I read this as a read-only final safety review - I’ll verify the sealed artifacts, trace every mutation path and guard, then compare the live profile and service state against the authorized dry-run without invoking the controller or any external action.


The sealed files match the supplied hashes. I found a material binding distinction to resolve: the authorization records an earlier approved controller/dry-run pair, while the final authorized dry-run records the current controller and a new seal. I’m tracing that handoff through the receipts/tests and independently snapshotting the live state before deciding whether it is an intended reseal or a blocker.


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stop_reason: error


I read this as a read-only final safety review - I verified the artifacts, live state, and mutation paths without invoking the controller.

## Verdict: NO-GO

Exact blockers:

1. **Authorization is not bound to the proposed executable**
   - Authorization approves controller `60a84bc5...` and dry-run `27fdf36c...` with seal `548e3519...`.
   - Proposed controller is `3ac9da0f...`; permission file is `c55ef391...` with seal `5c5874f4...`.
   - The controller validates both sets independently but never requires the approved controller/dry-run/seal to equal the executable permission set. Thus the current mutation is not authorized by the JSON approval.

2. **Rollback can overwrite refused or concurrently committed state**
   - Backup occurs before acquiring the authority lock.
   - Any under-lock drift or service-state refusal enters an unconditional rollback that deletes both source directories and the supplemental archive, then restores the pre-lock backup.
   - Two concurrent invocations can cause the second to delete the first invocation’s committed archive and restore the sources.

3. **One-use enforcement is incomplete**
   - `APPROVED_ONCE` is only a checked string; authorization is never consumed.
   - Sequential reuse is incidentally blocked by archive existence/output reuse, but a different output path, restored state, or concurrent execution defeats durable one-use semantics.

4. **Mutation scope exceeds disclosed paths**
   - Creates/deletes `/tmp/task27-supplemental-rollback-*`.
   - Can create an arbitrary `--output` file and parent directories; output destination is not authorization-bound.
   - Calls `mkdir/chmod` on profile `data` and creates/chmods `data/.profile-authority.lock`, neither disclosed in `proposed_mutations`.

Read-only live checks otherwise passed:

- Service `inactive/dead`, PID `0`, no matching process.
- Outbox and membership digests exactly match the final dry-run.
- 26 authenticated committed target-only outbox rows; emergency/callback queues empty.
- One valid target-only membership row; hash chain verified.
- Supplemental archive absent; no observed state drift.
- Wheel, cleanup receipt, controller, test, authorization, and permission-file hashes match those supplied.
- Archive operation subtree would be frozen to `0500/0400`, though this is permission-based rather than filesystem-immutable.
- No Telegram/provider/activation/release action exists in the execution path.

No files, profile state, service state, or external systems were modified.


I read this as a read-only re-review of the repaired final preview - I’ll verify the new sealed artifacts, trace each prior blocker through the revised controller/tests, and independently compare the live state without executing or modifying anything.


The core repairs are present: authorization now pins the current controller and preview, locking is noncreating and precedes backup, under-lock drift exits before rollback setup, and operation identity/output/consumption are deterministic. I’m completing the live drift check and auditing transient filesystem writes, since exact disclosure must include those as well as final paths.


I read this as a read-only repaired preflight - I verified the new artifacts, controller paths, and current live state.

## Verdict: NO-GO

Two blockers remain:

1. **Approved preview is not the executable permission**
   - Preview seal `5f2516ea...` has status `AWAITING_AUTHORIZATION`; `execute()` requires `READY`.
   - A post-approval dry-run generates a different payload/seal by adding authorization.
   - Execution does not enforce that this READY payload is an exact deterministic transformation of the approved preview. It can capture later valid-but-different state, identity, observations, or proposed mutations.
   - Therefore the approved preview’s exact state/seal is not bound to the eventual execution.

2. **One transient output path remains undisclosed**
   - Final receipt output is correctly fixed.
   - However `atomic_json()` first creates `.omo/evidence/task27/.task27-supplemental-live-cleanup-receipt.json.<random>` via `mkstemp`.
   - That sibling temporary path is outside the disclosed final receipt path.

Other repairs pass:

- Controller, tests, and preview hashes match.
- Preview seal recomputes exactly.
- Backup and rollback setup occur under the pre-existing, noncreating authority lock.
- Under-lock drift refusal occurs before rollback or profile mutation.
- Fixed operation ID, serialized execution, commit consumption record, and concurrent second-invocation refusal are present.
- Lock remains pre-existing `0600`, owner-only, and is not created/chmodded.
- Rollback buffer and fixed terminal receipt are disclosed.
- Live state has not drifted: exact outbox/membership digests match, supplemental archive and final receipt are absent, 26 authenticated target-only committed records and one verified membership row remain.
- Service is inactive/dead with PID 0.

No files or runtime state were modified.


I read this as the final read-only successor preflight - I’ll verify the three sealed artifacts, inspect the exact preview-to-READY projection and disclosed atomic path, then reconfirm the earlier execution guards and current live digests without invoking the controller.


I read this as the final read-only release gate - all prior blockers and regression checks now pass.

## Verdict: GO

Exact evidence:

- Controller SHA: `65fc6c93e4ba7b0efaff84563f50d37875d150551a00260e7f3ade7b9d009e9f`
- Tests SHA: `3833be95b478bcce4e96c6f7b95c07930d86e8b3f804fd7a5fffc324416fa3c1`
- Preview SHA: `670c9d07198942503a9da892d4dc723312ec60ccab538c8552f78a1b22660287`
- Preview seal recomputes exactly to `7d7b9d5b1da8c655bfae188841ffdf0da62818be952e43cfe1f8b5781cd61889`.

Prior blockers resolved:

- Post-authorization dry-run requires the READY payload, after replacing only `live_authorization` with `null`, to equal the complete approved preview payload.
- `execute()` independently repeats that exact projection check, rejecting recomputed forged seals.
- Authorization pins the current controller, preview hash, preview seal, and fixed paths.
- Atomic receipt temporary is disclosed as `.omo/evidence/task27/.task27-supplemental-live-cleanup-receipt.json.*`.
- Receipt output is fixed; arbitrary output is refused.
- Authority lock pre-exists as owner-only `0600`, single-link inode and is neither created nor chmodded.
- Lock acquisition precedes drift validation, backup, and mutation.
- Drift refusal occurs before rollback setup; rollback only runs after `mutation_started`.
- Deterministic operation ID, serialized lock, frozen consumption record, absent-source/archive checks, and fixed receipt provide one-success/concurrency enforcement.

Live state has not drifted:

- Outbox digest `29f118ab...`, 8 entries.
- Membership digest `ff57a22a...`, 3 entries.
- Supplemental archive absent with digest `4f53cda1...`.
- 26 authenticated, target-only committed records; emergency/callback queues empty.
- One verified target membership row.
- Service `inactive/dead`, PID `0`, matching processes `0`.
- Final authorization and terminal receipt remain absent, as expected before authorization.

No files, profile state, or service state were modified.