I read this as a read-only adversarial release audit - I’ll map the r5 artifacts and source architecture, trace every named failure class end to end, and report PASS/FAIL with reproducible static evidence only.


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I read this as an adversarial read-only audit - I will map the r5 candidate, preseal/rehearsal, and source-worktree flows, then report exploit-quality PASS/FAIL findings without changing or executing anything live.


I read this as an adversarial read-only release audit - I inspected evidence and source without edits, live-service actions, or network activity.

## FAIL

### 1. r5 qualification is a proven functional failure
`task-12-independent-verification-r5/final-qualification.json` marks candidate `cbfc112...` `NOT_CONFIRMED`, blocked on tests.

Reproduction evidence is strong:
- 12/12 independently process-isolated parallel executions failed.
- Failure: `DisposableScenarioError: approved customer send was not exactly once`.
- The failing scenario calls the approval/send callback, restarts the adapter, replays the callback, and asserts exactly one customer delivery. The failure occurs before its artifact verifier.

A serial pass does not clear this concurrency failure.

### 2. Candidate/preseal identity chain is broken
Three different identities are presented without a supersession/binding artifact:
- r5 failed candidate: `cbfc112...`
- current V14 candidate and r9 qualification: `e15933...`
- v1.1 F5 preseal/final seal: `0e3835...`

The F5 seal is therefore not a seal for the V14 `e159...` candidate, and cannot waive the r5 failure or qualify the current candidate.

The current worktree is also not a clean Git identity: `HEAD` is `ccd2eee...`, while the release seal records `ae909026...`; relevant V14 modules are untracked relative to `HEAD`. r9's inventory says its 275 sealed source entries align with the current tree, and sampled high-risk files match the `e159...` snapshot, but that is a manifest assertion, not a release-commit identity.

### 3. Profile-package substitution remains possible at the local service/config boundary
`gateway/platforms/telegram_customer_bootstrap_registration.py` and `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime.py` select:

```python
package_root or os.environ.get("DUALCOACH_PROFILE_PACKAGE")
```

`DualCoachProfilePackage.from_root()` only verifies that the *attacker-selected* absolute directory exists and is not a symlink. `resolve()` then accepts a module whenever its source lies beneath that same selected directory. It never binds the package to:

```text
<profile_root>/workspace/checkin_cli
```

or to a candidate digest, signed inventory, owner, or immutable file identity.

Exploit path:
1. A local actor able to set the gateway process environment or explicit `package_root` provides `/tmp/p`.
2. They place `/tmp/p/checkin_cli/customer_admin.py` and `customer_coaching.py`.
3. `TelegramCustomerBootstrapRegistration` imports and executes those modules, then invokes their `_read`, lock, registry-path, and registration functions under the gateway identity.
4. The resolver's origin check passes because the malicious module is inside `/tmp/p/checkin_cli`.

The exact resolver, registration, and onboarding-runtime bytes match the current source and the `e159...` candidate snapshot. The source-worktree-only activation path repeats the flaw and is weaker: it resolves the configured root before validation, accepting a symlinked configured root.

This is not a remote Telegram-only exploit; it requires local process-environment/config authority. It is nevertheless a seal-bypass at the configured-profile boundary.

## Controls that held under static review
- Canonical registration binds customer, canonical pins, authority marker, registry digest, inode, owner, mode, and link count; it uses `O_NOFOLLOW`, locked retained descriptors, double reads, and fsync.
- Registry substitution, replacement, malformed history, interruption, and restart recovery are explicitly fail-closed in the r5/r6 tests.
- Reminder delivery holds provider admission across final reread, provider call, and terminal write. Interrupted/unknown sends become terminal `unknown`, preventing retry.
- The provider fence refreshes the live registry and rechecks runtime, route, authority digest, candidate/config/receipt snapshot immediately before dispatch.
- Generated systemd units run system services as the selected non-root user by default and use an absolute Python executable. No independent ExecStart injection was demonstrated.

Caveat: the direct provider-fence race tests are absent; the r7 race test exercises bootstrap-time registry replacement, not a swap at the final provider boundary.

## Required disposition
Do not approve the r5/preseal/rehearsal aggregate.

Before a new seal:
1. Bind production profile imports to the canonical profile path and sealed package identity; remove the environment override from production entry points or authenticate it.
2. Repair the exactly-once parallel failure and rerun the full gate under process-isolated parallel execution.
3. Produce a single signed/hashed supersession chain that explicitly binds the approved candidate digest, source inventory, preseal, rehearsal, and final seal.