I read this as an implementation and release-readiness task - I’ll inspect the authoritative plan, evidence, worktree, and runtime/profile state before making the smallest compliant repair.


I read this as a focused fail-closed interface repair - I’ve confirmed the prior quarantine is complete preflight evidence, and I’m adding the provider-auth contract tests before implementing the command.


I read this as a convergence audit - I’ll freeze edits, verify the built wheel through an isolated installed environment, and report the single remaining arm blocker.


I read this as a convergence audit - edits remain frozen.

- Task-owned changes: `dualcoach_admin`, Tasks21-25 controller, their two test files, and two new package entry points in `pyproject.toml`. The former reset/quarantine source, wrapper, and test files are absent. Full worktree remains 128 dirty entries; only five are task-owned.
- Provider auth: implemented and fail-closed; 11 provider-auth cases plus 5 controller cases pass (16 total). Ruff and Ty pass.
- Full Gateway: `8105 passed, 59 skipped` (pre-existing warnings only).
- Profile package suite: `636 passed` using a disposable pre-existing package-test environment. Direct profile-suite commands failed only because the active `.venv` lacks cached `typer==0.27.0`; no source defect.
- Wheel: reproducible clean wheel passes byte comparison, SHA-256 `2c02...867d3`; contains both new modules and no legacy reset modules.
- Repeated verification failures resolved:
  - stale `build/` initially leaked removed modules into the wheel; targeted build-output removal and rebuild fixed it.
  - target-directory console-script import failed; a fresh isolated venv install now proves both installed entry points load from `site-packages` without `PYTHONPATH`.
  - read-only bwrap lacked `/tmp`; a tmpfs bwrap run passed all 16 focused tests.
  - xdist is unavailable; serial full Gateway suite passed.
- No candidate seal/manifest, profile deployment, live provider-auth receipt, or controller arm receipt exists. Service remains `inactive/dead`; no Telegram, service, activation, Git, or Task27 action occurred.

**Precise remaining blocker:** no immutable candidate manifest binds the wheel, source hashes, historical quarantine evidence, and repository-status digest. Without it, the required candidate-bound provider-auth receipt cannot be produced and the controller must remain unarmed.


I read this as Task26 candidate resealing and bounded re-arm work - I’ll bind the frozen bytes and recorded gates first, then authenticate and arm only if every manifest and profile check holds.


I read this as a fail-closed provider-auth diagnosis - the sealed candidate and inactive package deployment hold; I’ll identify whether the real read-only probe is unsupported before changing any frozen implementation.


I read this as a fail-closed Task26 outcome - the candidate is sealed and preserved, but provider authentication prevents arming.

**BLOCKER:** the configured `openai-codex` resolution returns `CodexAuxiliaryClient`, which has no supported `models.list` probe. The frozen installed command therefore returned typed, secret-redacted `probe_unknown` / exit `29`; no generation-capable alternative was used.

Known-good preserved:
- Candidate: `ca49f7561f22b870cc70aa135d15eef66129e3a39ffa3c4be284f0484a345706`
- Manifest SHA-256: `47121423e0b84a16bdf2e6545cb17299a1fd38eb194573799c5dcf6d26f1bed9`
- Provider candidate digest: `379930d664854e7aa6a6c57392d328fcd85838d49effa20f02dbff594a73230d`
- Wheel SHA-256: `2c02a2c60749e02b387d799f39d50d457627eb5ba3594965bd2622cafbe867d3`
- Independent canonical recomputation, manifest drift verification, and atomic profile-package deployment passed.
- Deployment receipt SHA-256: `499b39cc914ede241e055b41ac94f0cd903cb85fbe902dba1ea95a279c8ada0a`
- Provider receipt SHA-256: `1a201dc3458dfd4d94a7a89b94317f379cb118d1811c8d59da0791fa757fd22e` (`0600`, non-ready).
- Service remains inactive/dead; delivery is false, registry and delivery records are empty, and no controller arm receipt exists.

No service, Telegram, activation, Git, release, or Task27 action occurred.


I read this as an approved, tightly bounded provider-auth enhancement - I’ll TDD the explicit Codex-only active probe, then rebuild, reseal, deploy, run it once, and arm only on a verified READY receipt.


message: WebSocket error

stop_reason: error


I read this as final candidate validation before the single approved live probe - implementation tests are green, and I’m now running the bounded full Gateway and profile-package gates without touching runtime services.


I read this as a package-test environment failure, not a product failure - the suite’s wheel self-test cannot build from the intentionally read-only deployed package, so I’ll rerun the same bytes from a writable disposable clone.


I read this as candidate sealing - all non-live gates are bound to the rebuilt wheel, so I’ll seal and independently recompute the new immutable candidate before any profile auth request.


I read this as a one-shot integrity correction - the SDK defaults to retries, so I’ll disable retries on the resolved Codex client and bind that invariant before making the approved live request.


I read this as final post-fix validation - the one-shot retry guard is now covered, so I’ll rerun the full Gateway and byte-identical package gates before rebuilding the candidate.


I read this as the atomic candidate-rebind milestone - I’ll stop at a fresh sealed manifest, one verified active receipt, and a controller arm receipt, then return only those pins.


I read this as a staging-capacity blocker, not a candidate defect - I’ll remove only my prior disposable build copies and rebuild from one isolated source copy to preserve the milestone’s immutable artifacts.


I read this as sealing the current tested bytes before the authorized probe - the rebuilt wheel is byte-identical (`370e…35a7`); I’ll now bind those bytes into the manifest, then perform the single approved call only from that installed wheel.


I read this as a fail-closed checkpoint, not a reason to retry - the sole authorized invocation returned `active_probe_unknown` (exit 34), preserved the profile except its receipt/index, and the controller correctly produced no arm receipt.


I read this as the atomic rebind checkpoint - it is independently verified but **NO-GO**, so do not mark it done.

- Immutable candidate: `/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.omo/evidence/task26/dualcoach-provider-auth-candidate-dc166c0c77275bb5e0468dd24e828fd2611c96e3f399aedec36395ec9e47d089`
  - full digest: `dc166c0c77275bb5e0468dd24e828fd2611c96e3f399aedec36395ec9e47d089`
  - manifest SHA-256: `ddfd47d0a8fc324aab3eb8682bbcfd0947025f160c4f513a65d78ee1e9fcb003`
  - wheel SHA-256: `370e16a24e696de73acb80576eff056e843f41c829601017de81bc85525d35a7`
- Exactly one authorized active probe ran from the sealed-wheel install:
  - receipt: `/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest/data/dualcoach-provider-auth/receipts/20260814T130730Z-0dbb63d3cc0e4e6baa00bbb94949cb88.json`
  - SHA-256: `62aba53efddd1582b0baf7a46865e05d48522608a980d401288601f79bcff3cb`
  - result: `active_probe_unknown`, exit `34`; `request_attempts: 1`, `sdk_max_retries: 0`. No retry occurred or is authorized.
- Profile proof passed: only the new receipt and its index changed; zero delivery/registry/service/Telegram effects. Service remains `inactive/dead`.
- Controller arm returned `NO_GO: unsafe_input_file`; no arm receipt exists.
- Persistent checkpoint: `.omo/evidence/task26/dualcoach-provider-auth-active-gate-receipt-v2.json`
  - SHA-256: `7a76752c05515eedd69ccc767459327eeae822087f10a18bfe803588218c9797`

The candidate itself re-verifies PASS post-probe, but the provider receipt is not READY and the controller is unarmed.


I read this as a root-cause repair and reseal - I’ll first classify both NO-GO outcomes from sealed, read-only evidence, then make only test-proven fixes before considering the single newly authorized probe.


I read this as a classified root cause - the sealed model hash is exactly `gpt-5.1-codex-mini`, which the local Codex catalog documents as a ChatGPT-OAuth HTTP-400 retired slug; the controller separately rejects the immutable historical `0400` inputs because it only allowed `0600`.


I read this as implementation - I added fail-closed local rejection for the documented retired Codex slugs, safe propagation of the adapter’s content-free HTTP audit, and sealed-only acceptance for the two historical controller inputs; the added tests began red as expected.


I read this as verification and packaging work - the focused offline suite is green (`40 passed`), and Ruff plus Ty are clean; I am checking the reseal contract and the required no-op/input evidence before creating a new immutable candidate.


I read this as continuation of Task26 - I will resume from the completed offline fixes and gates, inspect the existing reseal workflow, then build and independently verify a fresh candidate before considering the single authorized probe.


I read this as offline-gate execution - the local type checker is clean, while the available LSP-compatible analyzer reports only three pre-existing errors in unchanged exception/import code; I will not broaden the root-cause patch to silence that baseline.


I read this as a gate-environment correction - full Gateway (`8129 passed, 59 skipped`) and network-isolated focused tests (`40 passed`) passed; the profile-package invocation used the wrong venv and lacked `typer`, so I will rerun that disposable clone through its locked offline environment and prove the immutable source tree stayed unchanged.


message: WebSocket error


I read this as packaging verification - the disposable profile package is now green (`636 passed`) and its immutable source tree hash is unchanged; I will build two offline source snapshots and require byte-identical wheels plus isolated entrypoint imports.


I read this as a newly confirmed root cause - the profile has no draft-model override, so the command still falls back to the retired `gpt-5.1-codex-mini`; I will make the default a catalog-supported OAuth slug through a failing test before rebuilding any candidate.


I read this as a pre-seal consistency check - the current source already defaults to `gpt-5.6-terra` (and has a passing test for it), so no profile/config mutation is needed; I will bind the fresh wheel, source, immutable inputs, clean profile baseline, and unchanged worktree state into the gate receipt.


I read this as a minor validation-environment mismatch - the profile baseline and immutable input checks passed; one source-default assertion imported the old installed package because its working directory was wrong, so I will rerun that assertion from the source tree before sealing.


I read this as documenting the shipped closure honestly - full Ty on the unchanged adapter reports 147 legacy diagnostics, while the changed files pass Ty/Ruff; I will capture the LSP-compatible baseline separately rather than hiding or suppressing it.


I read this as sealing the corrected candidate - all required offline, redaction, no-op, input, wheel, and package checks are bound in a private PASS receipt, so I will now create and verify a new immutable candidate without deploying or probing it.


I read this as independent integrity verification - the new candidate is sealed as `eefe28e3...` with provider digest `f9a46172...`; I will reverify it in a separate process and confirm its private inventory before atomically deploying the unchanged profile package.


I read this as deployment of verified bytes - the separate verifier confirmed the candidate’s immutable 0500/0400 inventory and pins; I will atomically exchange only the byte-identical profile package, keeping services and delivery inactive.


I read this as final pre-probe binding - deployment passed with the same package digest; I will independently reverify the deployed candidate, capture a private whole-profile preimage, and install the sealed wheel in a fresh isolated venv before the one authorized invocation.


I read this as a corrected verification invocation - the preimage and sealed-wheel venv are valid; the verifier’s first call had a mistyped immutable index path and made no mutation, so I will rerun it with the canonical `f4cd...` path before the authorized probe.


I read this as the explicitly authorized one-shot probe - the fresh candidate, deployed package, sealed venv, profile preimage, service state, and immutable inputs all verify PASS, so I will invoke the installed command exactly once with `--allow-billable-active-probe` and no retry path.


I read this as post-probe verification - the one allowed installed-wheel invocation exited `0`; I will now prove its READY receipt is candidate-bound and redacted, compare the whole profile to the private preimage, and independently reverify the immutable candidate before arming anything.


I read this as the local controller bind - the fresh READY receipt, whole-profile no-op proof, source status, and post-probe candidate verification all pass; I will arm the installed candidate controller once, without launching the service or touching Telegram.


I read this as post-arm verification - the installed controller exited `0`; I will validate the private arm receipt and its no-service/no-Telegram semantics, prove the arm did not alter the profile, and recheck candidate integrity before recording the atomic rebind.


I read this as recording the atomic rebind - the controller is ARMED with a private receipt, profile and source status remain unchanged, and the service is still `inactive/dead`; I will create a new immutable v3 gate receipt that binds this candidate, the sole READY probe, and the arm outcome without modifying the prior NO_GO evidence.


I read this as final attestation - the v3 gate receipt now records `READY_FOR_CLEAN_WINDOW`; I will independently validate every pinned hash and final quiescent state, without invoking the controller launch path.


I read this as completion reporting - the fresh candidate is verified READY and armed; launch remains untouched.

- New candidate: `eefe28e3...`; provider digest `f9a46172...`.
- One authorized installed-wheel probe ran: `READY`, exit `0`, one request, SDK retries `0`.
- Profile proof passed: only one receipt was added and the provider index changed; no delivery, registry, service, or Telegram effects.
- Controller is `READY_FOR_CLEAN_WINDOW`; arm receipt is private `0600`.
- Full Gateway: `8129 passed`; profile package: `636 passed`; reproducible wheel SHA-256: `ae705212...`.
- Atomic rebind gate: `.omo/evidence/task26/dualcoach-provider-auth-active-gate-receipt-v3.json` (`0600`), SHA-256 `039a9737...`.
- Service remains `inactive/dead`; no launch, Telegram action, Task27, or todo mutation occurred.
- Static caveat documented in the gate: changed closure passes Ruff/Ty; basedpyright retains 3 pre-existing diagnostics and full unchanged adapter Ty retains 147 legacy diagnostics.

Unexecuted human-only launch command:
```bash
/home/cube/.cache/dualcoach-v3-wheel-build.Ba7Th0/active-probe-venv/bin/dualcoach_tasks21_25_controller launch --arm-receipt /home/cube/.local/state/dualcoach-task26-controller/arm-f9a46172386333a0067f43695fb1429a043a606f04baceb06e8c59b90c36235c.json --start-service --json
```

First Owner action: `Tap "Approve" on the first owner review card.`