I read this as a read-only security audit of candidate `1a8ba68a8312943b8918ef9029023aa97fc968fd2d9c0f316d7385232e0d7712` - I will trace the specified attack surfaces and return a verdict with evidence.


message: WebSocket error

stop_reason: error


I read this as verification execution within the read-only audit - I will now re-run the sealed verifier and the exact 749-test receipt writer in isolated, network-disabled sandboxes.


I read this as a final read-only security audit - I am independently exercising the sealed candidate’s ingress and provenance claims before issuing a verdict.


I read this as a final v36 security verdict - I am issuing it from the sealed evidence and completed independent checks.

## PASS

Candidate: `1a8ba68a8312943b8918ef9029023aa97fc968fd2d9c0f316d7385232e0d7712`

- Independent isolated, network-unshared profile execution passed: exactly 749 collected/executed/passed; source digest, Python 3.12.9 executable, runner, wheel, manifest, stdout/stderr, and before/after source digest matched bindings.
- `process_update` is wrapped under one shared authority lease across the complete handler invocation, released in `finally` for normal exit, errors, and cancellation. Revocation cannot commit during an in-flight mutation.
- Source and installed real-loopback Telegram receipts show a server-delivered post-revocation update with `handler_entries=0`, `mutations=0`, and deferred watcher failure; cleanup is recorded.
- The wrapper is activated only when `nutrition_coaching.enabled is True`; the ordinary Telegram path remains unwrapped.
- Controller activation, authority-root exclusions, dnotify/signalfd watcher behavior, candidate/wheel/tool bindings, direct-url canonical provenance, raw-record non-equality handling, Ty 3.12 binding, substitution defenses, and seals are internally consistent.
- Sealed source and working-tree hashes matched for the Task26 authority, Telegram, controller, watcher, final-state, bootstrap, verifier, and socket-QA code.

No security blocker found.

One packaging caveat, not a verdict blocker: `postfreeze-seal.json` is intentionally generated for the disposable postfreeze verification copy and is not retained in the immutable prefreeze root. Invoking the independent verifier directly on that prefreeze root therefore fails preflight; the sealed postfreeze receipts bind the generated seal (`90be8531...ebd8db`) and record successful verifier/bootstrap execution.