I read this as an investigation - I will audit the Task26 evidence and execution repository read-only, recompute only safe offline integrity checks, and return a receipt-based verdict.


I read this as an investigation - I will re-authenticate the post-launch repair and expiry receipts directly, then issue the authoritative candidate verdict without changing any state.


I read this as an investigation - I verified the invalidation and expiry receipts read-only.

**Verdict: NEEDS-FIX.** There is **no current authoritative Task26 candidate**.

- Historical sealed candidate: full `5e6f2f2a01321ac89c2950e511e7346d23070c51146c14c22c04db54034b28f1`; core `f9a46172386333a0067f43695fb1429a043a606f04baceb06e8c59b90c36235c`.
- Its immutable evidence remains intact: manifest `0422f192...d801dc08`, checkpoint `3ec449df...514fc76`, wheel `6a3f5f04...fe12cbeb`; root/file modes are `0500`/`0400`.
- But the authenticated repair receipt explicitly has `candidate_invalidated_by_repair=true`. The sealed controller hash `76212d9...ba40a49` differs from current `b3036345...e556e13`; its corresponding test also drifted (`323bce7c...ed598bd` -> `95300eb8...65bcdf`).
- Repository-status hash also drifted: sealed `ca1ce270...58895478`, current `f290b556...74dff266`.
- Gate18/19/20 receipts bind to 5e6f, but predate invalidation. No successor manifest or re-run Gate18/19/20 receipt exists after the repair.
- The expiry receipt is authenticated and reports `PASS_BLOCKED_NO_LIVE_INVITE`: two sessions are `EXPIRED`, zero live prepared/owner-review state, and no valid Telegram link or Start action.

Missing successor-bound review receipts: objective/constraint, code quality, security/privacy, hands-on QA, provenance; plus replacement Gate18/19/20 receipts.

Relevant read-only commands executed:
```sh
(cd "$repair_dir" && sha256sum -c repair-receipt.json.sha256)
(cd "$cleanup_dir" && sha256sum -c cleanup-blocked-audit-receipt.json.sha256)
jq -e --arg d "$digest" '.full_candidate_digest==$d and .repair.candidate_invalidated_by_repair==true and .repair.controller_sha256 != .repair.sealed_candidate_controller_sha256 and .shutdown.main_pid==0' repair-receipt.json
jq -e --arg d "$digest" '.candidate_digest==$d and .status=="PASS_BLOCKED_NO_LIVE_INVITE" and .proof.live_prepared_count==0 and .proof.owner_review_count==0 and .recurrence_count==2' cleanup-blocked-audit-receipt.json
git -C /home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent status --porcelain=v1 -z | sha256sum
python3 -B  # compared all 375 manifest source entries to the execution tree
find "$evidence" -type f -name candidate-manifest.json -newer repair-receipt.json
```

Smallest allowed offline next action: preserve 5e6f and every receipt unchanged; use the documented journaled synthetic-session preparation/reconciliation path to establish exactly one recoverable `owner_review`, then create a **new successor seal** and bind fresh Gates18-20 plus all five review lanes to that successor. No launch, Telegram, provider, or human-window action.


I read this as a clarification request - I will reconcile the handoff prohibition with the receipts using only read-only receipt inspection and will not run any commands or change state.


I read this as a clarification request - the prior next-action wording was wrong under the active handoff.

It **cannot** be both offline and non-mutating. The recorded preparation is local/non-service, but it is a **profile mutation**:

- Exact API: `RoomBootstrapStore.prepare_rehearsal_customer_invite`
- Target: `/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest/data/onboarding/telegram-customer-bootstrap-v1/ledger.json`
- Proof: the receipt records its SHA changing `b5f0be...cefb28a` -> `efc1cc...e2ce5d7a`, with `prepare_invocations: 1`.
- It did not activate a customer, deliver, start a service, or send/click Telegram; that does not make it non-mutating.

The expired-window cleanup is also a profile mutation:

- Exact API: `RoomBootstrapStore.expire_unbound`
- Same target ledger, now at `76ec1618...d9c83e803`.
- Both prepared sessions are `EXPIRED`; no live invite or owner review exists.

No executable command for preparation/reconciliation is recorded in the authoritative receipts, only those APIs. Inventing one would not be evidence-based. The recorded controller `arm` command is not applicable: the repair receipt expressly forbids reseal, re-arm, or relaunch until the durable owner-review prerequisite exists.

| Substep | Classification | Allowed under active handoff? |
|---|---|---|
| Inspect receipts/hashes | evidence-only | Yes |
| Repair controller/test source | source-only | Not needed now; already caused 5e6f invalidation |
| Create successor seal | evidence-only | No: repair receipt puts preparation/reconciliation before reseal |
| `prepare_rehearsal_customer_invite` | profile mutation | No |
| Reconcile to committed `owner_review` | profile mutation | No |
| `expire_unbound` | profile mutation | Already completed; do not repeat |
| Controller arm or `systemctl` operations | service action | No |
| Create/serve a fresh link | profile mutation, then service action | No |
| Authorize a fresh invite window | human authorization | Not presently actionable |
| Open link / press Start | Telegram action and human authorization | No |

The auditor's “authorize one fresh canonical invite window” is conditional future-state guidance, not authority to override the active handoff. With profile mutation prohibited and both windows expired, the only allowed next action is to preserve the receipts and remain on hold; Task26 cannot advance to a new authoritative candidate.