message: 403: {"code":"ENTITLEMENT_ERROR","message":"Error 403: the user is not subscribed to required model plan"}

stop_reason: error


error_message: 403: {"code":"ENTITLEMENT_ERROR","message":"Error 403: the user is not subscribed to required model plan"}


I read this as a read-only deployment audit - I’ll compare the successor worktree with live r44, inspect migration and rollout risks, verify observer/gateway health without sending traffic, and return a strict PASS/FAIL with exact evidence.


I read this as a read-only deployment audit - I compared the successor tree with live r44 and evaluated runtime, migration, monitoring, and cron evidence.

## Verdict

```text
deployment_readiness=FAIL
blocker_count=3
```

### Blockers

1. **No deployable successor artifact**
   - Live r44 is candidate `62f33e7d...`, phase `COMMITTED`; authorization is `CONSUMED/SUCCEEDED`.
   - The current source differs from live in 11 Python files: 8 gateway, 1 `checkin_cli`, and 2 cron files.
   - Eight of 321 r44 sealed-controller entries have drifted.
   - Deployment scripts still target `live-transaction-preseal-v15-runtime-authority-r44`; no r45/successor seal exists. The consumed r44 authorization cannot deploy these changes.

2. **Persistent cron failure remains unresolved**
   - At `2026-08-31 09:36:53 KST`, job `6e042d5dff68` remained:
     `last_status=error`, `last_error="inline-card send failed"`.
   - The current uninterrupted failure streak began `2026-08-30 23:01:56`; at least 1,593 identical generic failures existed by 09:34.
   - Daily delivery itself reached `sent_audited` at 08:00, indicating another tick subtask is failing.
   - The successor patch only propagates existing `SendResult.error` into output and `jobs.json`; it does not fix the failure. Tests assert `LaunchResult.error`, but not scheduler `Reason:` output or persisted `last_error`.

3. **Live-state migration/cutover changes lack successor qualification**
   - Production bootstrap state has only `ledger.json`; successor code lazily introduces `events.jsonl` on its next mutation.
   - Existing ACTIVE state has `consent_handoff=null` and `consent_recovery_reconciled=false`, while successor cutover replay requires both populated.
   - Successor activates the customer/bootstrap before reserving the new completion-notice outbox. A reservation failure therefore occurs after commit.
   - Tests cover new-store journal behavior and successful notice idempotency, but not migration from this exact ledger-only live state or post-commit reservation failure/replay. No sealed rehearsal covers these changes.

## Runtime health

- **Gateway:** process healthy: PID `1418148`, active since `01:53:40 KST`, `NRestarts=0`, Telegram state `connected`, with an established Telegram socket.
- **Observer:** operationally healthy as a timer-driven oneshot. The 09:30 run passed integrity checks and reported `status=PASS`; a transient `telegram_connection` failure at 06:20 recovered at 06:30.
- **Observer limitations:** its socket check discards the gateway PID and counts system-wide Telegram sockets, and it never reads cron status. Its PASS therefore cannot clear the cron blocker. The unit also grants `ReadWritePaths=.../observer-r28` while current code writes `observer-r44`.

## Read-only assurance

No audit-induced production writes or Telegram sends occurred. Production code/config remained unchanged; for example:

- live `cron/scheduler.py`: `3eca06827bfd62a...`
- live `cron/physique_inline_card.py`: `cb563c334af1582e...`

Normal gateway cron and observer writes continued independently during inspection.


I read this as a final read-only operating-state gate - I’ll verify the r62 authority/runtime binding, preserved customer and feature state, consecutive cron success, observer evidence, and live gateway health, then return PASS/FAIL with exact blockers.


I read this as a final read-only operating-state gate - I verified r62 authority, data preservation, cron recovery, observer evidence, and gateway health.

```text
operating_context=PASS
blocker_count=0
```

Exact evidence:

- Candidate `ade0f8d45626e69de0d582a935ba1176fe95e82f269cdba014a11646b53d1ec8` is bound to runtime `ade0f8d4-v150`.
- r62 authorization: `CONSUMED/SUCCEEDED`; phase: `COMMITTED`.
- Gateway: active/running, PID `1988614`, `NRestarts=0`, Telegram connected, two gateway-owned established Telegram sockets, no post-start errors.
- Customer records preserved exactly:
  - Before and current customer-record hash: `10c57dbacc5d0420d5749b4e12e3abff15658e68c0c8ebf527398580712ddc53`
  - Only admission-policy candidate binding changed; capacity remains five.
- Channel Inbox: no filesystem/config surface found; observer reports `channel_inbox_off=true`.
- Cron `6e042d5dff68`: seven consecutive successful postdeploy ticks from 11:43 through 11:49; current `last_status=ok`, `last_error=null`.
- Observer-r62 at 11:46:30: `PASS`, with candidate, commitment, capacity, Channel Inbox, journal, restart, Telegram, and weekly checks healthy; `telegram_sockets=3`.
- r62 rehearsal: all 13 success/rollback cases passed.

Audit remained read-only. Immutable runtime, registry, config, and unit hashes were identical at the start and end of inspection. No audit-triggered Telegram traffic or production writes occurred; normal cron and observer activity continued independently.