I read this as a final read-only security audit of delivered candidate `d1109d8f…` - I’ll verify the delivered root directly and inspect the specified attack surfaces without generating replacements.


I read this as a final security disposition for delivered v38 - I verified the exact delivered root and audited the required boundaries.

**PASS** within the stated trusted-host/toolchain boundary.

- Direct delivered-root verification passed: `TASK26_INDEPENDENT_CANDIDATE_PASS` for candidate `d1109d8f…` using the sealed verifier from the delivered root; no replacement bundle was generated.
- Delivered/postfreeze/receipt inventories, candidate binding, wheel hashes, authority chains, profile-v2 receipt (749), direct_url projections, and Ty 3.12 semantic/raw diagnostics all verified.
- Static audit confirmed shared authority leases wrap update, background, scheduler, and transport paths; source/installed socket transcripts bind revocation to zero post-revoke handler entries/mutations and cleanup.
- Sealed cleanup journals are terminal forward-only with archive/projection validation; delivered root remains `0500`/`0400`, owner-only, symlink-free, with no temporary verifier roots left.

Note: the verifier correctly failed closed under the group-writable `~/.local/bin/python3.12` (mode `0775`). It passed using the trusted mode-`0755` Python 3.12.9 toolchain, matching the sealed qualification interpreter.