I read this as an independent read-only r26 authority-safety audit - I’ll trace the lock and authorization paths, run the authority suites, verify root/state conditions, and exercise the production loader under a root-read-only bwrap before issuing one verdict.


I’ve located the exact r26 candidate and preseal roots. The focused audit is now on the production authority implementation and installed launcher contract, followed by the non-mutating test and sandbox executions.


Static tracing confirms the read path opens the existing lock as `"r"` under `LOCK_SH` with no chmod, while recovery/append use `"a+"`, chmod, and `LOCK_EX`. I’m at final verification: all authority-named suites plus the V15 safety suite, and an actual production-loader invocation inside a root-read-only Bubblewrap while hashing live authority state before and after.


The first test invocation used the intentionally subsetted sealed controller tree as a standalone checkout, so collection lacked modules that are supplied by the bound wheel/source closure; this was a harness-context failure, not a test failure. The immutable preseal verifier and root-read-only loader both passed. I’m rerunning the same authority suites from the complete bound source tree with cache and bytecode writes disabled.


The complete-tree combined invocation hit pytest’s duplicate `tests` package-name collision between the root and profile test trees. I’m splitting those independently, which is the repository’s required collection shape; no assertions have failed and live hashes remain unchanged.


One profile test failed before reaching product code because its AF_UNIX fixture exceeded Linux’s 108-byte pathname limit under the default temp path; the other 42 profile tests and all 28 root authority tests passed. I’m rerunning that complete profile suite in a read-only-root bwrap with an isolated short `/t` temp directory, eliminating the harness pathname artifact without touching host state.


I read this as the final r26 authority-safety verdict - reporting the completed read-only audit.

UNCONDITIONAL PASS — blocker_count: 0