I read this as independent adversarial verification of Todo 2 - I’ll inspect the plan, evidence, implementation, and tests; reproduce all required checks; then write the requested verification JSON without editing product or test code.


I found the governing Todo 2 contract and completed the source-level review. I’m now running the exact focused/regression/static commands and independent fault probes; the evidence receipt itself does not record file hashes, so I’m also pinning current hashes directly rather than trusting its PASS summary.


The adversarial probes found a reproducible blocker: an already-existing target parent reached through an intermediate directory symlink is accepted and written through, contradicting the no-follow requirement and the implementation evidence’s claim that every existing component is checked. A second privacy-boundary probe shows arbitrary raw text can be persisted as an identity field; I’m sealing both findings with the otherwise-clean test and diagnostics results.


I read this as completion of Todo 2’s adversarial verification - I wrote and validated the required evidence JSON.

```json
{
  "verdict": "needs-fix",
  "evidence": [
    "Intermediate directory symlinks are followed when the final parent already exists.",
    "Arbitrary content-bearing strings can be persisted in identity fields.",
    "Focused tests: 24 passed; related selection: 4 passed.",
    "Ruff, ty, basedpyright, LSP, and compilation passed.",
    "Manual QA returned PASS with schema_version=2, projection_count=1, content_free=true."
  ],
  "repro": [
    "Save through linked/private/state.json where linked is a symlink and private already exists; the target state file is created.",
    "Put SENTINEL_RAW_ANSWER in IngressIdentity.message_id; record_projection persists it verbatim."
  ],
  "confidence": 0.99
}
```

Evidence: `.omo/evidence/nutricoach-telegram-checkin-stepper/task-2-adversarial-verify.json`
SHA-256: `97fae6a76b0c45ddab18a24722a6bd010755c088b4c8b4499f67d9f97d0ffa87`