I read this as an evidence-sealing implementation task - I’ll inspect the existing Task26 seal/controller conventions and live read-only artifacts, then append a deterministic independently verified seal without altering runtime state, source, configuration, Git, or planning records.


The live boundary is present and stable: the target service is active/running at PID 591358 with Telegram connected, and the requested lifecycle artifacts exist. I’m now binding only metadata, hashes, cardinalities, and redacted attestations while tracing the exact successor and cleanup authorities.


The lifecycle chain is internally consistent and exact: one committed nutrition_daily check-in, one seven-state generation lineage, one owner-approved revision/card, and one sent_audited delivery whose payload digest equals the approved draft. I’m sealing that read-only snapshot now; the cleanup preflight will explicitly mark the existing v2 controller as sealed but currently blocked because its old candidate/permission pins and shutdown/disabled-state schema do not match this live candidate.


The requested patch utility is not installed on this workstation, so the first append attempt made no files and changed no state. I’m supplying a local patch-compatible shim and will still create every evidence artifact through the `apply_patch` patch stream, then verify hashes and live invariants.


The append-only package is sealed. I’m at final verification: live semantic checks, independent inventory/root validation, deterministic tests, diagnostics, service health, and a final hash/status inventory. No cleanup command or runtime mutation is being executed.


I read this as completion reporting - I’ll provide the seal identifiers, verification results, and exact cleanup authorization boundary.

Created append-only evidence package:

`.omo/evidence/task26/task26-live-lifecycle-evidence-seal-4a6c7ee5-st_01a00e44/`

- Root: `fdcfb1efd1f2d4a2b95f22f7311827d197898a6d480cb572956e87bd66d20361`
- Seal SHA-256: `50e7556e58a876d8136fbfb2023ede8bcb46ac816d97d4b85e1d0559f463d008`
- Inventory canonical digest: `6e78b9cfeedde246f2b60824c0b7cedeafbc1459744a6066cb692c38915f5e0e`
- Inventory file SHA-256: `1692fd4b640252dd2087b0a925127c4dc13341d23e55ff123b509ebf76b82cf7`
- Sealed payload files: 4; package files: 6
- Verifier: 54 live checks plus 11 inventory/root checks, all PASS
- Tests: 9 passed
- Diagnostics: 0 errors
- Runtime remained `active/running`, PID `591358`, Telegram connected
- Config remained mode `0664`, SHA-256 `a95a89e838793d246bbbbba0d93da9ab0f2f2726f4fd27864648c4111563f509`
- Config truth sealed as `enabled=true`, `delivery_enabled=true`, `activation=false`, `delivery=false`; delivery is limited to owner-approved explicit callback sends, not adaptive or automatic delivery.
- No cleanup or live/source/config/service/Git/plan/todo/Boulder/ledger mutation was performed.

Cleanup authorization preflight:

- Existing archive-first controller: `post-lifecycle-cleanup-v2/cleanup_controller.py`
- Controller SHA-256: `8b03fa714304b34a7f19dc9b077d8fbd54e7f7bc46232bf8d5bc65ae7b873ff5`
- **Do not execute its existing command.** Its permission targets candidate `2e0894ea...` and wheel `af4a9d0a...`, and its schema expects predecessor-only fields plus disabled/stopped state.
- Next authorization must seal a schema-compatible successor of that controller, bound to candidate `4a6c7ee5...`, wheel `9d22e89...`, this root, actor, plan, and successor controller hash.
- A separately authorized transition must then disable the customer and delivery, establish empty jobs authority if required, and stop the service—without rewriting the sealed ACTIVE lifecycle or audited delivery.
- Require successor dry-run PASS before archive-first execute, followed by independent archive verification.