I read this as a final read-only security audit of the specified immutable candidate - I will inspect its implementation, tests, and verifier evidence offline, then return a PASS, FAIL, or INCONCLUSIVE verdict.


I read this as a final read-only security/safety audit - I am completing static authority, revocation, and receipt-binding review without running networked or mutating actions.


I read this as a final read-only security/safety audit - I am validating the two identified release blockers against the sealed candidate paths and completing the remaining scope summary.


I read this as a final read-only security/safety audit - the candidate fails on qualification evidence integrity and live-revocation ingress safety.

## FAIL - `2a6bf1a844e1110e79bfbc59a92a1b8d7d9acc41f1614c1b2ad8f13906a92622`

Release blockers:

1. **Profile qualification receipt is forgeable**
   - `write_profile_qualification_receipt()` in `gateway/platforms/task26_final_state.py` does not run pytest or consume test output. It writes the literal `749 passed\n` and constructs a PASS receipt from supplied source/wheel hashes.
   - Both frozen and independent verifiers only require that synthetic literal and its self-hash.
   - The outer candidate binding and `qualification-proof.json` do not bind an actual profile-test transcript to the claimed source tree and profile wheel.
   - Therefore the sealed `749 passed` claim is not proof that the bound profile was qualified.

2. **Authority revocation has an inbound-update TOCTOU race**
   - Revocation is detected asynchronously by the dnotify/signalfd watcher, then queued onto the event loop.
   - `_capture_telegram_update_context()` only checks `_task26_service_revoked`; it does not acquire runtime authority or otherwise linearize ingress with the authority lock.
   - An inbound update can be dispatched after external revocation commits but before the watcher callback sets that flag, allowing Task26-local handling/mutation.
   - The claimed socket QA does not test this race: its mock Bot API always returns empty `getUpdates` results, so `post_revoke_updates == 0` is tautological. The unit test calls the ingress gate only after disconnect completion.

Static controls that checked out, but do not offset the blockers:
- Candidate source hashes match the sealed Hermes wheel for controller, Telegram, runtime authority, final-state, and watcher modules.
- Direct customer transport holds runtime authority through the provider send; outbound revoke-vs-send locking is sound.
- Wheel RECORD recomputation passed: 992 members/rows, complete inventory, no hash or size mismatch.
- No symlinks or group/world-writable paths were found in the prefrozen bundle.
- Direct-URL portable provenance is correctly bound to sealed wheel hashes and explicitly does not claim raw path-dependent RECORD equality.
- Ty attestation binds the corrected wheel, Python 3.12 target, and exactly one `--python-version`.

Required remediation: make profile qualification an actual bound execution/replay artifact, and linearize protected ingress with revocation authority for the complete handling/mutation interval; add a real injected-update concurrent-revocation test.

Verification was static/read-only only: no network, sockets, test execution, or filesystem mutation.