I read this as implementation - I’ll trace the shipped invite API and ledger invariants, build a test-first sealed harness, then run diagnostics, tests, and only a live read-only dry-run.


The Task26 evidence bundle contains the candidate runtime closure and prior approvals. I’m narrowing the canonical bootstrap API, current live layout, and evidence hashes before designing the seal and tests.


message: WebSocket error

stop_reason: error


The shipped API has the necessary atomic prepare, single-use claim, and expiry primitives, but no cancellation primitive. The harness will therefore fail closed: rollback means withholding the token and allowing canonical expiry before publication; after the 0600 handoff exists, rollback is prohibited. I’m implementing that boundary and event-driven inotify watches against disposable copies of the current ledger layout.


The first disposable-ledger run caught a real compatibility error in my independent validator: the shipped ledger digest uses UTF-8 canonical JSON without a trailing newline, while receipt canonicalization uses a newline. I’ve separated those encodings and am rerunning the suite once against the corrected sealed bytes.


Implementation is complete. I’m at verification: diagnostics on the harness/tests, one focused test run on the final sealed bytes, static checks, then the authorized live profile dry-run only. No prepare, observe process, service, Telegram, provider, profile, or Git action will be run.


I read this as implementation - I built and validated the sealed harness, then ran only the live read-only dry-run.

**FAIL — live prerequisite not clean**

Blocker: `/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest/gateway.lock` still exists. It must only be cleared through the separately sealed reset path, never manually.

Harness result: **PASS**

- Root: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a`
- Modes: `dry-run`, `verify`, `prepare`, `observe`, `expire`
- Harness: `invite_harness.py`
  - mode `0500`
  - SHA-256 `2826b1baf97918829f80d41722ec6534f933e57efa52345353cdb366cac314fb`
- Permission seal:
  - `permission-seal.json`
  - mode `0600`
  - SHA-256 `c4e857894ebd8b2e96289ea70d7cdcdd38cdad1c72cc7b1c86f33a5d2de7d171`
- Approval receipt:
  - `approval-receipt.json`
  - SHA-256 `c7fc477141259087e8e9dd6520b2066eda3bab20dc6e2f625942431b6830c187`
- Verification receipt:
  - `verification-receipt.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256 `c2a6393f2ccf67ab6872f83e03793af72ea21b7df2e616c7cc2256c566c6b2c0`
- Exact commands and prerequisites: `OPERATIONS.md`

Verification:

- LSP: 0 errors
- Ruff: PASS
- `py_compile`: PASS
- Pytest: `6 passed in 1.04s`
- Loaded candidate API byte hash: `145515d5e110dcebb94fcaa554bcee29544b3a75dcfe058fae944ea3b70042b2`
- Live dry-run: exit `2`, expected fail-closed
- Live profile aggregate before/after:
  `c3a3458bf430292e365cdaaacc035513a342eddcb199999ccf39726656128f00`
- Profile mutations: 0
- No invite, service, Telegram, provider, network, archive restore, direct authority mutation, or Git action occurred.

The harness remains not ready for an invite until the sealed reset path removes the stale lock and a subsequent `dry-run` plus `verify` both pass.


I read this as a focused fix - I’ll prove whether the shipped store canonically initializes an absent ledger, preserve v1, build a sealed append-only v2 with missing-baseline event coverage, then run full checks and read-only live dry-run/verify only.


The candidate contract is conclusive: `RoomBootstrapStore.__init__` calls `_prepare_paths()`, creates the missing state directory recursively at 0700, creates/locks `ledger.lock` at 0600, and atomically writes an authenticated empty ledger before prepare appends the session. The reset baseline is valid; v1’s existing-ledger assumption is the defect.


I’m implementing v2 around two explicit baselines: authenticated existing-ledger state, or reset-bound canonical absence. For absence, read-only modes require the reset manifest/receipt and all cleared sibling authorities to remain absent; prepare watches `data/` before invoking the shipped initializer and rejects any post-subscription race or unexpected resulting tree.


The first v2 test exposed a second exact-source detail: `Path.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0700)` applies 0700 to the leaf state directory, while Python creates the intermediate `data/onboarding` under the process umask (0755 here). The profile and `data` roots remain 0700, and the ledger leaf remains 0700/0600. I’m recording that truthful candidate behavior rather than manually “repairing” it.


V2’s disposable matrix now passes the absent baseline, candidate initialization, post-subscription race, duplicate event, symlink/mode/schema/unknown-authority, reset-drift, and independent-verifier cases. I’m moving to final diagnostics, sealing documentation, and the two live read-only gates.


I read this as a focused fix - v2 is repaired, sealed, independently verified, and live read-only gates pass.

**PASS — READY_FOR_ONE_INVITE**

Determination:

- Candidate API legitimately initializes an absent ledger.
- Reset baseline is valid.
- V1 incorrectly required an existing ledger and remains preserved unchanged.
- No empty ledger was manually created.

Artifacts: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v2`

- Harness SHA-256: `83c95abb4b07f30fae0d996a7148c92b2db4600f6f3da2aadaf50a7ff62c71fc`
- Permission seal: `847548932b42210416fcfc302574e523778f12aecd2614ac28a95af6602c8dcc`
- Schema: `6a4249d263db04bea1432ad2393150ed77d3243a1365ed8dbe1eed5c0261df9e`
- Operations: `82099d8a3658a494c3cf13558e43fe7846e7e826cfcdec6c10515f05a697752d`
- Independent verifier: `bb3ae896f8dd1a51d2f9df425f3afdc2bf72f73877163b6941a2bba2ee44b4ad`
- Verification receipt: `c9a6bb0fea893d90956249264277481039a522021001495f07a2a28ec6280e0d`
- Hash inventory: `ad6cd01cfb85aa4183cea5067fab4a507cbae2a8418223c4f160b9253cf388e0`

Validation:

- Pytest: `14 passed in 0.73s`
- Ruff: PASS
- `py_compile`: PASS
- LSP errors: 0
- Independent verification: PASS, 10/10
- Live dry-run: PASS, absent-ledger baseline, mutations 0
- Live verify: PASS, absent-ledger baseline, mutations 0
- Profile aggregate before/after both gates:
  `4ea2ee60dcc6725c3b8aeca2f4893aa73a7a137ec0d274b813d0383d97787e3e`

Preparation now watches the stable `data/` parent before candidate initialization, catches pre-subscription races, and verifies one creation event and exactly one generation-1 `PREPARED` session.

Exact commands and prerequisites are in `OPERATIONS-v2.md`.

No invite, service, network, Telegram, provider, profile mutation, manual ledger initialization, or Git action occurred.


I read this as evidence-input preparation - I’ll inspect the candidate’s exact draft parser and v6 bindings, prove the proposed key is globally unused and live authorities remain empty, then write only one private 0600 draft plus redacted verification evidence and return the retry command if clean.


The proposed key `task26_live_2e_20260815_8527916639` satisfies the downstream 3–64 character customer-key contract and was absent from the repository, live profile, and retained reset archive before creation. I’ve written the sole draft input and am validating it through the exact loaded candidate parser plus fresh read-only live gates.


I read this as evidence-input preparation - the draft is sealed, validated, and live authority remains clean.

**PASS — safe to retry prepare**

- Draft: `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v2/task26-live-2e-customer-draft.private.json`
- SHA-256: `54967689318b27c620b45a4feb7620f5728b9d0fa4b3c4c0986dc9124b1416e2`
- Mode: `0600`, single-link, non-symlink
- Customer key: `task26_live_2e_20260815_8527916639`
- `customer_user_id`: `null`
- Candidate parser: PASS
- No raw token
- Binding receipt: `task26-live-2e-customer-draft-binding.redacted.json`
  - SHA-256: `1cdf5c28366bb64a6ff47fab1076627d34ac5056e3d918de5694b4f423b4cd41`

Exact schema:

- Required: `customer_key`, `display_name`, `starts_on`, `daily_time`, `weekly_weekday`, `monthly_day`, `calories_kcal`, `protein_g`, `meals`
- Optional: `primary_goal`, `dietary_restrictions`, `allergies`, `food_preferences`, `supplements`, `digestion_context`, `sleep_goal_hours`, `recovery_goal`, `training_context`, `carbohydrate_g`, `fat_g`, `water_liters`, `customer_user_id`

Live checks: registry/bootstrap/onboarding absent, PREPARED sessions `0`, service inactive, profile hash unchanged.

```bash
D='.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v2'
PY='/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.venv/bin/python'
PROFILE='/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest'

"$PY" -B "$D/invite_harness_v2.py" prepare \
  --profile "$PROFILE" \
  --permission "$D/permission-seal-v2.json" \
  --draft "$D/task26-live-2e-customer-draft.private.json" \
  --handoff "$D/task26-live-2e-invite-handoff.private.json" \
  --receipt "$D/task26-live-2e-preparation.redacted.json" \
  --evidence-root "$D"
```


I read this as replacement-input preparation - I’ll bind the newly recorded approval and terminal expired lineage, verify the exact installed candidate and clean live state, then create only the r2 private draft and redacted receipt without invoking prepare or touching the profile.


The live lineage is clean and terminal, but a binding conflict surfaced: the amended plan is now `d816dbbd...`, while both runbook v6 and the sealed v2 harness/permission still require `7ace03c6...`. I’ll still produce the requested r2 draft and redacted blocked binding receipt; I will not claim the existing prepare command is safe unless those executable bindings agree.


I read this as an append-only supersession - I’ll leave v2 untouched, create the r2 draft first, then build a v3 harness/permission contract that hard-pins that draft, the replacement approval, current plan, terminal predecessor, and one-replacement-only ledger shape before any candidate API call.


I read this as completion of the append-only replacement harness - v3 is sealed and verified without preparing an invite.

`READY_FOR_EXACTLY_ONE_REPLACEMENT_INVITE`

### Sealed v3

Root:

```text
.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v3
```

Key hashes:

```text
harness:     cb9a7ecf2e2f5c2b730d66c1a418311bd15da21119cd8629bb39a4819540d8ee
permission:  17d19e3ff54f2b15280ca6e675df314dfcd84679e748367e555bc6af4f9cfb54
approval:    014f5c95c1f28bea9f0ac5170dc3d28dd580b2e0477d14887b2c2b07781e40d1
schema:      5d11d2189049c5f3b438b107281a092322753cd2831a30bbb9e12b2df6160229
operations:  c04b6abccaba4982cb8392c3d6d9585fb011aac6237b549bea3e7e1f84c576fc
verification: 5af1c4809d70118f978928c28d5c4368b3a4a0f181b02a0d4a3f6250b2642c60
inventory:   7586d5a97368d3ecd8e56740d797afd615d2036fe0736ced497f0ee83817b32c
```

Draft:

```text
path: .omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v3/task26-live-2e-r2-customer-draft.private.json
SHA-256: ee05174e7287a87f9c5e40dae1034cf8b3228edc6b9516df8e6349667baffc7c
mode: 0600
customer_key: task26_live_2e_r2_20260815_8527916639
binding receipt: 5fec86d955518ad8029793972553e78833af21b6c512b4f44d45e43fcc2efdf8
```

Verification passed:

- Focused tests: `11 passed`
- Ruff: PASS
- Compile: PASS
- LSP errors: 0
- Independent verification: 13/13 PASS
- Live dry-run and verify: PASS
- Profile hash unchanged: `abd5cea4...`
- Existing v2 harness and permission hashes unchanged
- No replacement handoff, preparation, or claim artifacts exist

### Exact prepare command

```bash
D='.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v3'
PY='/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.venv/bin/python'
PROFILE='/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest'

"$PY" -B "$D/invite_harness_v3.py" prepare \
  --profile "$PROFILE" \
  --permission "$D/permission-seal-v3.json" \
  --draft "$D/task26-live-2e-r2-customer-draft.private.json" \
  --handoff "$D/task26-live-2e-r2-invite-handoff.private.json" \
  --receipt "$D/task26-live-2e-r2-preparation.redacted.json" \
  --evidence-root "$D"
```

### Exact observe command

Run after preparation and before exposing the handoff:

```bash
D='.omo/evidence/task26/task26-invite-harness-st_01a0056a-v3'
PY='/home/cube/projects/richard/hermes-agent/.venv/bin/python'
PROFILE='/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest'

mapfile -t BINDING < <(
  "$PY" -B - "$D/task26-live-2e-r2-preparation.redacted.json" <<'PY'
import json
import sys

receipt = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8"))
print(receipt["session_id"])
print(receipt["sid_hash"])
PY
)

"$PY" -B "$D/invite_harness_v3.py" observe \
  --profile "$PROFILE" \
  --permission "$D/permission-seal-v3.json" \
  --session-id "${BINDING[0]}" \
  --sid-hash "${BINDING[1]}" \
  --ready "$D/task26-live-2e-r2-claim-ready.redacted.json" \
  --receipt "$D/task26-live-2e-r2-claim-observed.redacted.json" \
  --timeout-seconds 120
```


I read this as filename lookup - returning the five exact relative filenames.

verification-receipt-v3.redacted.json
hashes-v3.json
task26-live-2e-r2-dry-run.redacted.json
task26-live-2e-r2-verify.redacted.json
independent_verify_v3.py