I read this as an independent release-goal audit - I will inspect the frozen sources, evidence, manifests, verifier, and tests without editing or invoking live execution, then return an evidence-backed verdict.


I read this as a frozen successor audit - I verified the sealed inputs, sources, V12 closure, verifier, tests, and clone receipts without live execution.

<verdict>FAIL</verdict>

**Confidence:** 99%

## Decisive blocker

The sealed real registry has **2 customers, only 1 enabled**:

- Live/preflight registry SHA: `bd61ed95...660b29`
- `migration-dry-run.json` binds that same SHA and reports `enabled_customers: 1`.
- `scripts/nutricoach_v150_weekly_authority.py:133-141` loads every registry customer, builds keys from enabled customers, then rejects when `len(enabled_keys) != len(registry.customers)`.

Therefore the frozen V13 input deterministically raises:

`HostError("weekly_authority:disabled_customer_startup_contract")`

during `weekly_and_capacity_apply`. The rollback guard restores the four snapshots and consumes the one-use authority as `FAILED`. This cannot produce the requested successor.

The clone successes are not representative: their predecessor registry SHA is `c6978823...`, not the sealed live registry SHA `bd61ed95...`.

## Requirement mapping

| Requirement | Result | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Frozen V13 digest/binding | Pass | Read-only verifier passed: package digest `25ca8f...baae4`, package SHA `71c3dd...e3614`, closure `0b4d2c...651a5`; 43/43 closure files matched. |
| V12 failure retained and superseded | Pass | V12: `CONSUMED/SUCCEEDED`, `ROLLED_BACK`, `POSTCOMMIT_STARTUP_FAILED_ROLLED_BACK`; root cause explicitly records omitted canonical authority. Current live critical bytes equal V12 rollback snapshots. |
| One-use authority | Fails as usable release | Global ledger replay denial exists, but the deterministic migration failure consumes the new authority without installing the successor. |
| Exact rollback | Mechanism passes, release fails | Snapshots cover config, registry, unit, drop-in; rehearsal reports 41 cases and exact cleanup. The only production outcome for the sealed input is rollback, not upgrade. |
| Capacity 5 | Fails | Preflight permits the one enabled customer and proposes capacity 5, but weekly-authority code rejects the valid disabled draft customer. This contradicts the feature brief's allowed disabled drafts. |
| Channel Inbox OFF | Pass | Live semantic read found no `channel_inbox` nodes; pre-migration off-smoke rejects enabled Inbox. |
| Complete canonical weekly authority / V12 startup fix | Fails | The authority builder cannot complete on the bound registry. The V13 verifier does not execute `build_weekly_authority_postimage`, `apply_migrations`, or a real startup against sealed input. |
| Zero provider/Telegram/customer/network actions | Fails guarantee | `bwrap --unshare-net` covers only the controller. `systemctl --user start` starts the `Type=simple`, `Restart=always` gateway outside that namespace; the unit has no `PrivateNetwork`. `network_events`, `telegram_events`, and `provider_events` are never instrumented or populated. |
| Lifecycle-safe stop/start | Fails guarantee | `ConcreteLiveHost.stop()` does not verify stopped state; `stopped_probe()` checks files, not service state. Post-fence only checks immediate systemd active/running fields, not successful canonical-authority construction by the started successor. |

## Representative flows

1. **V12 terminal flow:** committed authority was consumed, postcommit startup failed, and exact predecessor bytes/service were restored. Evidence chain hashes are intact.
2. **V13 clone success:** two synthetic single-customer clones complete all stages, deny replay, and report zero synthetic events. Their registry input differs from live.
3. **Actual V13 authorized flow:** sealed registry -> capacity postimage retains two customers -> weekly builder sees one enabled/two total -> raises `disabled_customer_startup_contract` -> rollback -> authority consumed `FAILED`.

## Edge cases traced

1. Wrong/superseded approval is denied before reservation.
2. Replay and cross-execution-root reuse are denied by the global ledger.
3. Faults at all 11 transaction stages restore snapshots and remove created paths in rehearsal.
4. Short write, EINTR, zero write, fsync failure, and mixed restore failure are covered.
5. SIGTERM/SIGKILL recovery reaches `ROLLED_BACK`.
6. A valid disabled draft customer causes the deterministic production failure above.
7. A service that remains/restarts active after `stop` is not rejected before mutable writes.
8. Controller closure omits transitive `checkin_cli` and `gateway` weekly-authority sources; wheel SHA values are recorded but never checked on the actual sealed-controller install path.

## Engineering assessment

- **Over-engineered:** the 43-file closure seals obsolete verifiers and test fixtures.
- **Under-engineered:** it does not seal the transitive production authority code or verify wheel bytes before installation; it also omits the real sealed-input migration/startup rehearsal that would have exposed the disabled-draft failure.

No live action was run or modified.