{"task_id":"st_01a0484f","status":"completed","residency_state":"resident","parent_session_id":"01a00387-aaf8-7f2f-89e3-e24c1af24859","root_session_id":"01a00387-aaf8-7f2f-89e3-e24c1af24859","depth":1,"execution_mode":"in-process","model":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-terra","notify_on_terminal":true,"created_at":"2026-08-28T12:16:29.626Z","updated_at":"2026-08-30T13:06:36.043Z","notification":{"run_epoch":0,"notified_epoch":0},"name":"v13-security-audit","task_summary":"Audit V13 one-use authority and rollback security","description":"Authority security audit","category":"unspecified-high","requested_model":{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-terra","display":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-terra","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"},"fallback_models":[{"provider":"clinepass","model_id":"cline-pass/glm-5.2","display":"clinepass/cline-pass/glm-5.2","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"medium"},{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-sol","display":"openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"}],"resolved_model":{"provider":"openai-codex","model_id":"gpt-5.6-terra","display":"GPT-5.6 Terra","source":"category","variant":"xhigh","reasoning_effort":"xhigh"},"spawn_spec":{"version":1,"cwd":"/home/cube/projects/richard/traning coach","prompt":"Review type: SECURITY AND AUTHORITY. Adversarially audit frozen V13 package `25ca8f7708eb5c30d43984af8f73ebeafe191b7faeee37de1e7aead2bf7baae4`. Read source, V13 preseal, V12 consumed ledger/ROLLED_BACK/postcommit receipt, global supersession ledger, and clone rehearsal. Focus on detached closure trust, package/target/derivation hashes, one-use global ledger across roots, stale V12 phrase denial, TOCTOU registry identity, sidecar ownership/mode/symlink/hardlink checks, receipt owner/consent/customer/time binding, crash recovery, partial authority creation rollback, and ability to bypass network/provider/Telegram fences. Run only read-only/tamper-on-copy checks; never mutate live profile/service or execute approval. Return attack table, evidence, residual risk, blockers, and `<verdict>PASS|FAIL</verdict>`.\n\n<Category_Context>\nYou are working on tasks that don't fit specific categories but require substantial effort.\n</Category_Context>"},"host_pid":1174611,"final_response":"I read this as a root-cause and release-blocker audit - preserve disabled drafts only through a new sealed package, not a V13 mutation.\n\n**Verdict: V13 remains FAIL / do not approve.**\n\nConfirmed live registry: 2 customers, 1 enabled, registry SHA-256 `bd61...60b29` and secure `0600` mode.\n\nThe immediate failure is real:\n\n- `build_weekly_authority_postimage()` creates `customer_keys` from enabled customers, then rejects whenever that count differs from all registry customers.\n- Removing only that check is insufficient. Startup independently requires the full registry key set to equal `enabled_customer_keys` in `nutrition_weekly_reminder_bootstrap_customers.py`, and `WeeklyReminderAuthorityOwner.verify_registry()` repeats the full-set equality.\n\n### Security-safe root fix (new V14 candidate)\n\nDefine the authority scope as **exactly the current enabled registry customers**:\n\n1. Builder: retain the existing `enabled` selection, capacity, consent, registry-identity, and receipt generation. Remove the all-customers equality rejection.\n2. Bootstrap: replace the full-registry equality with an exact ordered comparison between:\n   - `receipt.enabled_customer_keys`, and\n   - the current registry's enabled customer keys.\n3. Owner factory and refresh fence: require the constructed sidecar customers to equal that same enabled set. A disabled customer must have:\n   - no canonical authority registration,\n   - no reminder ledger/store capability,\n   - no entry in the receipt,\n   - no possible `tick_snapshot()` / `bound_customer()` path.\n4. Preserve full registry identity binding for startup. A changed registry before startup fails closed; disabled drafts are retained but never authorized.\n\nThis safely preserves the disabled draft without silently widening scope. A disabled-to-enabled change after startup must invalidate the authority owner because the enabled set changes.\n\nAdd regressions for one enabled plus one disabled customer: successful startup, receipt/sidecars only for the enabled customer, disabled-customer denial, and failure when the draft is enabled or the active customer is disabled.\n\n### Additional blockers\n\n1. **V13 controller cannot import its authority dependencies in its declared sandbox.**  \n   A read-only exact `bwrap --clearenv` import of `scripts.nutricoach_v150_weekly_authority` fails with `ModuleNotFoundError: checkin_cli`. The test injects `dualcoach/profile` into `sys.path`, but the live bootstrap does not. An approval would reserve/consume authority and roll back during migration.\n\n2. **Capacity-five is not presently supportable for distinct consents.**  \n   The receipt has one `consent_digest`; the builder requires every enabled customer to have that same digest. Real multi-customer consent records will normally differ. Either scope V14 explicitly to one enabled customer or evolve the receipt to bind `{customer_key: consent_digest}`.\n\n3. **Service/network/startup fencing is not adequate.**  \n   `--unshare-net` protects only the controller. `systemctl --user start` launches the gateway in the host network namespace; the live unit has no `PrivateNetwork`, `IPAddressDeny`, or equivalent restriction. The post-fence checks only in-process event lists and service liveness, not actual host egress.\n\n   Worse, `service_state()` replaces systemd's observed `ExecStart` with the unit-file text before validation. A running stale or overridden process can therefore satisfy the successor-runtime text check.\n\n   V14 needs an offline, successor-runtime startup gate before the main service is allowed to communicate: load the complete authority, verify the enabled-only sidecars and receipt, then verify the actual systemd-reported command/PID rather than rewritten unit text. Monitor the service cgroup for egress during the fence and rollback on any event.\n\n4. **Authority artifact trust remains weak.**  \n   Preseal files are `0664`, source and dependency roots are `0775`, and the bootstrap runs before it verifies its own closure. Package manifests are self-excluding; inventory verification accepted a same-content external symlink on a copy. The ledger class also accepts symlinked roots and is only global per supplied root. A new package needs an immutable or separately trusted launcher, signed/root-owned manifest, no-follow descriptor traversal, and ledger-root identity checks.\n\n5. **Supersession governance is inconsistent.**  \n   The V13 preseal ledger names V13 active, while the runtime global supersession file still names V12 active; the live controller does not enforce that global document.\n\nThe static V13 verifier passes, but it does not cover these runtime and trust-boundary failures. No live or source files were changed.","run_stats":{"runtime_ms":745768,"turns":22,"tool_calls":135,"output_tokens":31814,"input_tokens":426112,"cache_read_tokens":2506752,"total_tokens":2964678,"generation_ms":642593,"tokens_per_second":50,"cost_usd":1.7353424,"cache_hit_rate_last":0.8670644062928233,"cache_hit_rate_run":0.8547112992624274,"token_status":"complete","cost_status":"reported","duration_status":"monotonic"},"task_seq":8,"config_generation":0,"background_mode":"background"}