I read this as a security and authority-integrity audit - I’ll trace the owner-risk-acceptance diff through authorization, state transitions, rendering, and side effects, then return a PASS/FAIL verdict with exact evidence.


I’ve isolated the v1.3 owner-risk feature surface. I’m now tracing the card token from issuance through callback handling and profile mutation, including owner identity refresh, candidate binding, single-use behavior, and customer-visible publication.


The authority routing itself is fail-closed for current owner, route, generation, message, and consumed update. Two deeper integrity gaps remain: callback authorization is not bound to the rendered action set, and the claimed append-only acceptance evidence is overwriteable/non-transactional. I’m verifying those paths against the real domain service before issuing the verdict.


I read this as a security audit verdict - I traced issuance, callback authority, replay handling, state mutation, and publication side effects.

# FAIL

## 1. High: stale/unrendered cards can invoke owner-risk acceptance

- The rendered `owner_risk` action is conditional: `gateway/platforms/telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication.py:308-326`.
- Publication equivalence ignores the rendered action set and returns early based only on payload equality: `gateway/platforms/telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication_transport.py:20-39,302-314`.
- Callback validation checks generation, message, route, and payload epoch, but never proves `owner_risk` was actually present in the committed card’s rendered actions: `gateway/platforms/telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_callback.py:167-193,410-433`.

Therefore, after enabling the capability against an existing safety-hold card with the same operator epoch, restart recovery can retain the old card without the button. A manually constructed `owner_risk` callback for that card is nevertheless accepted. This violates the specified stale-card and capability-at-issuance boundaries.

## 2. High: acceptance evidence is not append-only or transactionally tied to the transition

- Every acceptance writes the same file: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:92-96`.
- The underlying writer replaces existing files: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_fs.py:144-161`.
- The receipt is written before the workflow transition and consumed-update commit: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:93-105`.
- Normal state transitions permit `owner_review -> safety_hold`: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding.py:310-328,397-405`, allowing repeated acceptance to overwrite prior evidence.
- The receipt also omits the promised bootstrap/session identifier: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:72-91`.

I reproduced two legitimate hold/accept cycles: the second acceptance replaced the first receipt and its Telegram update ID. A crash between lines 96 and 102 can likewise leave an acceptance receipt without the corresponding state transition, then permit replacement on retry. This contradicts the append-only and immutable-audit requirements.

## Additional integrity gap

The safety-card identity binds reconciliation but not baseline digest (`telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication.py:85-96`), while acceptance copies stored digests without proving they still match the card (`nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:59-91`). The declared “changed baseline/reconciliation” stop condition is therefore not fully enforced at callback time.

Exact-owner routing, duplicate update rejection, candidate equality, and `clinical_approval: false` are present. I found no direct customer publication, activation, coaching, or provider call from this action.

Verification: focused owner-risk tests passed (`16 passed`), but they do not cover rendered-action binding, repeated acceptance, or crash atomicity. No files were modified.


I read this as a focused re-audit of the remediations - I’ll verify the new card identity, stale-card republish behavior, atomic append-only transition, full binding recomputation, and regression tests, then return an updated PASS/FAIL with exact lines.


The publication and append-only fixes are present and address the original replay/overwrite paths. One claimed boundary still needs validation: the domain reconstructs its binding from stored digest fields, so I’m checking whether altered baseline/reconciliation content with unchanged embedded digests is actually rejected rather than merely compared by label.


I read this as a post-fix security verdict - I verified the remediations and tested content-drift rejection.

# FAIL

The original stale-card and overwrite findings are fixed, but changed reconciliation/baseline content is still not fully rejected.

## Remaining blocker: domain trusts embedded digest fields without validating underlying content

- Acceptance extracts `reconciliation["digest"]` without calling the existing canonical reconciliation validator: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:82-100`.
- It reads `document["baseline_digest"]` without recomputing the digest of `baseline-candidate.json`: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:95-105`.
- Consequently, the identity comparison validates digest labels, not the current documents’ contents: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:102-107`.

I altered persisted reconciliation content while retaining its old embedded digest and card binding. `record_owner_risk_acceptance` accepted it and transitioned to `owner_review`. This violates the declared stop condition for changed baseline/reconciliation.

## Confirmed fixed

- Card payload now binds candidate, bootstrap session, customer, baseline, and reconciliation: `gateway/platforms/telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication.py:103-125`.
- Acknowledged legacy cards no longer suppress publication when the new identity is present: `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication.py:301-313`.
- Changed bound payload forces a new generation: `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication_transport.py:20-39,42-58,302-320`.
- Callback requires the bound identity and reconstructs the current bootstrap/customer binding: `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_callback.py:410-455`.
- Receipts are appended inside the same atomic workflow update as state and consumed-update mutation: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:108-144`; `nutrition_onboarding_session.py:67-77`.
- Receipts explicitly record `clinical_approval: false` and `bootstrap_session_id`: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:108-128`.

Verification: focused suite passed, `17 passed`. No files were modified.


I read this as the final security re-audit - I’ll verify canonical baseline/reconciliation validation, tamper tests, and whether acceptance receipts survive finalization into readiness evidence, then return PASS/FAIL with exact lines.


The acceptance-time content checks now correctly reject relabeled baseline and reconciliation tampering, and receipt history is carried into `ready.json`. The remaining question is post-acceptance drift: finalization consumes the baseline candidate again, so I’m verifying it recomputes that candidate’s digest before using the risk receipt as the clinical-review substitute.


I read this as the final post-fix audit - I verified acceptance integrity and finalization/readiness preservation.

# FAIL

Acceptance-time tampering is fixed, but a post-acceptance/pre-finalization integrity gap remains.

## Blocker: baseline can drift after acceptance and still finalize under the old receipt

- Acceptance correctly recomputes baseline content and validates reconciliation: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:207-225`.
- After acceptance, owner approval does not repeat that content validation.
- Finalization rereads `baseline-candidate.json`, but only model-validates its payload; it does not verify `candidate["digest"] == canonical_digest(candidate["baseline"])`: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:87-96`.
- The risk history is then validated against that unverified digest label and can replace clinical review: `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:133-151`.
- Final artifacts and plans are generated from the potentially changed payload while retaining the old source digest and acceptance receipt: `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:157-209`.
- Readiness subsequently validates the receipt against the copied source-digest label, not the original candidate payload: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_readiness_validators.py:145-163`.

Therefore, after valid risk acceptance, altering the baseline payload while retaining its old `digest` allows finalization and readiness generation under an acceptance receipt for different content. Finalization must recompute the candidate baseline digest immediately before validating risk history and creating artifacts.

## Confirmed fixed

- Baseline and workflow digest equality are checked at acceptance: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:207-218`.
- Reconciliation structure and canonical digest are validated with `load_reconciliation`, including the baseline reconciliation pin: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:219-225`.
- Receipt structure, nonclinical labeling, identity, and digest are revalidated during finalization: `nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:73-143`.
- Full receipt history is passed into finalization and retained in `ready.json`: `nutrition_onboarding_finalize_service.py:35-58`; `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:305-315`.
- The latest receipt is embedded in the readiness baseline and independently audited: `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:201-209`; `nutrition_readiness_validators.py:145-163`.

Verification: relevant suites passed, `37 passed`. No files were modified.


I read this as the release-gate recheck - I’ll verify the finalization-time digest fence, post-acceptance tamper regression, pregnancy readiness alignment, and receipt preservation, then issue the final PASS/FAIL.


I read this as the final release-gate verdict - all previously identified integrity gaps are now closed.

# PASS

Evidence:

- Finalization recomputes and verifies the canonical baseline payload digest before risk-history validation or artifact generation: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:87-105`.
- Risk receipts are validated against the verified baseline and reconciliation binding before substituting for clinical review: `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:142-160`.
- Post-acceptance baseline tampering is rejected, then restoration successfully finalizes: `dualcoach/profile/tests/test_nutrition_onboarding.py:683-724`.
- Acceptance-time baseline and reconciliation content validation remains enforced: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_onboarding_owner_risk.py:207-238`.
- Pregnancy and other medical-input readiness checks accept only clinical clearance or a validated owner-risk receipt; invalid receipts still fail readiness: `dualcoach/profile/checkin_cli/nutrition_readiness_validators.py:143-175`.
- Acceptance history survives finalization in `ready.json`, while the validated latest receipt is embedded in the readiness baseline: `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py:201-209,305-315`.
- Candidate, session, customer, baseline, reconciliation, current publication, exact owner route, and nonclinical labeling remain bound across publication and callback handling: `gateway/platforms/telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication.py:128-149,357-370`; `gateway/platforms/telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_callback.py:410-455`.

Verification: focused security/domain suites passed, `37 passed`; diagnostics were clean. No files were modified.