I read this as an independent adversarial verification - I’ll inspect the disposable artifact and prior evidence, rerun the required tests and reproductions without touching protected state, then write the requested evidence JSON with an exact readiness verdict.


The artifact is internally small, but its qualification claims exceed what the source currently implements. I’m moving to executable verification now: clean source/installed-wheel tests, strict analyzers, RECORD/source parity, deterministic rebuilds in two isolated names, and read-only live binding/inventory checks.


The reproducibility and typed-row core are genuine: both differently named rebuild roots reproduced `f1a325...`, and installed production types reconstructed the exact 792-byte/`405b...` row. The decisive issue is sealability, not those primitives: the wheel contains only protocols and helpers, with no production launcher/recovery/observer/receipt assembly, and several claimed security bindings are not enforced. I’m now proving those gaps with isolated adversarial probes and recording the exact blockers.


Verification is complete. The artifact is fail-closed for authoritative sealing: four independently reproduced blockers remain despite clean tests, strict typing, exact row reconstruction, and deterministic wheel reproduction. I’ve written the requested needs-fix evidence and am validating its JSON structure and final cleanup/absence assertions.


I read this as an independent adversarial verification - completed and recorded the fail-closed verdict.

Evidence written:

`/.omo/evidence/nutricoach-telegram-checkin-stepper/task-11-day-status-continuity-r1-adversarial.json`

- Verdict: `needs-fix`
- Confidence: `high` (`0.99`)
- Blockers: `4`
- Authoritative seal readiness: `false`
- Evidence SHA-256: `2882ea7c4dc67aa2a96046d8b286b45a33567cd189b1467c693177f137ca6bee`

Confirmed: 66 tests pass from source and installed wheel, strict checks pass, exact 792-byte row reconstruction passes, and two differently named builds reproduce wheel `f1a325...`.

Primary blockers are missing production/recovery assembly, overclaimed crash testing, unenforced filesystem bindings, and unreproducible integration/provenance claims. Protected hashes and gateway state remained unchanged; disposable and authoritative roots are absent.


I read this as a delta adversarial qualification of the repaired package - I’ll authenticate the final evidence/wheel/package first, then execute its retained disposable CLI, 54-checkpoint recovery, filesystem, installed-store, observer, reproducibility, and full test gates without touching live state, updating the same verdict only if every gate passes.


The final artifacts authenticate to the requested hashes and the repaired closure is present. I’m starting the high-cost gates now: the unskipped 925-case source and installed-wheel runs, strict analyzers, canonical package/CLI verification, and twin deterministic rebuilds; afterward I’ll independently exercise the retained real adapters and adversarial mutation boundaries.


The first unskipped run exposed a stale disposable key file, not a package failure: `/tmp/gw.customerkey` had been overwritten with Python source and failed identity validation before every real-store case. I’m discarding that external fixture, deriving the exact opaque key from the sealed current registry into a new private disposable file, and rerunning once; the deterministic wheel and canonical CLI verification already passed.


The repaired package passes both 925-case runs and strict checks, but the independent actual-controller matrix found a real remaining recovery defect: 52/54 checkpoints pass; both crashes after `APPEND_INTENT_DURABLE` becomes visible fail recovery on an empty target because `canonical_reissue(recovery=True)` incorrectly rejects the required first append and consumes the reservation FAILED. I’m continuing the remaining real CLI and filesystem probes to bound the verdict precisely; this already prevents blocker-zero/seal-ready.


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