I read this as a mandatory advisory-only security/privacy/authority audit of the bound Task26 final state - I’ll inspect the full architecture, source, configuration, tests, and archived evidence without mutations or external actions, then return PASS only if every required control is directly substantiated.


I read this as a mandatory read-only Task26 security review - I’m resolving the remaining delivery-window and archive-immutability questions, then I’ll issue PASS or exact blocking findings.


I read this as the same read-only review - the lifecycle and cleanup seals verify; I’m correcting the candidate-binding check to use its declared canonical digest rather than the manifest file hash.


I read this as a mandatory read-only Task26 security review - I completed the verification and am reporting the policy-blocking gaps.

# Verdict: FAIL

Candidate `4a6c7ee5…`, lifecycle seal `50e7556…`, cleanup seal `84d937…`, and Telegram message `232` are correctly bound and internally consistent. However, two medium-severity policy gaps prevent PASS.

## Findings

### 1. MEDIUM — `delivery_enabled` was not limited to the authorized send window

The delivery gate remained enabled after message `232` was already `sent_audited`:

- `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-live-lifecycle-evidence-seal-4a6c7ee5-st_01a00e44/lifecycle-evidence.json:7` — `delivery_enabled: true`
- Same file:
  - `:117` — customer message `232`
  - `:123` — `sent_audited`
  - `:150` — recorded at `2026-08-17T05:48:59Z`
- Archived pre-cleanup configuration:
  - `/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest/data/post-lifecycle-cleanup-archives/task26-current-4a6c7ee5-20260817/payload/config.yaml:660`
- It was disabled only by cleanup:
  - `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-post-lifecycle-cleanup-v3-4a6c7ee5-st_01a00e50/cleanup_controller.py:391`
  - Configuration changed around `15:17:26 KST`, at least 28 minutes after the sealed post-delivery state.

Owner authorization and callback pins still prevented automatic or non-owner delivery, so this is not evidence of an extra send. Nevertheless, the global transport capability remained live beyond the one authorized operation.

**Remediation:** Keep the global gate false and use a durable one-use capability bound to candidate, customer, draft, revision, owner actor/chat/topic, card nonce, and render message. Consume it atomically before transport. If retaining the boolean, enable it immediately before transport and restore false for success, failure, timeout, and unknown-provider outcomes before processing further updates. This historical lifecycle cannot be retroactively corrected; certification requires an explicit exception or a new lifecycle.

Current exposure is closed: `/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest/config.yaml:660` is false and the service is inactive/dead.

### 2. MEDIUM — Archive is tamper-evident, not immutable

The archive remains writable by its owner:

- Archive root:
  - `/home/cube/.hermes/profiles/dualcoachtest/data/post-lifecycle-cleanup-archives/task26-current-4a6c7ee5-20260817`
- Files are mode `0600`; directories are `0700`.
- `lsattr` shows no immutable flag.
- The verifier explicitly accepts writable files:
  - `.omo/evidence/task26/task26-post-lifecycle-cleanup-v3-4a6c7ee5-st_01a00e50/verify_successor_seal.py:48`

The supplied `84d937…` pin makes subsequent modification detectable, and the archive currently matches it. It does not prevent alteration or deletion, which fails an immutable-archive requirement.

**Remediation:** Preserve the existing sealed archive unchanged and copy it byte-exactly into independent WORM/object-lock storage, then issue a successor seal anchored to `84d937…`, the WORM object checksums, and retention metadata. A local alternative is root-owned storage with filesystem immutability and verifier checks for those controls, but changing existing POSIX modes would invalidate the current archive-root digest.

## Controls verified

- Exact candidate and both supplied seal bindings: PASS.
- DM isolation and exact actor/chat/topic routing: PASS.
- Owner-only approve/send: PASS.
- Callback nonce, render identity, and generation/revision CAS pins: PASS.
- Exactly one delivery row and provider message `232`; idempotency key `40f246…`: PASS.
- Unknown-provider outcome and retry handling fail closed: PASS.
- No automatic/adaptive sends observed: PASS.
- Secret literal scan found no Telegram, OpenAI, AWS, or bearer credentials: PASS.
- Handler-exception records contain reason codes/update IDs rather than customer message content: PASS.
- Final service/poll state is inactive/dead, delivery disabled, with no live customer artifacts, jobs, or publications: PASS.

Read-only verification executed without network or customer actions:

- Lifecycle inventory verifier: 11 checks, PASS.
- Cleanup successor verifier: 64 checks over 172 archive entries, PASS.
- No files were modified.