I read this as a read-only operational-safety investigation - I’ll trace the deployed and worktree scheduler/ledger/control paths, compare them with the captured cron and preflight evidence, then write the single evidence JSON deliverable without executing or mutating runtime state.


The captured evidence establishes the unsafe send predicate; I’m now checking every supported control and terminal-state escape hatch against the actual r70 code and the r71 protected-inventory contract, with special attention to whether any no-op can truthfully set cron success.


The control-surface trace is conclusive: pausing or producing an empty tick preserves the prior error, while every path that can mark this inline-card job successful either reaches the unfenced current-day Topic-59 send, relies on an unhealthy disabled capability, or fabricates delivery state. I’m recording the NO_SAFE_PATH verdict and the minimal package-level guard needed to change that result.


I read this as a read-only recovery-path investigation - I traced all supported controls and delivered the evidence verdict.

Created:

`/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach/.omo/evidence/nutricoach-telegram-checkin-stepper/task-10-cron-no-send-recovery-analysis.json`

Verdict: `NO_SAFE_PATH`

Core blocker: an absent current-day Topic-59 slot unconditionally transitions to `PREPARED -> SENDING`; no authenticated terminal maintenance-skip state exists. Paused/no-due ticks cannot update cron success.

Verified:
- JSON valid; no diagnostics
- SHA-256: `968a3ea4e15d149736d47c239d410ed9b88b7dbb20e0703214a2a6b19c3025d0`
- Service remains active with original PID and `NRestarts=0`
- r71 action/runtime/observer roots remain absent
- No job execution, restart, network action, ledger/config mutation, or Telegram operation occurred