{"task_id":"st_019ff582","status":"completed","residency_state":"persisted_only","parent_session_id":"019fe727-6018-700d-9bb7-2ba4611da8e8","root_session_id":"019fe727-6018-700d-9bb7-2ba4611da8e8","depth":1,"execution_mode":"in-process","model":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-terra","notify_on_terminal":true,"created_at":"2026-08-12T10:27:10.633Z","updated_at":"2026-08-15T03:46:45.120Z","notification":{"run_epoch":0,"notified_epoch":0},"name":"task23-bootstrap-expiry-incident-audit-v1","task_summary":"Audit Task23 status-triggered session expiry","category":"unspecified-high","requested_model":{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-terra","display":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-terra","source":"category","variant":"max","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"},"fallback_models":[{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-sol","display":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol","source":"category","variant":"max","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"}],"resolved_model":{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-terra","display":"GPT-5.6 Terra","source":"category","variant":"max","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"},"spawn_spec":{"version":1,"cwd":"/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach","prompt":"Strictly read-only incident audit first; no profile/service/product mutation. Task23 worker st_019ff57c reports supported `status` CLI expired the sealed bootstrap session to EXPIRED generation8 and changed ledger digest f3a3...->e327..., with no activation/checkin/job/delivery/restart. Inspect its full transcript/evidence to capture exact argv, timestamps, stdout/stderr, source/candidate loaded, and whether status semantics intentionally reconcile expiry or violated a read-only contract. Authenticate before-image from Task22 evidence/current bootstrap ledger event chain/HMAC: prior phase/session/generation/deadline and exact new EXPIRED event, actor/reason/time, receipt keys, inode/hash. Confirm Task22 supplemental terminal journal/callback/gen27/28 remains valid and identify which Task22/Task23 seals are now stale. Form at least 3 hypotheses and prove root cause. Determine supported forward-only continuity options without reset, deletion, direct JSON edits, re-answering, real activation, or rerunning all Task22: (A) journaled renewal/rebootstrap retaining 22 answers and terminal owner approval lineage, (B) fresh synthetic DM session requiring only bounded migration/reapproval, (C) impossible. Search source/tests/history for expiry/rebootstrap/reconciliation contracts and customer lifecycle invariants. Also prove whether current gateway runtime already observes EXPIRED and whether it is safe to leave running. Do not accept the prior manual recommendation unless code/contracts prove it. No Telegram, service action, plan/ledger/todo, commit/push/release. Store immutable redacted evidence. Return exact incident timeline, auth verdict, root cause, safe forward recovery direction, required code/test fix for status mutation if any, and blocker/manual action.\n\n<Category_Context>\nYou are working on tasks that don't fit specific categories but require substantial effort.\n\n<Selection_Gate>\nBEFORE selecting this category, VERIFY ALL conditions:\n1. Task does NOT fit: quick (trivial), visual-engineering (UI), ultrabrain (deep logic), artistry (creative), writing (docs)\n2. Task requires substantial effort across multiple systems/modules\n3. Changes have broad impact or require careful coordination\n4. NOT just \"complex\" - must be genuinely unclassifiable AND high-effort\n\nIf task fits ANY other category, DO NOT select unspecified-high.\nIf task is unclassifiable but moderate-effort, use unspecified-low instead.\n</Selection_Gate>\n</Category_Context>"},"final_response":"I read this as a read-only incident audit - the cause is proven; no state was changed by this audit.\n\n**Root cause**\n- Task23's `status` is not read-only. It explicitly calls `active_store.expire_unbound()` before reading the session.\n- The prior authenticated snapshot was `AWAITING_ACTIVATION`, generation 7, `chat_id: null`, with `expires_at: 2026-08-10T07:29:02.306006Z`.\n- At `2026-08-12T10:23:52.354302Z`, the expiry predicate was true: nonterminal + unbound + past deadline. It changed only:\n  - `state`: `AWAITING_ACTIVATION` -> `EXPIRED`\n  - `generation`: 7 -> 8\n  - `updated_at`\n- The writer atomically uses `os.replace`, explaining the inode change. The 12-byte size reduction matches the shorter state string; the new payload digest and ledger SHA are internally valid.\n\n**Authenticated evidence**\n- The preimage is authenticated by the Task22 supplemental journal HMAC and embedded snapshot: SHA-256 `f3a3...`, inode `33166473`, 1757 bytes.\n- Current ledger: SHA-256 `e327...`, inode `33165847`, 1745 bytes; payload digest verifies.\n- The supplemental journal HMAC verifies and still records the original bootstrap seal, callback `629525051`, and phase chain `PREPARED -> REVIEW_COMMITTED -> PUBLICATION_COMMITTED`.\n- Generation 28 / message 123 remains committed. The Task22 activation gate currently returns true because it validates the journal, callback, and gen27/gen28 receipts, but it does **not** validate the live bootstrap seal.\n\n**Seal status**\n- The bootstrap seal is stale: expected `f3a...` / inode `33166473`; live is `e327...` / inode `33165847`.\n- Every other sealed source, including the external candidate manifest, still matches.\n- A full supplemental-review replay/load verifies all sealed sources and would reject this as `freeze drift`. The terminal journal cannot use `reseal_prepared`: it is restricted to `PREPARED` journals with no generation-27/28 authority, and Task22 has both.\n\n**Runtime safety**\n- `EXPIRED` is terminal. There is no transition, recovery-slot operation, or cutover path back to `AWAITING_ACTIVATION`.\n- Cutover accepts only `AWAITING_ACTIVATION` or `ACTIVE`; this session is rejected before activation.\n- Gateway recovery and customer-message authority process only `AWAITING_ACTIVATION`; `EXPIRED` is ignored.\n- The gateway remains running (PID 675692). The customer is disabled, trainer is null, no customers are enabled, and no profile data file changed after the ledger mutation.\n\n**Forward-only recovery**\n- Do **not** restore the old ledger, edit its state/deadline/digest, or attempt recovery/cutover commands against this terminal session.\n- A new `prepare` can create a new session because the old one is terminal, but it cannot reuse Task22's supplemental approval: that journal requires the exact old session ID.\n- Therefore, completing onboarding requires a new supported supersession workflow: retain the old evidence, create a new session, and create fresh session-bound approval/seal evidence. No existing command provides that complete recovery.\n\n**Required product fix**\n- Make `status` pure: remove its call to `expire_unbound()`.\n- If reconciliation is needed, expose an explicit mutating `reconcile-expiry` command.\n- Add a CLI regression test with an expired unbound session asserting `status` leaves ledger bytes, SHA-256, and inode unchanged. The existing status test only checks no Telegram call while the session is still fresh.","run_stats":{"runtime_ms":631758,"turns":17,"tool_calls":117,"output_tokens":31881,"total_tokens":2003231,"generation_ms":601721,"tokens_per_second":53,"cost_usd":1.8793456,"cache_hit_rate_last":0.9722889062466409,"cache_hit_rate_run":0.6892981966672584}}