I read this as a read-only release-provenance audit of the exact v10 candidate - I’ll locate the frozen bundle and receipts, independently recompute every stated invariant, then rerun the bundled verifier and sealed-wheel rehydration from the final state before issuing a hash-grounded verdict.


The evidence layout is now identified and fully frozen (`0500` directories, `0400` files). I’m moving from receipt inspection to independent recomputation: canonical document chains, all wheel ZIP/RECORD metadata and dependency closure, source/installed parity, authority history including the external ledger line, and a fresh isolated verifier/rehydration run using only disposable `/tmp` state.


Independent recomputation found one semantic discrepancy despite all byte-level seals passing: the bundled source Golden chain is not for candidate `310632…`; it is frozen to candidate `b34b2a…`, while only the installed chain is bound to v10. I’m still completing the mandated fresh final-state execution now, including the verifier’s expected PASS, sealed-wheel rehydration, hostile-CWD origin check, before/after equality, and cleanup/preservation checks; the final verdict will distinguish verifier coverage from the uncovered release-provenance defect.


I read this as the final read-only v10 provenance verdict - report the independently recomputed result, fresh execution evidence, discrepancy, and residual risk.

# Verdict: FAIL

Candidate `310632f25b112373d97355c5ce3290dc55fb6d036a735e2b53861d983c4fd648` is byte-consistent and operationally reproducible, but its sealed **source Golden seven-clause chain belongs to another candidate**:

- Expected v10: `310632f25b112373d97355c5ce3290dc55fb6d036a735e2b53861d983c4fd648`
- Sealed source chain: `b34b2a12fd0ad3d4c95a58c847a2411e81272a646f5a4f5ec568d0d3640a3747`
- Source chain head: `292a39f1d1a6bf3cf466bc10ddde2f5ed145ba45f043864bb2941f866fe257f2`
- Installed v10 chain correctly binds candidate `310632…`
- Installed chain head: `f712a4004b4e54a8e45f63ec7783265bc6145d77a08ac2adc9a1a4e1ed652157`

The bundled frozen verifier still returns PASS because it validates only the installed chain; it does not require the source chain to bind the candidate.

## Passing recomputations

- Candidate manifest SHA-256: `1e7064006cfefa2df8a33abdfb54533b4cbae424f934ec889e914656e0f8b1db`
- Bundle seal: `f9a85ba877008043adc6a4842760e2e122d2466c7a26daa50f3a2cf410fa0241`
- Product: `86be3a61d1af08bc434416192ff22f1f30dce2408d986ed20700964ba06dc207`
- Portable runtime: `0e63013ffb74bd9d37eb6f5f9636f196ef37929000dec17179af68bc3a81253d`
- Post-freeze seal: `24dce55cbdba09e555f6d8a4e309e4c9541ccce2da8e487f2d8595233e2e0c73`
- Inventory: 364 sealed files; 447 entries including directories; no writable paths or symlinks.
- Wheels: 107 dependency wheels plus two product wheels; 109 unique projects.
- Independently checked 11,309 ZIP members and RECORD rows: all hashes/sizes valid; zero wheel symlinks; dependency closure complete; no active direct URLs.
- Five source/wheel/installed product modules matched byte-for-byte.
- Wheelhouse before/after: identical, SHA-256 `9bdc1462b626d77452b7493cf327658c80578a2c48d9f4cc9ce7c12900737e19`.
- Origin isolation and hostile-CWD shadow-import rejection passed.
- Trust-boundary content digest: `1273abc223a8f1eb6d4adb5178d5ab466d68bbcc365b33364cf6d7ef602410c6`; receipt file SHA-256 `636d9cc2b57dd3b03557f35ea9a502ddb116dec5c948bd9685eeb1ec9e27b174`.
- Authority: 17 chained events, 9 qualifications, 8 revocations; only v10 current.
- Registry head: `d4e0e2f6d44d15d9ca74c47941d5504a6c1618836b455567f268c7cec8cdffe7`
- Ledger head: `3dd46f75fa61fe632315c0a8fa5c344671124289a890884ecb8352c741154549`
- External ledger line 159 correctly records v10; line SHA-256 `4ce742fa9346fa1a7bf823b02ba98d802b33e6494f306995c71a3ded5d3d5144`.
- Zero-inotify proof: `dnotify_signalfd_v1`, one directory resource, zero observer/process watches.
- Logged counts agree: 8,321 Gateway tests, 376 files, zero failures; all other stated source/installed/profile/security counts present.

## Fresh final-state reruns

- Frozen verifier: PASS, byte-identical output SHA-256 `1e53178ec183664118173f3433890fdab1678d2fea73794d19bfc273281f1e83`
- Sealed-wheel rehydration: PASS, byte-identical output SHA-256 `37265d393947798ff48a7fcc9b1b543ed7f9acb18fd8ed6a503cb93eb2a64d0f`
- Rehydration stderr empty; temporary runtime, controlled CWD, and hostile caller tree removed.
- Bundle before/after digest unchanged: `ac8df0d1f2288b70cfe134e40a6a6094d42ed4c24d1b2bf8507e74179d16b8eb`
- Ledger and all nine discovered Git dirty-tree states unchanged.
- No audit temp directories or residual audit processes remain. Existing unrelated tmux sessions were untouched.

## Blocker and residual risk

Release qualification is blocked until a source seven-clause chain is generated and sealed for exact candidate `310632…`, and the frozen verifier requires that source binding. Existing cryptographic integrity cannot repair the semantic cross-candidate binding.

Even after repair, evidence remains limited by its declared trust boundary: no external authenticity, non-repudiation, WORM protection, or compromised operator/admin resistance is claimed.