I read this as a read-only security review of the `customer_v2` onboarding changes - I’ll trace the changed implementation and tests against each named invariant, then return only PASS/FAIL, blocker count, and exact blockers.


I’ve completed the main invariant trace and found the candidate is still changing during review; I’m re-reading the current versions of the safety and transport boundaries so the blocker report reflects the actual snapshot rather than stale intermediate content.


FAIL
blocker_count: 2

1. `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py` omits `eating_disorder_risk` from `baseline-v1.json`; `nutrition_readiness_contract.py` does not require it and `nutrition_readiness_validators.py` never checks it. Activation therefore accepts a durable baseline with this safety field absent instead of failing closed.

2. Activation can race finalization: readiness artifacts and registry projection commit before `ready.json` is written and `baseline-candidate.json.source_answers` is scrubbed. `validate_first_claim_owner_review()` requires only baseline/readiness receipts plus the already-recorded approval callback, not committed `ready` state or scrub completion. Activation during that window prevents restart recovery once the customer becomes enabled, leaving onboarding incomplete and `source_answers` retained.


I read this as a fresh review of the current finalized source - I’ll re-check the previously identified safety and activation boundaries plus the extracted parser integration, then return only the exact current blockers.


FAIL
blocker_count: 3

1. `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_customer_v2._numbered_sections()` silently overwrites duplicate section numbers. An answer such as `1 땅콩 / 1 없음 / 2 없음 / 3 한식` records exclusions as safe/none, discarding the safety-critical first value instead of rejecting the grouped answer.

2. `nutrition_onboarding_finalization.py` omits `eating_disorder_risk` from `baseline-v1.json`; readiness neither requires nor validates the field. Activation therefore accepts a durable baseline with this safety value absent rather than failing closed.

3. Activation can occur after readiness/projection commits but before `ready.json` creation and `source_answers` scrubbing. `validate_first_claim_owner_review()` does not require committed ready state or scrub completion; activation in this crash window makes restart recovery fail once the customer is enabled, leaving incomplete onboarding and retained source answers.


I read this as a final read-only re-review after the three fixes - I’ll verify each repaired boundary in current source and check for any remaining bypass before returning only PASS/FAIL, blocker count, and exact remaining blockers.


PASS
blocker_count: 0
remaining_blocker: none