{"task_id":"st_01a0046f","status":"completed","residency_state":"evicted","parent_session_id":"01a00387-aaf8-7f2f-89e3-e24c1af24859","root_session_id":"01a00387-aaf8-7f2f-89e3-e24c1af24859","depth":1,"execution_mode":"in-process","model":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol","notify_on_terminal":true,"created_at":"2026-08-15T07:59:39.039Z","updated_at":"2026-08-18T04:55:23.102Z","notification":{"run_epoch":0,"notified_epoch":0},"name":"task26-checkpoint-recursion-adjudication","task_summary":"Design a non-recursive exact-candidate trainer-free checkpoint model","description":"Adjudicate trainer checkpoint recursion","category":"architect","requested_model":{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-sol","display":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"},"fallback_models":[{"provider":"clinepass","model_id":"cline-pass/glm-5.2","display":"clinepass/cline-pass/glm-5.2","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"medium"},{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-terra","display":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-terra","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"}],"resolved_model":{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-sol","display":"GPT-5.6 Sol","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"},"spawn_spec":{"version":1,"cwd":"/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach","prompt":"Adjudicate the Task26 trainer-free checkpoint recursion as a read-only architecture/contract review. Facts: immutable current candidate full digest 2e0894ea...da925 contains authenticated pre-seal trainer-free inputs scoped to predecessor 653; independent verification proves product parity, 23 fields, 763/763 inputs, 14 source-bound gates, zero absence counts, no mixed authority. Current reviewer FAILs because candidate 2e lacks its own complete checkpoint status READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT and authoritative inventory still says FAIL/checkpoint_observed=false. Embedding a checkpoint containing exact current full digest inside the candidate changes the digest, creating infinite self-reference/reseal. Determine the minimal satisfiable evidence model that preserves candidate immutability and invariant 10 exact-candidate evidence. Evaluate: (A) external append-only post-seal checkpoint + inventory observation binding current full/core/manifest/checkpoint/freeze/tree and pre-seal inputs; (B) content-addressed checkpoint excluding itself from digest via explicit domain separation; (C) endless successor reseal. Give a decisive recommendation, exact fields/ordering/authority rules, how to supersede v2 append-only without weakening 14 gates, and whether 2e can remain current candidate. Also identify any hidden security/provenance weakness and whether the reviewer remediation can be fulfilled without product/test/profile/runtime actions. Observable stop: return one decision-complete contract and PASS/FAIL rationale suitable for an evidence worker; no writes/actions.\n\n<Category_Context>\nYou are a big-picture system design consultant, NOT an implementer.\n\n<Method>\n1. Survey the WHOLE architecture end to end before proposing anything: module boundaries, data flow, ownership, and the blast radius of the area in question.\n2. Produce at least TWO viable designs and state the trade-offs of each in concrete terms (coupling, testability, migration cost, failure modes).\n3. Recommend ONE of them with the reasoning that decided it, the boundaries it assumes, and the risks it carries.\n4. Demand the SIMPLEST architecture that handles the actual requirements. Reject enterprise patterns that do not pay for themselves.\n</Method>\n\n<Advisory_Mode>\nWhen the caller marks the task advisory-only, produce NO file edits: return the analysis, options, recommendation, and risks as structured text.\n</Advisory_Mode>\n</Category_Context>"},"host_pid":4082105,"final_response":"I read this as a read-only contract adjudication - I recommend a finite post-seal attestation DAG that keeps candidate `2e` immutable and exact-candidate-bound.\n\n# Decision\n\n**Adopt A: an external append-only post-seal readiness checkpoint, followed by an append-only inventory-state observation.**\n\nCandidate:\n\n`2e0894eac92bc396cc4723bf1f18ebc653b95018dd41574df435941c235da925`\n\n**remains the current immutable candidate.** Do not reseal it and do not modify its in-tree checkpoint.\n\nInvariant 10 requires evidence **from and bound to** the exact candidate; it does not require every later review receipt to be embedded inside that candidate. Task26 review receipts are already external attestations.\n\nThe evidence graph must be acyclic:\n\n```text\nv2 normative inventory\n  -> predecessor-653 authenticated trainer-free inputs\n  -> immutable candidate 2e + in-tree seal checkpoint\n  -> external 2e post-seal readiness checkpoint\n  -> external v2 inventory-state observation\n  -> independent trainer-free final re-audit receipt\n```\n\nNo artifact references a later artifact.\n\n## Important implementation fact\n\nThe current `full_candidate_digest` is not actually a digest of the complete candidate tree. The sealer computes it from `manifest_core`; `candidate-checkpoint.json` is excluded. Therefore the literal hash recursion is partly a naming/contract problem.\n\nEditing the in-tree checkpoint is nevertheless prohibited because it would change the frozen tree and invalidate:\n\n- checkpoint SHA-256 in `verifier-input.json`;\n- freeze receipt bindings;\n- the observed immutable-tree commitment;\n- the claim that candidate `2e` was not mutated.\n\nA sidecar attestation is therefore still the correct solution.\n\n# Options\n\n| Option | Viability | Trade-offs |\n|---|---|---|\n| **A. External post-seal checkpoint and inventory observation** | **Recommended now** | Lowest coupling and migration cost. Preserves `2e`, its freeze, wheel, manifest and tree. Pure hash verification is easy. Main risk is external-record equivocation or deletion. |\n| **B. Domain-separated self-excluding checkpoint** | Viable for a future candidate format | Architecturally clean if candidate identity is explicitly a payload digest and checkpoint identity is separate. Requires coordinated changes to sealer, verifier, freeze schema, reviewers and naming. Retrofitting it to frozen `2e` would redefine existing identity semantics. |\n| **C. Successor reseal containing its own digest** | **Reject** | Unsatisfiable when the successor digest covers the checkpoint containing that digest. Every checkpoint creates another digest. More reseals only increase provenance complexity and attack surface. |\n\nFor a future B-format, use:\n\n```text\npayload_digest =\n  SHA256(\"task26-candidate-payload-v2\\0\" || canonical(payload_manifest))\n\ncheckpoint_digest =\n  SHA256(\"task26-readiness-checkpoint-v2\\0\" ||\n         canonical(checkpoint_binding_payload_digest))\n\npackage_digest =\n  SHA256(\"task26-package-v2\\0\" ||\n         payload_digest || checkpoint_digest)\n```\n\nThe checkpoint may contain `payload_digest`, never `package_digest`. Candidate identity must explicitly mean `payload_digest`. That redesign does not pay for itself for `2e`.\n\n# Required contract\n\nUse canonical JSON:\n\n```text\nUTF-8\nsort_keys=true\nseparators=(\",\", \":\")\nensure_ascii=true\nallow_nan=false\nduplicate keys forbidden\narrays retain declared order\n```\n\nAll evidence files must be unique-path, atomically published, regular non-symlinks, `st_nlink == 1`, owner-private, and never overwritten.\n\nDefine:\n\n- `C` = immutable candidate `2e...da925` root\n- `E` = `.omo/evidence/task26`\n\n## 1. External post-seal readiness checkpoint\n\nLogical top-level field order:\n\n1. `schema`\n2. `status`\n3. `recorded_at_utc`\n4. `execution_head`\n5. `git_status_porcelain_v1_z_sha256`\n6. `git_status_entry_count`\n7. `candidate_manifest_path`\n8. `candidate_manifest_sha256`\n9. `candidate_digest`\n10. `candidate_file_count`\n11. `v1_runtime_closure_manifest_path`\n12. `v1_runtime_closure_manifest_sha256`\n13. `production_wheel_path`\n14. `production_wheel_sha256`\n15. `production_wheel_member_count`\n16. `trainer_free_migration_receipt_path`\n17. `trainer_free_migration_receipt_sha256`\n18. `preclean_fixture_manifest_path`\n19. `preclean_fixture_manifest_sha256`\n20. `preclean_fixture_receipt_path`\n21. `preclean_fixture_receipt_sha256`\n22. `verification_receipt_paths`\n23. `verification_receipt_sha256`\n24. `task22_permission_receipt_path`\n25. `task22_permission_receipt_sha256`\n26. `hash_algorithm`\n27. `product_profile_service_telegram_provider_delivery_mutations`\n28. `commits_pushes_releases`\n29. `authority`\n30. `scope`\n31. `candidate_root`\n32. `candidate_core_digest`\n33. `seal_checkpoint`\n34. `freeze_receipt`\n35. `candidate_tree`\n36. `current_candidate_verification`\n37. `source_evidence_transfer`\n38. `trainer_free_control_binding`\n39. `inventory_contract_binding`\n40. `non_actions`\n41. `privacy`\n\nRequired values include:\n\n```text\nschema =\n  task26-trainer-free-current-candidate-postseal-checkpoint-v1\n\nstatus =\n  READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT\n\nauthority =\n  CURRENT_CANDIDATE_READINESS_ONLY_NOT_TASK26_PASS_OR_RELEASE_AUTHORITY\n\ncandidate_digest =\n  2e0894eac92bc396cc4723bf1f18ebc653b95018dd41574df435941c235da925\n\ncandidate_core_digest =\n  a8d099d5372b1ac87c9b47e7d5b47c8bb4cdff7681e093bb3cd79d0303e6e88e\n\ncandidate_manifest_sha256 =\n  7b6d0d6e275426fada6bc585989052e03fdc056587fc2051764e47c61756752d\n\ncandidate_file_count = 43\nexecution_head = 0dc0f228dcec8fa54430882daf72e901d6a89f79\ngit_status_entry_count = 1294\ngit_status_porcelain_v1_z_sha256 =\n  ca1ce2705c0c406f30461e5f05e8d09468dee33348960c3650b6b98758895478\n\nproduction_wheel_sha256 =\n  af4a9d0a1ffffb6eb7551c1d6dc2b32853ca6d024332a4f8f5702bbf992f141b\n\nproduction_wheel_member_count = 860\nhash_algorithm = sha256\nproduct_profile_service_telegram_provider_delivery_mutations = 0\ncommits_pushes_releases = 0\n```\n\nThe existing seal checkpoint remains separately bound:\n\n```text\nseal_checkpoint.sha256 =\n  5ae5b75bc10fdbe86d13d18f9204b5a4def17d5c5b6dc90da5fb8534fccea102\n\nseal_checkpoint.status =\n  SEALED_SUCCESSOR_CANDIDATE_NOT_TASK26_PASS\n```\n\nThe freeze binding is:\n\n```text\nfreeze_receipt.sha256 =\n  002c8c64e79d757b38c13251475ec2b6a5ff70c0fc01222cf29066a060fbd521\n```\n\nThese statuses are not contradictory: one proves sealed bytes; the external checkpoint proves readiness for review.\n\n### Candidate-tree commitment\n\nUse rows over `[root, *root.rglob(\"*\")]`, sorted by full path. Each row is:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"path\": \".\" or candidate-relative POSIX path,\n  \"type\": \"directory\" or \"regular_file\",\n  \"mode\": four-digit octal string,\n  \"bytes\": null for directories, otherwise file size,\n  \"sha256\": null for directories, otherwise file SHA-256\n}\n```\n\nHash the canonical row list. Reject symlinks, non-file/non-directory entries, wrong modes and hard-linked files.\n\nExpected observation:\n\n```text\nentry_count = 51\ndirectory_count = 8\nregular_file_count = 43\nmode_violation_count = 0\ntree_sha256 =\n  d5213d1b71d6e4d1e14f1b6f18c57d72551e295a3c0e0735bd4198dfb3dc75b4\n```\n\n### Source-evidence transfer\n\nThe predecessor must remain explicitly predecessor-scoped:\n\n```text\nsource_candidate_digest =\n  653cc2f0b47873e95f985ea3eb32b8f2c044d6de64cd9e8fe37ebcec67c7a723\n\nexact_source_delta_sha256 =\n  4f53cda18c2baa0c0354bb5f9a3ecbe5ed12ab4d8e11ba873c2f11161202b945\n\nproduct_source_delta_count = 0\nproduct_wheel_byte_identical = true\nhistorical_execution_retargeted_to_successor = false\n```\n\nDo not rewrite the predecessor receipts to claim execution on `2e`. Their results transfer only as source-bound evidence through proven byte identity. Current-candidate authority comes from the new checkpoint, current verifier and tree binding.\n\nThe control object must bind at least:\n\n```text\ntrainer_free_v4_successor_binding_sha256 =\n  2e46a3bae7c6f6194449b841685b568412b1cbe74cf742cba3f534f3dd093d47\n\nauthoritative_inventory_v2_sha256 =\n  3ce7f5b93ac9265cd82bb18a04cbc4363efa7d08e16a2810835980aa0d69b4d8\n\ninventory_v2_supersession_sha256 =\n  fa6a0d1de70a8496c6e0dbb9c008cc13bbbdefe7a9bd684317da686ebbe59024\n\nruntime_closure_v2_sha256 =\n  f8b732bd42c0142931d06f37f5f2c64315bcbb3686ec7fe50473e69ee5eab4b0\n\nsealer_input_index_sha256 =\n  2ca3b8db32bcc8124f053ca0d778bd64c86916d019956dd0657985619aed202c\n\nsealer_input_index_digest =\n  470f2bb25c95babd3d786355de5bf9b718fdef50b14bd2bdb21e06baf0930471\n\nindexed_leaf_count = 763\nindexed_leaf_mismatch_count = 0\ncheckpoint_field_count = 23\nacceptance_gate_count = 14\n```\n\nGate IDs must retain the v2 order from `TFV1-CLOSURE-001` through `TFV1-CANDIDATE-001`.\n\n## 2. Append-only inventory-state observation\n\nDo not create a modified copy of v2. Preserve it as the normative policy and append a state-supersession record with this logical order:\n\n1. `schema`\n2. `status`\n3. `recorded_at_utc`\n4. `authority`\n5. `state_parent`\n6. `supersedes`\n7. `current_candidate`\n8. `postseal_checkpoint`\n9. `contract_invariance`\n10. `acceptance_gate_observation`\n11. `effective_state`\n12. `anti_equivocation`\n13. `non_actions`\n14. `privacy`\n\nRequired semantics:\n\n```text\nauthority =\n  INVENTORY_STATE_SUPERSESSION_ONLY_NOT_TASK26_PASS\n\nsupersedes:\n  v2 current_verdict = FAIL\n  v2 checkpoint_observed = false\n  prior 2e trainer-free final verdict = FAIL\n\neffective_state:\n  candidate_digest = 2e...da925\n  checkpoint_observed = true\n  current_verdict = READY_FOR_TASK26_SECURITY_READONLY_REAUDIT\n  task26_pass = false\n```\n\nIt must bind the raw SHA-256 of the new checkpoint and preserve these policy digests exactly:\n\n```text\nrequired_fields_sha256 =\n  9068f017d63340389c1909cd0dfcbc51d53bf11d9bcbe0aac70ebce42d7ff9b0\n\nrequired_values_sha256 =\n  daefea96e08ff2575e00a3fbce4cdc567d8ac5af3ca7656e484f190392db677b\n\ncheckpoint_contract_sha256 =\n  a91f3401c0052542303d393f983062b8ab01eb5a6ae5370348f918020a9b9f59\n\nacceptance_gates_sha256 =\n  f6b83edbcb3c1f2d4ac338a737f2c271c9098c3866eb3521cb88f810985ec98a\n\nglobal_trainer_free_scan_sha256 =\n  f397d35d5a5b47f66e423078cea55eae76621afd1221072df28908ccebe8c03a\n\nrequired_reaudit_execution_sha256 =\n  d45437e933124c2c92efc000b73a95d09ebd6b5b6d4bb7aeddc1e85b3f3052a\n```\n\nThus the observation supersedes only v2's historical state flags. It cannot remove, rename, relax or reinterpret any of the 14 gates.\n\n# Authority rules\n\n1. `2e...da925` is the only current candidate digest.\n2. `653...a723` may appear only as inherited source-evidence provenance.\n3. The in-tree checkpoint establishes sealed bytes, not readiness.\n4. The external checkpoint establishes readiness, not Task26 PASS.\n5. The inventory observation advances state, not policy.\n6. Only a later independent trainer-free reviewer may issue that lane's PASS.\n7. Only the overall release review may grant Task26 or release authority.\n8. Timestamps never select authority. Hash-chain membership and exact candidate match do.\n9. Any competing valid child of the same inventory-state parent is an equivocation and decisive FAIL; do not choose “latest”.\n10. Any candidate-tree drift, missing 763 input, altered gate digest, nonzero absence count or predecessor receipt retargeting is decisive FAIL.\n\n# Hidden weaknesses\n\n- **“Full digest” is misleading.** It commits the manifest domain, not the complete candidate tree or checkpoint. The external checkpoint must therefore bind the tree, seal checkpoint and freeze explicitly.\n- **POSIX read-only is not immutable or append-only.** The owner can chmod, replace or delete evidence. Hashes prove integrity of available bytes, not authorship or non-deletion. The minimum mitigation is unique paths, parent-hash chaining, stable descriptor-bound reads and fail-closed fork detection. A detached signature or transparency log is required only if the threat model includes a malicious evidence owner.\n- **The 763-input index commits hashes but not availability.** Many source leaves and Gate18-20 receipts remain outside the candidate. They must all be present and reauthenticated at checkpoint time. A future format should package them content-addressably.\n- **Absolute-path/TOCTOU risk exists.** Verification should use directory descriptors, `O_NOFOLLOW`, stable pre/post `fstat`, single-link files and stable root device/inode.\n- **Byte parity transfers code-bound evidence, not historical live execution.** This contract must not convert Task22-25 historical Telegram actions into execution against `2e`.\n\n# Final PASS/FAIL rationale\n\n- **Current evidence state:** **FAIL**, correctly. The post-seal checkpoint and state observation do not yet exist.\n- **Contract satisfiability:** **PASS** under option A.\n- **Candidate decision:** `2e...da925` remains current and unchanged.\n- **Literal endless-successor remediation:** **FAIL / structurally unsatisfiable**.\n- **Substantive reviewer remediation:** Can be fulfilled with two append-only evidence records, read-only hash/verifier authentication, and one later final review receipt.\n- **Required operational actions:** zero product edits, zero test edits or reruns, zero profile/runtime/service actions, zero archive changes, zero network/Telegram/provider actions and zero Git actions. Evidence-only writes are required.\n- **Scope:** Success permits the trainer-free lane to re-audit `2e`; it does not by itself make overall Task26 or the release PASS.","run_stats":{"runtime_ms":427013,"turns":13,"tool_calls":40,"output_tokens":21956,"total_tokens":1909056,"generation_ms":419955,"tokens_per_second":52,"cost_usd":2.65226,"cache_hit_rate_last":0.9777009813694867,"cache_hit_rate_run":0.8763499549573419}}