I read this as building and proving the sealed v1.5 upgrade authorization package without touching live state - I'll inspect the upgrade architecture, implement candidate-independent safeguards, wait for the frozen manifest before binding it, and stop when the package is demonstrably `AWAITING_AUTHORIZATION` or one exact blocker remains.


Blocked only on the frozen v1.5 candidate manifest/freeze receipt. Read-only contract mapping and both CLI RED captures are complete; lead notified.


I read this as binding the prepared safeguards to the now-frozen candidate and finishing the GREEN package - I'll implement only the assigned scripts/tests, verify stable protected inventories around explicitly volatile ledgers, and stop when `AWAITING_AUTHORIZATION` is proven with unchanged service identity and zero live/provider/network mutation.


The frozen seal matches the lead’s manifest and candidate digests; I’m moving into test-first implementation now, with volatile ledgers segregated from the stable protected inventory rather than weakening the immutability claim.


The format gate supersedes the candidate before any package was produced; I’m stopping implementation immediately, removing the stale candidate-bound files and disposable test environment, and will wait for the fresh reseal.


Cleanup complete. Superseded candidate artifacts and disposable `.venv` are absent; no package output exists. Service remains active/running with PID `571685` and unchanged start timestamp. Waiting for fresh reseal.


I read this as resuming against the fresh format-clean seal and completing the bounded package - I'll bind the new manifest plus old-manifest denial receipt, run focused RED→GREEN, and stop at `AWAITING_AUTHORIZATION` with stable/volatile and service immutability evidence.


The package reached `AWAITING_AUTHORIZATION`, but a later wrong-approval probe exposed one live path still misclassified as stable; I’m identifying that exact drift and will correct only the volatility classification before regenerating the package.


The rollback logic proved byte restoration but exposed a cleanup flaw: read-only cloned directories prevented deletion while the receipt incorrectly claimed cleanup. I’m fixing the root cause by making only disposable clone directories owner-writable before removal, never touching hardlinked file modes or live bytes.


Package is `AWAITING_AUTHORIZATION`.

- Candidate: `066a794d44861d2cd0fe8c1ea14c0050e00219b38a2d2026b389772783056dad`
- Package digest: `a362d994b41a5d05ed2fcdafc76482e72d18ff69334cd8249eec061bff733acb`
- Exact phrase: `AUTHORIZE NUTRICOACH V1.5 LIVE UPGRADE a362d994b41a5d05ed2fcdafc76482e72d18ff69334cd8249eec061bff733acb`
- One-use authorization remains unconsumed.
- Service remains active/running, PID `571685`, unchanged start timestamp.
- Focused tests: 9 passed; Ruff and ty clean.
- No live, provider, network, Telegram, commit, tag, or release mutation.