I read this as a sealed-candidate security/privacy audit - I’ll inspect the immutable evidence and source offline, close every prior blocker explicitly, run cache-disabled static checks with network denied, and write only the required append-only redacted receipt.


The sealed candidate and all three gate receipts are present; the workspace is intentionally not a Git checkout, so drift must be established from the manifest/status seal rather than live Git metadata. I’m now tracing the candidate’s exact file set, prior blocker chain, and security-sensitive source paths without touching runtime or profiles.


A decisive post-gate blocker has surfaced: the post-launch repair receipt explicitly says `candidate_invalidated_by_repair=true` after proving the sealed controller could start without any durable owner review. The current status SHA still matches only because both controller paths are untracked; their bytes changed while the NUL status listing did not. I’m completing an isolated byte-level audit to quantify that drift and distinguish controls that remain evidenced from the blocker that cannot be closed for this seal.


The authority update matches the evidence: this lane is now constrained to FAIL/NO-GO. I’ll verify the invalidation and both expired windows by exact hashes in a network-unshared, read-only sandbox, then issue the required receipt with no runtime action authorized.


Verification is complete: the seal itself is internally authentic, but its executable source closure is no longer current (exactly two candidate-bound files drifted), the repair explicitly invalidates it, and cleanup proves both invite sessions expired with no live prepared invite, activation, owner review, or delivery. I’m writing the append-only redacted FAIL/NO-GO receipt now.


I read this as the final authority verdict - report the verified FAIL/NO-GO and receipt.

**FAIL / NO-GO — HIGH severity**

- Candidate `5e6f2f2a...` was explicitly invalidated by the post-launch owner-review repair.
- Two sealed source entries drifted: controller and its test.
- Both human invite windows are `EXPIRED`; no live invite remains.
- Historical Gate18/19/20 PASS receipts cannot authorize release or runtime action.
- No product/profile/runtime/service/Telegram/provider or Git mutation occurred.

Receipt:

`/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.omo/evidence/task26/task26-security-privacy-final-5e6f2f2a.redacted.json`

SHA-256:

`de7e8e6a8f0155e7a561704eefa1a46e31c7d024ebc8e980bb1f73a5b3f11fd7`

Mode: `0600`. No runtime action authorized.