I read this as an adversarial verification of Todo 1 only - I’ll independently reconstruct its authority chain, exercise all positive and negative paths, and return only the required verdict object.


The authority artifacts are internally coherent so far, but the verifier itself is not yet proven as a trust anchor; I’m now checking backend-derived inventory equivalence and attempting target/verifier substitution rather than relying on the recorded negative receipts.


A fatal gap is now evident: the executable verifier has no self-integrity check, and its structural manifest error codes are masked by the earlier whole-file digest check. I’m completing fresh positive/test derivations and recording exact pre-build repros to distinguish a valid product build from an untrustworthy verification entry point.


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