I read this as a read-only security audit - I’ll trace each required invariant through implementation and focused tests, run relevant local tests, and report exact evidence plus exploit paths without editing.


I’ve completed the main state-machine trace. I’m now validating the edge boundaries—policy-version loading, concurrent/replayed failure accounting, exact callback publication authority, and restart/recovery delivery—against focused regression tests.


I read this as a request for the final audit verdict - I’ll report only verified safety findings and exploitability.

**PASS**
**blocker_count: 0**

- **Replay-safe durable counters:** `nutrition_onboarding_input_help.py:99-116` persists per-field counts atomically; `nutrition_onboarding_session.py:107-126` rejects consumed update IDs before appending them. Runtime mutations share one lock. Restart persistence verified.
- **Exact authority routes:** `nutrition_onboarding_authority.py:24-37` requires exact actor/chat/topic equality. Callback actions map explicitly to customer or owner routes at `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_callback.py:197-213`, followed by route validation at `:309`.
- **Stale publication protection:** callbacks require exact generation, message ID, role, current route, payload, and signed receipt at `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_callback.py:215-224` and `telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication_transport.py:137-184`.
- **`input_help` cannot activate:** only `help_resume` is published; callback transition requires current `input_help` state. Resume requires the exact owner route (`nutrition_onboarding_input_help.py:125-155`). Finalization independently requires `FINALIZING` at `nutrition_onboarding_finalize_service.py:36-37`.
- **Owner resume binding:** exact current publication and owner actor/chat/topic are required before `resume_input_help`; customer or forwarded/stale cards cannot resume.
- **Unknown safety fields hold:** unknown allergies/intolerances and unknown/provided health-sensitive fields are classified at `nutrition_onboarding_clarification_policy.py:108-122`; the independent baseline gate enforces safety hold at `nutrition_onboarding_authority.py:83-92`.
- **Policy compatibility:** reconciliation accepts versions v1-v3, validates the current version against its exact policy digest, and verifies the complete record digest (`nutrition_onboarding_reconciliation.py:58-65,84-98`). Probe confirmed legacy-v2 load and current stale-digest rejection.
- **Privacy:** invalid raw input is parsed only transiently. Failure persistence receives field, authority, evidence, and count—not raw text (`telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_collection.py:332-369`; `nutrition_onboarding_input_help.py:49-122`).
- **Recovery delivery:** exact-owner `/status` recovery supports both `input_help` and `safety_hold` (`telegram_nutrition_onboarding_runtime_publication.py:187-225`) and adds a request-bound recovery identity.

**Verification:** 48 focused tests passed plus the policy-compatibility probe.

**Exploit path:** none found for replay, stale/forwarded callbacks, customer-triggered owner resume, `input_help` activation, safety-hold bypass, or invalid-text persistence.


I read this as a request for the final verdict only - no further tool use.

**PASS — blocker_count: 0**

No exploitable safety, authority, replay, privacy, stale-publication, activation, or recovery-delivery path found. All focused checks passed.


I read this as a focused re-audit of the new shared failure-counter path and reconciliation handoff - I’ll inspect only those changes and verify the four named invariants.


PASS
blocker_count: 0