I read this as a final read-only privacy and authority audit of candidate `2a6bf1a...` - I’ll inspect that exact revision, its test/evidence artifacts, and report a verdict with any blockers or residual risk.


I read this as an audit constrained to the named candidate - the supplied working directory is not a Git worktree, so I’ll locate the candidate’s repository or archived bundle before assessing it.


I read this as evidence-backed verification of the sealed v33 bundle - I’ve identified the candidate as a bundle digest (not a Git revision) and will now cross-check its final ledger entry, seals, bundle contents, and static enforcement surfaces.


I read this as a final artifact audit rather than a rerun - the ledger’s candidate entry and both postfreeze pass receipts bind the requested digest, and I’ll now validate the supporting static checks, wheel contents, routes, and cleanup records without starting any runtime.


I read this as closing the remaining static-evidence gaps - I’ll inspect the sealed wheel payloads and the exact transcript/cleanup/provenance records, still without invoking the candidate or opening a socket.


I read this as validation of the final product payload itself - the sealed Hermes and profile wheels contain no `trainer` token, and I’ll now trace the Telegram advisory/revocation code paths to distinguish scoped `store=False` enforcement from unrelated bundled client utilities.


I read this as final authority-path confirmation - the three Telegram advisory request paths all set `store=False`; I’ll verify the owner/customer identity material and fail-closed watcher implementation before issuing the read-only verdict.


I read this as a final consistency pass across all required authority dimensions - I’ll confirm the four authorization purposes and perform a complete sealed-root trainer-token scan, then return the audit verdict without executing tests or services.


I read this as resolving the last semantic ambiguity - the only sealed-root `trainer` text is a historical test filename (`test_trainer_free_v1_contract.py`), not a role, route, marker, or runtime datum; I’ll confirm customer-activation authorization exists in the sealed wheel before closing.


I read this as correcting a read-only audit query error - the underlying source and installed transcript records were already read directly; I’ll rerun only the local JSON summary with the path construction fixed.


I read this as a final read-only release audit - I verified the sealed v33 candidate and its postfreeze evidence.

**PASS** - no blockers.

- Ledger line 167 names exactly `2a6bf1a844e1110e79bfbc59a92a1b8d7d9acc41f1614c1b2ad8f13906a92622`; prefreeze/postfreeze seals, source/installed parity, and authority registry bind it.
- No deployed trainer role/route/data: both sealed wheels and both golden bundles have zero runtime `trainer` tokens; roles are only `customer` and `owner`, on private topic-0 routes `[200,0]` and `[100,0]`. The sole retained textual occurrences are two qualification-log test filenames: `test_trainer_free_v1_contract.py`.
- Customer and operator/owner identities are distinct private DMs. Approval callbacks map exclusively to `owner`.
- Static authorization gates cover activation, service activation, capability issue, and transport. Revocation stops the watcher, clears authority/coordinator state, persists `service_revoked`, and disconnects the network.
- Source and installed real-loopback transcripts both show `actual_socket=true`, `mock_network=false`, `external_traffic=false`, committed revocation, `post_revoke_updates=0`, zero active connections, and watcher/socket/server cleanup.
- All three Telegram advisory completion paths explicitly set `store=False`.
- Independent sealed-wheelhouse replay, frozen bootstrap, rehydrated installed replay, and tamper rejection passed. Profile, direct-url portable projection, candidate/product/wheel bindings, and hermetic Python 3.12 Ty bindings are present; Ty reports zero capability-surface diagnostics.
- Cleanup receipts report no orphan processes/FDs, watcher/socket/external-authority residue, writable residue, or runtime residue.

Residual risk: this is evidence-backed and deliberately did not re-run services or contact external providers. Ty retains 810 acknowledged diagnostics outside the sealed capability surface.