I read this as an adversarial verification of Todo5 r7's sealed registry identity boundary - I will inspect the prior audit and implementation evidence, run the specified hostile-boundary and regression checks without modifying source, then record only confirmed results in the required receipt.


I found the r6 blocker and verified the r7 source hashes match its receipt. The r7 loader now has descriptor-relative `O_NOFOLLOW` opens and a retained registry FD; I am exercising the boundary against disposable real filesystems, including receipt/config substitutions rather than relying on the executor's incomplete fake-provider assertion.


The filesystem boundary rejects all requested pre-construction attacks twice and the regression matrix is green. Two independent defects remain: the authority receipt is self-authenticating under the service UID, so a same-UID caller can reissue a matching receipt/config for a replacement inode; and the post-pin swap failure leaks 12 descriptors per attempt despite returning the required typed incident.


I read this as final adversarial verification - recorded only confirmed results and blockers.

NOT CONFIRMED. Receipt: `.omo/evidence/nutricoach-v140-weekly-operations/task-5-reminder-independent-verification-r7.json`

Blockers:
- Same-UID caller can reissue a matching registry identity via mutable config/receipt; default `TelegramAdapter(config)` accepts the replacement inode.
- Post-pin swap raises the typed incident but leaks 12 FDs per attempt.

Confirmed: all eight registry attacks rejected twice without bootstrap mutation; ON=1/OFF=0 bytes equal; required suites passed (1035, 124, 55, 18, 73, 50); focused quality gates clean. JSON syntax and source hashes verified.