I read this as a final code-quality investigation of Task26 at the specified candidate and evidence level - I will inspect the bound source and tests, run the targeted verification, then report severity-ordered findings without edits.


I read this as a final read-only Task26 audit - I inspected candidate `5948498c...`, v12 evidence, and reran the targeted checks.

## FAIL - High

1. **Candidate identity is not cryptographically derived from the product binding.**
   - `scripts/source_golden_path.py:94-140` accepts any 64-hex CLI value or self-consistent binding file; it never derives it from wheels or a manifest.
   - `gateway/platforms/task26_final_state.py:379-426` sets and verifies `product_binding_sha256 == candidate_digest`, a tautology.
   - v12 confirms the gap: `preexecution-product-binding.json` has document digest `d16f...`, file digest `24b1...`, and real wheel hashes `774c...` / `62c5...`; none derive or equal candidate `5948...`.
   - This violates the required content-digest candidate identity (`.omo/plans/dualcoach-production-readiness.md:318-320`).

2. **The Golden Path writes the candidate digest into both wheel-hash fields.**
   - `scripts/source_golden_path.py:271-276` writes `candidate_digest` as `hermes_wheel_sha256` and `profile_wheel_sha256`.
   - Both v12 `source-golden-bundle/data/source-deployment-receipt.json` and `installed-golden-bundle/.../source-deployment-receipt.json` contain `5948...` for those fields, not the actual wheel hashes above.
   - `gateway/platforms/dualcoach_activation_cutover.py:271-280` only checks equality between two self-authored documents, never against wheel bytes.
   - Result: activation evidence falsely claims wheel identity; source/installed identity separation is not trustworthy.

## PASS

- The eight qualification-tool hashes exactly match v12 preexecution evidence; source tree recomputation matches `b34b...` across 137 Python files.
- Frozen v12 source bundle independently verified `ACTUAL_SOURCE_GOLDEN_PATH_PASS`.
- Candidate evidence inventory: all 365 recorded files hash-match; postfreeze seal and all listed receipts hash-match.
- Omitted/malformed/tree-as-candidate and re-signed-chain negatives passed: `tests/gateway/test_source_golden_path_verifier.py:666-906`.
- Cross-mode mismatch, wheelhouse closure/tamper, isolated-origin, authority-chain, and zero-inotify tests passed: `test_task26_final_state.py:220-660`, `test_task26_final_authority.py:45-75`, `test_commit_observer.py:96-313`.
- Observer is event-driven (`gateway/commit_observer.py:198-334`), reports zero inotify watches, and relevant source/tests contain no sleeps or polling loops.
- `ruff` and `ty` passed against the bound candidate source path.
- Targeted suite: **99 passed** in 4.19s. No edits or live actions performed.

## INCONCLUSIVE / residual risk

- I did not freshly replay full v12 wheelhouse rehydration because the exact sealed wheels are no longer available locally. The sealed postfreeze `rehydrated.json` reports installed-pass and its receipt seal validates, but that is historical evidence rather than a fresh replay.
- The documented trust boundary excludes a coherently compromised operator/host; that does not mitigate the two deterministic identity-binding defects above.

**Overall: FAIL.** The lifecycle verifier, authority chains, parser negatives, observer, and rehydration machinery are strong, but candidate-to-product and wheel-identity binding are release-blocking.