`


I read this as Task26-only implementation - I’ll inspect the v4 provenance failure and immutable inputs, then stage a surgical v5 repair without touching v4.


I read this as an added Task26 provenance constraint - I’ll require two independent, canonically framed digest recomputations before any v5 seal and fail closed on disagreement.


I read this as a consolidation checkpoint - I’ll make no edits and will report the exact staged delta, current failures, and provenance-repair status.


I read this as a consolidation checkpoint - no v5 edits were made during this check.

**Current failing commands:** none.

Last green commands:
- Full suite: `23 passed, 2 deselected`
- Task24 bwrap: `2 passed, 1 deselected`
- Candidate verifier: pass
- Exact Ruff command:
  `.../.venv/bin/ruff check owner_v1/src owner_v1/scripts tests/test_owner_v1_runtime.py tests/test_owner_v1_security_repair.py tests/test_owner_v1_candidate_seal.py tests/test_owner_v1_reaudit_hardening.py tests/gateway/task24_preflight_harness.py tests/gateway/test_task24_preflight_integration.py`
  - stdout: `All checks passed!\n`
  - stderr: empty

Content changes from v4 staging:
- `owner_v1/src/hermes_owner_v1/contracts.py`
- `owner_v1/scripts/seal_candidate.py`
- `owner_v1/scripts/verify_candidate.py`
- `owner_v1/scripts/recompute_candidate_digest.py` (new)
- `tests/test_owner_v1_candidate_seal.py`
- Deterministic fixture/release derivatives: preclean manifest, candidate manifest, fixture/wheel/closure/verification receipts, wheel.
- `bindings/task26-v5-canonical-digest-agreement.redacted.json` (new)

Repair status:
1. Unused `typing.Mapping` / exact Ruff receipt: **fixed and passing**.
2. Task24/25 historical control mode drift: **pending**; historical script remains byte-identical at current `0600` versus historical declared `0700`.
3. Append-only candidate-binding graph: **pending**.
4. Handoff/ledger synchronization inputs: **pending**.
5. Dual digest recomputation: **pass**.

Both independent digest implementations agree on:
`80700cc03e0e94ed065d45b4a647316d0cdd1ae5b5a9a39e8a36ad1460b9a2a6`

Algorithm: `sha256-canonical-json-v1`; order: `repository_relative_path_ascending`; framing: `utf8-json-sort_keys-separators-comma-colon`.

No v5 snapshot has been sealed.


I read this as Task26-only implementation - I’ll add only append-only v5 provenance artifacts, verify them against the green candidate, then seal a new private snapshot without altering v4 or the candidate source.


I read this as Task26-only provenance completion - v5 is sealed as readiness-only, not Task26 PASS.

- Candidate digest: `80700cc03e0e94ed065d45b4a647316d0cdd1ae5b5a9a39e8a36ad1460b9a2a6`
- Candidate manifest SHA-256: `963e44c1c8caf76cd232e3304e294e3c2d856e732843beb27fe4d9dbb9ec06d3`
- Snapshot path: `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.task26-owner-v1-snapshots/task26-owner-v1-80700cc03e0-v5`
- Snapshot manifest SHA-256: `dd6c2a43f0fff219013e55d26b701a37b3ccda65db950d06e16667f1e32ed319`
- Readiness checkpoint: `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.task26-owner-v1-snapshots/task26-owner-v1-80700cc03e0-v5/snapshot/bindings/task26-owner-v1-v5-readiness-checkpoint.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `4d6786815153c3dff9dc97e0d835bfb30e5ce19ba43f34a0ca6e3c9b4447c352`
- Final readiness receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-v5-provenance-readiness-receipt.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `5a1e80af4c3c8bccb471349c98b72d845f402f408d799ec98ac5c53f970d7161`

Verification passed: 23 tests, bwrap, Ruff, Ty, compileall, reproducible wheel, installed entrypoint, closure, successor derivation, mutation checks, and two independent canonical digest implementations.

The historical mode correction is `0600`, retains historical `0700` as declared-only, and does not rewrite historical bytes. Task26 remains `READY_FOR_FIVE_FINAL_TASK26_LANES_NOT_TASK26_PASS`; no Task27, live, Git, plan, handoff, or ledger action occurred.


I read this as Task26-only implementation - I’ll authenticate the v5 failure inputs, isolate the digest and permission causes, then build a separate v6 repair without modifying v5.


I read this as Task26-only implementation - v6 is sealed and remains readiness-only, not Task26 PASS.

- Candidate digest: `8536818c0fb846fdbc3e9993ebd9705fd440672bf0f89f6cd7bdb3e22fcfc0c3`
- Candidate manifest SHA-256: `b32bc145479041c4d5a339fac36bed94543fde6eef4800d5e8977e8cf1aabd65`
- Snapshot path: `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.task26-owner-v1-snapshots/task26-owner-v1-8536818c0fb-v6`
- Snapshot manifest SHA-256: `db93a59ff97d365c40703d68b95271d339fb8ed6899ed2068cfab4c621d242eb`
- Snapshot digest: `068ac1b5beef71ff6436c0498dcd9f8dc09109e8f5921f5f302698b73e2ed7b5`
- Readiness checkpoint: `/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.task26-owner-v1-snapshots/task26-owner-v1-8536818c0fb-v6/snapshot/bindings/task26-owner-v1-v6-readiness-checkpoint.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `5722a8d4877ba6747fba81c9c75968f1724aa6903d73feafca4698e8d1350df6`
- Final readiness receipt: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-owner-v1-v6-provenance-readiness-receipt.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `ed4a22c51d224714055ab3a36b77915728e75584a359bbae16ae3340d5aacf26`

Validated: 23 tests, bwrap, Ruff, Ty with zero diagnostics, compileall, reproducible wheel, install, closure, successor derivation, sealed-target no-mutation precondition, permission-drift detection, and two fresh-process sealed-digest/permission rounds.

Task26 remains `READY_FOR_FIVE_FINAL_TASK26_LANES_NOT_TASK26_PASS`. No Task27, live, Git, plan, handoff, or ledger action occurred.


Terminal candidate 81b1b7e1 is sealed and clean-window controller preparation is authoritative. Cancel competing v6 repair to prevent source/evidence drift.