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{"type":"assistant_message","payload":{"text":"I read this as a read-only architecture/contract adjudication - I’ll trace the evidence pipeline and reviewer authority end to end, compare the three recursion models, then return one decision-complete contract with a decisive PASS/FAIL rationale."}}
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{"type":"assistant_message","payload":{"text":"I read this as a read-only contract adjudication - I recommend a finite post-seal attestation DAG that keeps candidate `2e` immutable and exact-candidate-bound.\n\n# Decision\n\n**Adopt A: an external append-only post-seal readiness checkpoint, followed by an append-only inventory-state observation.**\n\nCandidate:\n\n`2e0894eac92bc396cc4723bf1f18ebc653b95018dd41574df435941c235da925`\n\n**remains the current immutable candidate.** Do not reseal it and do not modify its in-tree checkpoint.\n\nInvariant 10 requires evidence **from and bound to** the exact candidate; it does not require every later review receipt to be embedded inside that candidate. Task26 review receipts are already external attestations.\n\nThe evidence graph must be acyclic:\n\n```text\nv2 normative inventory\n  -> predecessor-653 authenticated trainer-free inputs\n  -> immutable candidate 2e + in-tree seal checkpoint\n  -> external 2e post-seal readiness checkpoint\n  -> external v2 inventory-state observation\n  -> independent trainer-free final re-audit receipt\n```\n\nNo artifact references a later artifact.\n\n## Important implementation fact\n\nThe current `full_candidate_digest` is not actually a digest of the complete candidate tree. The sealer computes it from `manifest_core`; `candidate-checkpoint.json` is excluded. Therefore the literal hash recursion is partly a naming/contract problem.\n\nEditing the in-tree checkpoint is nevertheless prohibited because it would change the frozen tree and invalidate:\n\n- checkpoint SHA-256 in `verifier-input.json`;\n- freeze receipt bindings;\n- the observed immutable-tree commitment;\n- the claim that candidate `2e` was not mutated.\n\nA sidecar attestation is therefore still the correct solution.\n\n# Options\n\n| Option | Viability | Trade-offs |\n|---|---|---|\n| **A. External post-seal checkpoint and inventory observation** | **Recommended now** | Lowest coupling and migration cost. Preserves `2e`, its freeze, wheel, manifest and tree. Pure hash verification is easy. Main risk is external-record equivocation or deletion. |\n| **B. Domain-separated self-excluding checkpoint** | Viable for a future candidate format | Architecturally clean if candidate identity is explicitly a payload digest and checkpoint identity is separate. Requires coordinated changes to sealer, verifier, freeze schema, reviewers and naming. Retrofitting it to frozen `2e` would redefine existing identity semantics. |\n| **C. Successor reseal containing its own digest** | **Reject** | Unsatisfiable when the successor digest covers the checkpoint containing that digest. Every checkpoint creates another digest. More reseals only increase provenance complexity and attack surface. |\n\nFor a future B-format, use:\n\n```text\npayload_digest =\n  SHA256(\"task26-candidate-payload-v2\\0\" || canonical(payload_manifest))\n\ncheckpoint_digest =\n  SHA256(\"task26-readiness-checkpoint-v2\\0\" ||\n         canonical(checkpoint_binding_payload_digest))\n\npackage_digest =\n  SHA256(\"task26-package-v2\\0\" ||\n         payload_digest || checkpoint_digest)\n```\n\nThe checkpoint may contain `payload_digest`, never `package_digest`. Candidate identity must explicitly mean `payload_digest`. That redesign does not pay for itself for `2e`.\n\n# Required contract\n\nUse canonical JSON:\n\n```text\nUTF-8\nsort_keys=true\nseparators=(\",\", \":\")\nensure_ascii=true\nallow_nan=false\nduplicate keys forbidden\narrays retain declared order\n```\n\nAll evidence files must be unique-path, atomically published, regular non-symlinks, `st_nlink == 1`, owner-private, and never overwritten.\n\nDefine:\n\n- `C` = immutable candidate `2e...da925` root\n- `E` = `.omo/evidence/task26`\n\n## 1. External post-seal readiness checkpoint\n\nLogical top-level field order:\n\n1. `schema`\n2. `status`\n3. `recorded_at_utc`\n4. `execution_head`\n5. `git_status_porcelain_v1_z_sha256`\n6. `git_status_entry_count`\n7. `candidate_manifest_path`\n8. `candidate_manifest_sha256`\n9. `candidate_digest`\n10. `candidate_file_count`\n11. `v1_runtime_closure_manifest_path`\n12. `v1_runtime_closure_manifest_sha256`\n13. `production_wheel_path`\n14. `production_wheel_sha256`\n15. `production_wheel_member_count`\n16. `trainer_free_migration_receipt_path`\n17. `trainer_free_migration_receipt_sha256`\n18. `preclean_fixture_manifest_path`\n19. `preclean_fixture_manifest_sha256`\n20. `preclean_fixture_receipt_path`\n21. `preclean_fixture_receipt_sha256`\n22. `verification_receipt_paths`\n23. `verification_receipt_sha256`\n24. `task22_permission_receipt_path`\n25. `task22_permission_receipt_sha256`\n26. `hash_algorithm`\n27. `product_profile_service_telegram_provider_delivery_mutations`\n28. `commits_pushes_releases`\n29. `authority`\n30. `scope`\n31. `candidate_root`\n32. `candidate_core_digest`\n33. `seal_checkpoint`\n34. `freeze_receipt`\n35. `candidate_tree`\n36. `current_candidate_verification`\n37. `source_evidence_transfer`\n38. `trainer_free_control_binding`\n39. `inventory_contract_binding`\n40. `non_actions`\n41. `privacy`\n\nRequired values include:\n\n```text\nschema =\n  task26-trainer-free-current-candidate-postseal-checkpoint-v1\n\nstatus =\n  READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT\n\nauthority =\n  CURRENT_CANDIDATE_READINESS_ONLY_NOT_TASK26_PASS_OR_RELEASE_AUTHORITY\n\ncandidate_digest =\n  2e0894eac92bc396cc4723bf1f18ebc653b95018dd41574df435941c235da925\n\ncandidate_core_digest =\n  a8d099d5372b1ac87c9b47e7d5b47c8bb4cdff7681e093bb3cd79d0303e6e88e\n\ncandidate_manifest_sha256 =\n  7b6d0d6e275426fada6bc585989052e03fdc056587fc2051764e47c61756752d\n\ncandidate_file_count = 43\nexecution_head = 0dc0f228dcec8fa54430882daf72e901d6a89f79\ngit_status_entry_count = 1294\ngit_status_porcelain_v1_z_sha256 =\n  ca1ce2705c0c406f30461e5f05e8d09468dee33348960c3650b6b98758895478\n\nproduction_wheel_sha256 =\n  af4a9d0a1ffffb6eb7551c1d6dc2b32853ca6d024332a4f8f5702bbf992f141b\n\nproduction_wheel_member_count = 860\nhash_algorithm = sha256\nproduct_profile_service_telegram_provider_delivery_mutations = 0\ncommits_pushes_releases = 0\n```\n\nThe existing seal checkpoint remains separately bound:\n\n```text\nseal_checkpoint.sha256 =\n  5ae5b75bc10fdbe86d13d18f9204b5a4def17d5c5b6dc90da5fb8534fccea102\n\nseal_checkpoint.status =\n  SEALED_SUCCESSOR_CANDIDATE_NOT_TASK26_PASS\n```\n\nThe freeze binding is:\n\n```text\nfreeze_receipt.sha256 =\n  002c8c64e79d757b38c13251475ec2b6a5ff70c0fc01222cf29066a060fbd521\n```\n\nThese statuses are not contradictory: one proves sealed bytes; the external checkpoint proves readiness for review.\n\n### Candidate-tree commitment\n\nUse rows over `[root, *root.rglob(\"*\")]`, sorted by full path. Each row is:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"path\": \".\" or candidate-relative POSIX path,\n  \"type\": \"directory\" or \"regular_file\",\n  \"mode\": four-digit octal string,\n  \"bytes\": null for directories, otherwise file size,\n  \"sha256\": null for directories, otherwise file SHA-256\n}\n```\n\nHash the canonical row list. Reject symlinks, non-file/non-directory entries, wrong modes and hard-linked files.\n\nExpected observation:\n\n```text\nentry_count = 51\ndirectory_count = 8\nregular_file_count = 43\nmode_violation_count = 0\ntree_sha256 =\n  d5213d1b71d6e4d1e14f1b6f18c57d72551e295a3c0e0735bd4198dfb3dc75b4\n```\n\n### Source-evidence transfer\n\nThe predecessor must remain explicitly predecessor-scoped:\n\n```text\nsource_candidate_digest =\n  653cc2f0b47873e95f985ea3eb32b8f2c044d6de64cd9e8fe37ebcec67c7a723\n\nexact_source_delta_sha256 =\n  4f53cda18c2baa0c0354bb5f9a3ecbe5ed12ab4d8e11ba873c2f11161202b945\n\nproduct_source_delta_count = 0\nproduct_wheel_byte_identical = true\nhistorical_execution_retargeted_to_successor = false\n```\n\nDo not rewrite the predecessor receipts to claim execution on `2e`. Their results transfer only as source-bound evidence through proven byte identity. Current-candidate authority comes from the new checkpoint, current verifier and tree binding.\n\nThe control object must bind at least:\n\n```text\ntrainer_free_v4_successor_binding_sha256 =\n  2e46a3bae7c6f6194449b841685b568412b1cbe74cf742cba3f534f3dd093d47\n\nauthoritative_inventory_v2_sha256 =\n  3ce7f5b93ac9265cd82bb18a04cbc4363efa7d08e16a2810835980aa0d69b4d8\n\ninventory_v2_supersession_sha256 =\n  fa6a0d1de70a8496c6e0dbb9c008cc13bbbdefe7a9bd684317da686ebbe59024\n\nruntime_closure_v2_sha256 =\n  f8b732bd42c0142931d06f37f5f2c64315bcbb3686ec7fe50473e69ee5eab4b0\n\nsealer_input_index_sha256 =\n  2ca3b8db32bcc8124f053ca0d778bd64c86916d019956dd0657985619aed202c\n\nsealer_input_index_digest =\n  470f2bb25c95babd3d786355de5bf9b718fdef50b14bd2bdb21e06baf0930471\n\nindexed_leaf_count = 763\nindexed_leaf_mismatch_count = 0\ncheckpoint_field_count = 23\nacceptance_gate_count = 14\n```\n\nGate IDs must retain the v2 order from `TFV1-CLOSURE-001` through `TFV1-CANDIDATE-001`.\n\n## 2. Append-only inventory-state observation\n\nDo not create a modified copy of v2. Preserve it as the normative policy and append a state-supersession record with this logical order:\n\n1. `schema`\n2. `status`\n3. `recorded_at_utc`\n4. `authority`\n5. `state_parent`\n6. `supersedes`\n7. `current_candidate`\n8. `postseal_checkpoint`\n9. `contract_invariance`\n10. `acceptance_gate_observation`\n11. `effective_state`\n12. `anti_equivocation`\n13. `non_actions`\n14. `privacy`\n\nRequired semantics:\n\n```text\nauthority =\n  INVENTORY_STATE_SUPERSESSION_ONLY_NOT_TASK26_PASS\n\nsupersedes:\n  v2 current_verdict = FAIL\n  v2 checkpoint_observed = false\n  prior 2e trainer-free final verdict = FAIL\n\neffective_state:\n  candidate_digest = 2e...da925\n  checkpoint_observed = true\n  current_verdict = READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT\n  task26_pass = false\n```\n\nIt must bind the raw SHA-256 of the new checkpoint and preserve these policy digests exactly:\n\n```text\nrequired_fields_sha256 =\n  9068f017d63340389c1909cd0dfcbc51d53bf11d9bcbe0aac70ebce42d7ff9b0\n\nrequired_values_sha256 =\n  daefea96e08ff2575e00a3fbce4cdc567d8ac5af3ca7656e484f190392db677b\n\ncheckpoint_contract_sha256 =\n  a91f3401c0052542303d393f983062b8ab01eb5a6ae5370348f918020a9b9f59\n\nacceptance_gates_sha256 =\n  f6b83edbcb3c1f2d4ac338a737f2c271c9098c3866eb3521cb88f810985ec98a\n\nglobal_trainer_free_scan_sha256 =\n  f397d35d5a5b47f66e423078cea55eae76621afd1221072df28908ccebe8c03a\n\nrequired_reaudit_execution_sha256 =\n  d45437e933124c2c92efc000b73a95d09ebd6b5b6d4bb7aeddc1e85b3f3052a\n```\n\nThus the observation supersedes only v2's historical state flags. It cannot remove, rename, relax or reinterpret any of the 14 gates.\n\n# Authority rules\n\n1. `2e...da925` is the only current candidate digest.\n2. `653...a723` may appear only as inherited source-evidence provenance.\n3. The in-tree checkpoint establishes sealed bytes, not readiness.\n4. The external checkpoint establishes readiness, not Task26 PASS.\n5. The inventory observation advances state, not policy.\n6. Only a later independent trainer-free reviewer may issue that lane's PASS.\n7. Only the overall release review may grant Task26 or release authority.\n8. Timestamps never select authority. Hash-chain membership and exact candidate match do.\n9. Any competing valid child of the same inventory-state parent is an equivocation and decisive FAIL; do not choose “latest”.\n10. Any candidate-tree drift, missing 763 input, altered gate digest, nonzero absence count or predecessor receipt retargeting is decisive FAIL.\n\n# Hidden weaknesses\n\n- **“Full digest” is misleading.** It commits the manifest domain, not the complete candidate tree or checkpoint. The external checkpoint must therefore bind the tree, seal checkpoint and freeze explicitly.\n- **POSIX read-only is not immutable or append-only.** The owner can chmod, replace or delete evidence. Hashes prove integrity of available bytes, not authorship or non-deletion. The minimum mitigation is unique paths, parent-hash chaining, stable descriptor-bound reads and fail-closed fork detection. A detached signature or transparency log is required only if the threat model includes a malicious evidence owner.\n- **The 763-input index commits hashes but not availability.** Many source leaves and Gate18-20 receipts remain outside the candidate. They must all be present and reauthenticated at checkpoint time. A future format should package them content-addressably.\n- **Absolute-path/TOCTOU risk exists.** Verification should use directory descriptors, `O_NOFOLLOW`, stable pre/post `fstat`, single-link files and stable root device/inode.\n- **Byte parity transfers code-bound evidence, not historical live execution.** This contract must not convert Task22-25 historical Telegram actions into execution against `2e`.\n\n# Final PASS/FAIL rationale\n\n- **Current evidence state:** **FAIL**, correctly. The post-seal checkpoint and state observation do not yet exist.\n- **Contract satisfiability:** **PASS** under option A.\n- **Candidate decision:** `2e...da925` remains current and unchanged.\n- **Literal endless-successor remediation:** **FAIL / structurally unsatisfiable**.\n- **Substantive reviewer remediation:** Can be fulfilled with two append-only evidence records, read-only hash/verifier authentication, and one later final review receipt.\n- **Required operational actions:** zero product edits, zero test edits or reruns, zero profile/runtime/service actions, zero archive changes, zero network/Telegram/provider actions and zero Git actions. Evidence-only writes are required.\n- **Scope:** Success permits the trainer-free lane to re-audit `2e`; it does not by itself make overall Task26 or the release PASS."}}
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